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Abstract
Why are some people rich and others poor? Why are some states more prosperous 
than others? In answering these questions, the public and scholars alike often take the 
rarely challenged position that economic inequalities result from past or present
discrimination or other forms of injustice. Evidently, few believe that all economic 
inequality is produced by injustice: slackers are despised for their unwillingness to 
help themselves; countries with failing economic policies do not go uncriticised. 
Nevertheless, the belief that economic disparities arise because of calculated injustice 
is deeply ingrained. Underlying this conviction is the assumption that “given equal 
opportunity, all people would perform equally well”. In fact, this assertion ignores 
instances of economic success achieved despite vigorous negative discrimination. 
There are many examples of poor, migrant minorities, who, despite transplantation 
into alien, discriminating environments, succeeded in out-performing the indigenous 
population and so incurred envy, resentment, and worse. What remains inescapably 
evident is that people differ in their ability to utilise opportunities presented by a free 
market system. Defensively, under-performing groups therefore invest energy in 
securing state interference to change market outcomes in their favour, and demonise 
the free market system as inherently unjust. In fact, it can be shown that the only 
economic arrangement compatible with the equality of all individuals and groups 
before the law is the free market. Globalisation facilitates the spread of this free 
market system. It should, therefore, be welcomed as the path to greater economic 
prosperity and greater equality before the law for everyone.
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Introduction
The finest opportunity ever given to the world was thrown away because the passion for
equality made vain the hope for freedom.1
- Lord Acton
“I don’t have the knowledge to blame a government,.. I don’t know about politics, but
for our problems I blame [the] world community. All humans should be equal, but we
are not. You ask me who is to blame... You can see for yourself. You wear nice clothes
and are healthy. But look at us. We have no clothes to wear and we are not healthy.” 
These are the words of Bakhtiar Khan, a brick-maker in Peshawar, Afghanistan. To 
Khan, like so many other people throughout the world, material equality among peoples 
is a given. It is the natural condition of mankind and any departure from it is, by 
implication, a result of some sort of unfair practice. Where did Khan get his ideas?
Maybe he reflected on the world as he saw it and maybe he was taught at a school
similar to the one recently reported on in the press. There a teacher held up a wealth 
chart of the world. “America”, she said, “controls this huge slice of the pie, leaving a 
tiny sliver for us Afghans”.2 According to this view, America is wealthy, because 
Afghanistan is poor. Also, according to this view, wealth is not created, but merely 
transferred from one nation to another. It matters little what form of government the 
people live under. Similarly, it does not matter what their culture and their abilities are. 
The more vicious and powerful nation always wins. And, because it is vicious and
2unfair, it is just to punish it. If this logic is true, then on September 11th 2001, the United
States of America (USA) suffered a just punishment.
There is nothing new about the way in which disproportionately wealthy people are
perceived, whether they live in generally prosperous states like the USA or form a 
minority within a state like Russian Kulaks. Because of the widespread egalitarian 
assumptions, their prosperity is seen as unjustly acquired. Groups that outperform others, 
often in the face of outright discrimination, are normally assigned a set of negative social 
characteristics, such as selfishness, greediness, individualism, disloyalty and so on. More 
often then not, they are also accused of taking advantage of an inhumane, uncaring, and 
selfish economic system. The Jews and the Chinese working within the capitalist milieu 
are, of course, prime examples of such superior economic performers. That is not to say 
that all states and groups indeed gained their prosperity in a just way. But the link that 
most people make between disproportionate wealth and injustice should never be 
allowed to become automatic, for the feeling of injustice gives rise to hatred and 
inevitable consequences, such as social strife, follow. It is for this reason that 
explanations of global economic inequalities are immensely influential. Today, with 
trade liberalisation around the world growing, a proper understanding of why it is that 
some people are richer than others is more important than ever.
The goal of this thesis is to address the question of equality in the context of 
globalisation. As will be seen, the persistence and, in some cases, growth, of 
international and intra-national economic disparities has emerged as one of the most 
important objections to globalisation - especially globalisation understood as 
liberalisation of trade around the world. Books and articles are being written about the
3supposed impact of globalisation on the rise of inequality in the world, which is, almost 
without exception, seen as a negative phenomenon. Only very few scholars, it seems, 
wonder why economic equality should be expected in the first place and whether this 
expectation is either realistic or practicable. As Dunn wrote in his study of revolutions, 
their main is “a simple one: do human social conditions have to be as unequal and as 
unjust as everywhere they now are?”3 Why equality should be more just than inequality 
or why change is likely to be better than no change he left unanswered? Clearly, equality 
of condition, as opposed to “mere” equality before the law, is a notion that has become 
an obsession to many members of the academe and a number of influential politicians. 
What they ignore is the alternative view, which holds that more important than relative 
inequality is the absolute increase in the standard of living, an outcome which free trade 
has an impressive record of delivering.
Outline of the Argument
It was reasonable to expect that the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) would signal an 
end not only to the idea of planned economy, but also to the infatuation that many people 
had with all variations of Socialism. At least that was the expectation of those who, like 
F. A. Hayek, understood that despotism found behind the Berlin Wall was typical to all 
societies which were based on grand communal designs and which necessitated 
suppression of individual needs and goals. Yet, even as the Wall was coming down, 
some thinkers started claiming that Socialism in the USSR was not real Socialism after 
all. Rather, they claimed, it was a perversion of a noble idea. “Rampant” Capitalism,
4which replaced it, they asserted, remains too dangerous and immoral. It is true that 
people, who subscribe to the unreconstructed Communist ideal, are very few, but 
scepticism concerning the free market permeates the world. One of the schools of
thought that has emerged after the collapse of Communism and that shares this basic
scepticism is “Cosmopolitanism” and its political actualisation, “The Third Way”.
Cosmopolitanism is an example of a way in which the post-1989 left tries to 
combine the self-evident practicality of the free-market capitalism with “social” or 
“distributive justice” which, it claims, capitalism compromises. In the political arena, 
therefore, the Third Way aims to steer a course between the efficiency and “injustices” 
of capitalism, by borrowing certain Socialist techniques, such as regulation of the 
economy and high degree of financial redistribution. Of particular interest in this thesis, 
are the justifications presented for economic intrusion. As will be shown, the reasons 
offered by Cosmopolitans are based on the same kind of egalitarian logic as those that 
have been used to discriminate against over-performing groups in the past.
As one Cosmopolitan thinker, David Held, argues, people who wish to enjoy true 
or substantive equality must first come to terms with what he calls “nautonomic 
inequality”. This inequality, he staaes, rests in “tine aity'nmerrtcai produccion and 
distribution of life-chances wHcci limit and the possibilities of political
participation”. Crucially, he assumes that these inegalitarian nautonomic structures must 
arise out of the ability of one group to exclude or discriminate against another group. 
This he calls “social closure”. He goes on to argue that nautonomic structures can only 
be ascertained by outcomes of the socio-economic process. This argument, it seems 
clear, assumes that whenever a definable group exceeds the average level of
5performance, it makes the presence of social closure ipso facto clear. To rectify these 
nautonomic inequalities, a just society must equalise everything from divergent patterns 
of physical and emotional well-being, physical and mental diseases correlated with race,
class, gender and geography to public access to education, social security and so on.
According to Held, nautonomic inequalities do not arise spontaneously. They are 
caused by discrimination and one more crucial factor - capitalism. “One of the results of 
the capitalist form of ownership and control”. Held writes, “has been the creation of the 
plethora of forms of inequality”. Held asserts that capitalism in effect originates, 
supports, and perpetuates discrimination hy being inherently unfair. To redress the 
inegalitarian tendencies of capitalism, he then explores avenues through which access to 
productive property can be “broadened”. He begins by distinguishing between the wish 
“to secure possession of the shirt on.. .[one’s] back... from the right to acquire shares in 
IBM and therewith the standard rights of ownership that shareholdings legally convey”. 
Instead, he recommends types of “co-operative ownership” such as “market socialism”
and “associationahsm”.
As this thesis will argue, the Cosmopolitan justifications for the governmental 
intrusion in the economy, be it national or international, is deeply flawed, for there are 
examples of superior group-performance that can under no circumstances be attributed 
to the systemic inequality about which Held talks. Both the Chinese minority in Malaysia 
and the Jewish minority in the USA were transplanted from very poor environments into 
totally alien ones. Though they were discriminated against, they succeeded in 
significantly outperforming the dominant groups among which they lived. They became 
affluent and influential. Thus, as with individuals, groups too perform differently despite
6constraints, succeeding as they often do, in different areas of social and economic life.
Based on these examples, it must be concluded that there is no automatic causal link
between under-performance and political and economic exclusion.
To summarise, the reasons that the Cosmopolitans offer for interference with
international and domestic economies are based on an erroneous assumption that all 
economic inequalities emerge out of political discrimination. But, this is often not true. 
As this thesis will show, economic inequalities can also emerge when there has been no 
discernable discrimination in favour of a particular group. In fact, there are examples of 
groups, which perform disproportionately well despite discrimination. Why some groups 
succeed, while others fail in a non-discriminating environment is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. But, if the above argument is correct, then it must be concluded that the 
Cosmopolitans fail to present convincing reasons for interference with the process of 
globalisation. To put it differently, the mere existence of economic inequality has 
nothing to do with the question of justice. Some people maybe poor because they were 
wronged, but this connection is by no means to be automatically assumed. Similarly, the 
fact of economic inequality suggests nothing regarding the desirability of rectifying this 
situation or, for that matter, of the ways in which this situation should be rectified. 
Economic inequality, therefore, presents no grounds for being sceptical about trade 
liberalisation integral to globalisation.
Before moving on, a general comment. One of the foundations of this thesis is 
the belief in environment-neutral variations in performance among groups. Recognition 
of unequal potential to succeed, whether as a group or an individual, says nothing about 
the moral worth of that group or individual. As Thomas Jefferson said, “Whatever may
7be their degree of talent it is no measure of their rights. Because Isaac Newton was 
superior to others in understanding, he is not therefore lord of the person or property of 
others”.5 Indeed, it is a fundamental tenet of liberalism that all people, irrespective of 
their characteristics and provided they behave within the constraints of law, must be
treated in a morally equitable way. Similarly, an individual’s belonging to an under­
performing group does not logically convey anything about that particular individual. As 
Flew writes, “...the fact that I belong to some set which is on average less this or more 
that than another set, to which you belong, carries no implication that I, as an individual, 
am less this or more that than you. However much we may sympathise with... [him who 
belongs to an under-performing group], his argument...[that he will automatically be 
labelled in a prejudiced way, is], as an argument, paradigmatica^ fallacious”^ Facts 
cannot be prejudiced, only attitudes can.
The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis will begin with a discussion of the profound changes in the interaction
between the individual and the state that have occurred as a result of the First World War
(WWI). As is well known, the state’s intervention in the economy - though always a 
phenomenon - grew out of all proportion as a result of the need of nations to conduct this 
first “total” war. Similarly, personal freedoms, such as free movement across borders and 
the choice in joining the military, were curtailed. Following the War, the world turned to 
protectionism, which contributed toward yet another, even more destructive war. 
Moreover, the accumulation of absolute power by the state in the USSR and Nazi
8Germany, for example, precipitated tyranny and destruction of human life on a scale 
previously unknown. The second part of this chapter, therefore, turns to a theoretical 
discussion of the proper role of the state. It seems that the basic dichotomy is between 
the state as an instrument for the prevention of human coercion and the state that aims to 
enable people fully to realise their potential. Thus, while the former promotes only 
freedom from constraint, the latter aims to alter the arbitrariness of nature.
The second chapter will continue with a discussion of globalisation and the 
changing impact it has on the scope of the state. Some of its more obvious 
manifestations are the freer movement of capital and the consequent more limited fiscal 
and monetary powers of individual governments. These developments, of course, affect 
the ability of states to behave in a truly independent fashion. Whilst before it had been 
possible for the governments to engage in extensive programmes of social engineering, 
the market now makes the cash for such programmes scarcer. But, as the second part of 
the chapter shows, it would be wrong to think that the recent relaxation of trade 
restrictions amounts to anything even approximating free trade. In fact, the current trade 
regime can only be called “interventionist” and falls far short of the laissez-faire of the 
19th century. The key difference is the identity of the actors determining the pace and 
direction of trade negotiations as well as the actual participants in exchange. Unlike the 
19th century, when much depended on the provisions that individual businessmen and 
businesses made for themselves, internal as well as external trade today is still 
dominated by the state.
As will be argued in the third chapter, despite the constraints still placed upon the 
markets, many find the idea of freer markets unpalatable. Much of this opposition is
9based on misunderstanding of how economies work. Underlying all these 
misconceptions is the unifying belief that the betterment of people’s fortunes can come 
only through governmental intervention. This “statist” view applies to both right and left 
of the political spectrum. Moreover, both still see trade as a zero-sum game with clear 
winners and losers. As a result, the opponents of the free markets find it to their 
advantage to keep the group of the alleged “victims” of capitalism expanding. Every 
instance of unequal outcome is seen as a proof of unfair discrimination. In order to tackle
this inexhaustible supply of victims, governments are asked to regulate socio-economic 
life further. Opposition to the free markets is not new and the second part of this chapter
provides some examples of what Hayek called “eternal” and “universal” hatred of 
capitalism. Of course, it is one thing to criticise the markets and quite another to live 
without the benefits they bring. Thus, as the last section shows, the people who are most 
opposed to the freedom of the markets are very often the same people who derive 
greatest advantages from it.
The fourth chapter will begin by describing the views of David Held and 
Anthony Giddens. Their arguments have already been introduced and therefore this 
chapter immediately turns toward refuting them. The tactic adopted is to point out some 
of the dilemmas associated with empirical measurement of inequality. Social mobility, 
for example, points against Cosmopolitan pessimism. One study, for example, shows 
tremendous social mobility in the USA, where four-fifths of the people who were in the 
bottom 20% of the income earners in 1979 were no longer there in 1988. Similarly,
definition of what it means to be “poor” is constantly changing - reflecting the progress 
that capitalist societies make. Precisely because it is relative, “poverty” in the West can
10
be used repeatedly in the battle against capitalism. On the international scene, matters are
just as complex. As the World Bank’s Gini Coefficient shows, there is, in fact, growing 
international economic equality. The prime cause of this equalisation is, thanks to 
capitalism, the huge economic improvement of the standards of living in Communist
China.
The fifth chapter will then turn to the already mentioned examples. The Chinese 
minority in Malaysia and the Jewish community in USA hoth have suffered 
discrimination and yet manage to prosper and outperform the dominant groups in the 
midst of which they live. Social closure, therefore, cannot be assumed to be the 
automatic reason for disproportionate wealth of any particular group. Even more 
damaging to the Cosmopolitan case is the way in which the Nazis used disproportionate 
the wealth of the Jews in order to justify their extermination. As Farron’s study shows, 
the Nazis used the fact of Jewish ovettrpresentation in the ultra-capitalist financial and 
commercial sectors of the economy as evidence to support their claim that the Jews got
rich by unjust means. As will be shown, there can be no doubt that the Nazis saw 
Germans as a nation “victimised” at the hands of the Jews. The egalitarian dogma of 
equal performance among groups and anti-capitalism reached its apogee in the USSR,
where an entire social class was exterminated on the basis of the mistaken view that
economics was a zero-sum game and that one group’s advantage could only happen as a 
result of another group’s disadvantage.
As will be shown in the sixth chapter. Cosmopolitan assumptions, despite being 
flawed, underpin many of the social policies found in the West today. As such, Western 
societies continue to discriminate against excellence, ability, confidence, and hard work.
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The purpose of this chapter is to show some of the many ways in which this is done. The 
underlying moral argument, which ties all this empirical evidence together, is Hayek’s 
observation that the more the society tries to achieve equality of outcome among people 
with different abilities, the more unfree and more inegalitarian it has to become in their
treatment. This compromises the egalitarian treatment of people before the law, a 
principle that is at the very heart of liberal social order. Moreover, besides the rule of 
law, the economy suffers as well, for is has to bear the burden of inexperience, 
inefficiency and sheer lack of ability. Economic consequences of egalitarianism will,
therefore, also be considered.
As will be argued in the seventh chapter, not all egalitarianism is imposed from 
ahove. As Public Choice Theory shows, in a world where the government assumes 
control over an ever-growing proportion of resources, human proclivity to live at 
someone else’s expense expands as well. This type of parasitic behaviour can be 
observed among individuals and companies alike. In terms of economic growth, 
however, corporate parasitism is a bigger problem. The chapter will, therefore, consider 
it at some length. As it will further discuss, the only effective way to stop all forms of 
parasitic behaviour is to minimise the role of the government in the economy. The first 
and crucial step on this road must be the reinstatement of a strong conception of private 
property. This is so, because private property is an insuperable obstacle to egalitarian 
designs. Without destruction of private property, it is impossible to engage in 
“redistribution” or any other form of social engineering. In that sense, therefore, private
property not only thwarts the designs of the social engineers, but also maximises liberty.
12
The eighth chapter will offer an alternative view of globalisation and free trade. Far from 
being an enemy, it is argued, free trade benefits those who embrace it. Historically, the 
free market has been defended from two separate positions, one moral and the other 
consequentialist. But, as will be shown, an effective defence of the free market must 
combine both morality and practicality. Israel Kirzner’s thesis does just that. As Kirzner 
shows, capitalism as a process of discovery enables the observer to see more than the 
benefits that entrepreneurship brings. Importantly, it provides moral defence of the 
rewards that the entrepreneur receives. The conclusion then returns to the question posed 
in Chapter One: What is the state for? As will be shown, the role of the state should not 
transcend prevention of man-made coercion, for only a minimal state can ensure 
maximum freedom that will in turn lead to what Hayek called “competition as an 
evolutionary and open-ended ‘discovery procedure’ of experimentation and trial-and- 
error” necessary for a smoother functioning of society.1
13
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Chapter One
Liberalism... is the supreme form of generosity; it is the right which the majority 
concedes to minorities and hence it is the noblest cry that has ever resounded on this 
planet. It announces the determination to share existence with the enemy; more than 
that, with an enemy which is weak. It was incredible that the human species should 
have arrived at so noble an attitude, so paradoxical, so refined, so anti-natural. 
Hence it is not to be wondered at that this same humanity should soon appear 
anxious to get rid of it. It is a discipline too difficult and complex to take firm root on 
earth.1
- Jose Ortega y Gasset
According to the “realist” school of thought, International Relations is a discipline 
concerning relations between the main actors in the international arena - the nation­
states. According to some of the main protagonists of this theory, what is of vital 
importance are not the internal characteristics of the state, but the anarchic structure 
of international relations and the lack of an overreaching supranational authority. 
This “state-centric” approach to international relations has been a dominant force in 
the theory of the discipline for much of the past century. But, with two world wars, in 
which tens of millions of lives were lost, and the Cold War, which brought the world 
close to utter destruction, the 20th century was one of the bloodiest on record. Indeed, 
only natural disasters in the previous eras approximate to the scale of destruction that 
humanity inflicted upon itself in this last century. Even more startling than the 
suffering resulting from these “inter-national” conflicts is the extent of suffering and 
destruction resulting from “intra-state” conflict. The Chinese, Soviet and German
15
treatment of their own citizenry resulted in deaths of tens of millions - deaths not at 
the hands of foreign invaders, but at the hands of their respective governments.
At the start of the 21® century, however, the realist paradigm is heing 
challenged. The challenge comes from globalisation - a phenomenon that could have 
a profound impact on the development of international relations in the century to 
come. After all, what if the opening of the states to market forces can change the way 
in which states behave towards each other and the way they behave towards their 
own citizens? If so, what is the proper role of the state vis-a-vis the life of a citizen? 
There are, as will become apparent, diverging schools of thought concerning the way 
that globalisation should either be embraced or rejected. Certainly, as far as the 
realists are concerned, globalisation poses some serious problems to the 
independence of the state. Historically, increased economic interaction has often 
resulted in making countries more prosperous. But, it has also made them more 
dependent on other countries with regard to vital imports. How, the argument goes, 
can a country claim to be independent, if it relies on food imports from overseas?
But, there are different views of globalisation. One of them is the 
“libertarian” view, which embraces greater economic interdependence as a way in 
which countries can achieve most of their legitimate goals, such as economic 
prosperity of their people, without recourse to war. The libertarian or laissez-faire 
approach goes further though. It sees globalisation as a way of ensuring that the state 
is weaker vis-a-vis its own citizens. As will be seen below, this is an important 
consideration when looking at the 20th century as a whole. The arguments concerning 
differing visions of economic interdependence will be discussed below. Bearing the 
above discussion in mind, however, the thesis will start with the international system 
as it had been known throughout what Conquest called “a ravaged century”.2
16
fhThe first part of this chapter will sketch how the state-centred system of the 20'
century evolved. As will be shown, the WWI and the decades that preceded it played 
a significant role in the growth of the functions and powers of the state. But, the 
more powerful and absolute the state had become, the more was it able to misuse this
power to inflict pain both domestically and internationally. What, then, should the 
proper scope of the state be? The second part of this chapter will look at those who 
helieve that the powers of the state should be limited; that the state should not try to 
do more than is absolutely necessary for the preservation of social order; that it 
should do no more than protect, in Locke’s words “life, liberty and property”. This, 
they feel, is the clearest way to make sure that the tragedies of the last century remain 
unrepeated. An alternative response, which is currently very influential and presents 
a partial return to the statism of the past, suggests that the best way to respond to 
globalisation is with increasing regulation and monitoring; that the only way that 
globalisation can be managed without producing massively destabilising social 
consequences is through increase of the power of the state. The debate between these 
two visions will be the hinge on which this thesis will turn in the chapters to come.
I. Rise and Fall of Laissez-Faire Liberalism
Barriers [in trade] result in isolation; isolation gives rise to hatred; hatred, to war;
war, to invasion...3
Frederick Bastiat
17
On the 28* of June 1914, Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Anstria-Este and heir to the 
throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was shot dead in Sarajevo. Within months, 
Europe was at war, ending a century of general peace in Europe. The lack of pan­
European conflict that characterised the hundred years between the Congress of 
Vienna and the events in Sarajevo is a matter of historical record. This peace has 
been usually attributed to the military Balance of Power. This explanation, however, 
misses a vital point. Be it the very source of stability or merely a contributor to it, the 
role of the high level of interconnectedness of the European states during this period, 
facilitated by free trade and scientific progress, must not be underestimated. After all, 
the 19* century was a period of decisive departure from the mercantilist tradition, 
which dominated inter-state relations from the beginning of the 16* century to the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars. According to this tradition, exports were a source of 
wealth and imports were a source of impoverishment. By implication, it was 
assumed that trade benefits one state at the expense of another. This theory of trade 
was rejected by a Scottish philosopher, Adam Smith, who influenced political figures 
at the time into believing that rather than causing impoverishment and conflict, trade 
could well be seen as a source of enrichment and tranquillity among states. Not only 
was it mistaken to expect the government to be able to know how to organise the 
affairs between individuals better than they knew themselves, the philosophers of 
this period argued. Mercantilism was also misguided because it was incompatible 
with the right of individuals to freely interact in mutually profitable way.?
In fact, following the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, European powers 
progressively abolished many of their protectionist laws and free trade grew. This 
new understanding of economics came to be known as laissez-faire. Among its most 
influential proponents in Great Britain were the Whigs. In the House of Commons,
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the Whigs were the main opposition to the conservative aristocrats, known as the 
Tories. To emphasise their reformist programme and their opposition to the Tories, 
the Whigs started calling themselves “Liberals”. It was these laissez-faire liberals, 
who initiated a process of change that culminated with the repeal of the unpopular 
Com Laws in June 1846. Before their repeal, the Com Laws kept the prices of food 
artificially high. This served the interests of the landed aristocrats, but harmed the 
poor. Accordingly, there was a saying amongst the British poor, “I be protected and I 
be starving”.5 Other proponents of laissez-faire included Richard Cobden, who 
spearheaded the protest against market restrictions through his Anti-Corn Law 
League. According to Cobden, the importance of free trade went beyond making the 
foodstuffs cheaper; it was a way towards peace. By de-politicising human 
relationships, Cobden believed, many causes of war would be eliminated. He wrote,
[Commerce] ...like a beneficent medical discovery, will serve to 
inoculate with the healthy and saving taste for civilization all the 
nations of the world... [Our merchandise] bears the seeds of 
intelligence and fruitful thought to the members of some less 
enlightened community... [Visiting merchant] returns to his own 
country the missionary of freedom, peace, and good government -
whilst our steamboats... and our miraculous railroads... are the
advertisements and vouchers for the value of our enlightened 
institutions.6
In trade, unlike in politics, it did not matter what the differences between peoples 
were. The stock exchange was a place where a Jew, an Arab, and a Christian could
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do business together regardless of the divisive world outside. Their tolerance of one 
another’s differences was driven by an enlightened self-interest. The fact that the 
trading centres of the world were for a long time also the places of greatest tolerance 
was not lost to contemporary observers. Renaissance Florence, for example, was one 
of the world’s largest trading centres. Trade and traders were readily seen as the 
reason for Florentine strength and prosperity. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
contemporaries observed that a “Florentine who is not a merchant... enjoys no 
esteem whatsoever”.7 But, Florence was also a very tolerant place. Despite being 
labelled a mortal sin, punishable by death, homosexuality was so widespread that for 
many years the German euphemism for a homosexual was “Florentzer”? As in the 
case of Florence, Spinoza saw Amsterdam as the “most flourishing state, and most 
splendid city, [where] men of every nation and religion live together in the greatest 
harmony, and ask no questions before trusting their goods to a fellow-citizen.. .”.9
In fact, the Netherlands led the way out of the medieval gloom and 
deprivation into which the world had fallen following the collapse of the Roman 
Empire. The economy of the latter was characterised by voluminous trade across 
both land and sea.10 A system of law and order that the Romans introduced and 
network of roads, which much improved communications, aided the growth of trade 
to a significant degree. Empire’s collapse was, predictably, accompanied by the 
collapse of trade and European economy in medieval times was characterised by 
autarkic agricultural production that was not conducive to economic growth. 11 Most 
peasants lived at subsistence level, with a bad crop often causing mass starvation. 
Small towns that did manage to develop were dominated by guilds, which prevented 
competition from arising. Sometimes, guilds organised military expeditions in the 
countryside in order to search for and physically destroy competing manufacturers.n
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The Netherlands broke away from the medieval economic model. Possessing little 
land and limited natural resources, the Dutch turned to trade. They imported raw 
materials such as tin and copper and turned them into exportable products sought 
after throughout Europe. Subsequently, Bartlett writes, the Netherlands became 
Europe’s centre of commerce. With commerce came shipping, which gave the 
Netherlands control of grain trade in the Baltic area. The growth of commerce 
necessitated developments in finance and insurance. “Scarcity in any part of 
Europe”, Bartlett continues, “was quickly and accurately reflected in higher prices on 
the Amsterdam bourse and higher freight charges, factors that added to the city’s 
prosperity”. 13 But, the Dutch position as the dominant trading power was not to last. 
As Wilson explains, by the end of the 17th century taxes and protectionist tariffs grew 
to such extent that trade and commerce began to leave the Netherlands for other 
destinatinns.'h The Netherlands’ leading position in world trade was taken over by 
England and this remained so until the WWI.
Protectionism returned in the decades immediately preceding the WWI. 
Germany, like Britain, followed a low tariff policy until 1879. In that year, ostensibly 
in the pursuit of increased revenues, Bismarck instituted protective tariffs. Though 
some of the negative effects of protectionism were offset through bilateral 
agreements between Germany and her neighbours, the 1902 regulations meant a 
return to autarky. 15 In Britain, Joseph Chamberlain laid the groundwork for the return 
of protectionism with his idea of a protected trading area consisting of the territories 
belonging to the British Empire. This policy of “Imperial Preference” became an 
issue during the 1906 election, prompting Winston Churchill to ask, “What is the use 
of pretending that this greatest of all exporting nations has got to lie down 
pusillanimously behind a network of tariffs, cowering in our own markets, living by
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taking in each other's washing, feeding like a dog on its own tail?”16 It is perhaps 
worth mentioning that Chamberlain’s Tories suffered a heavy defeat.
The tide of time, however, proved unstoppable. The evolutionary character of 
laissez-faire liberalism seemed unsuitable in an age of revolution. Britain, 
Dangerfield wrote, was “a nation which wanted to revive sluggish blood by running 
very fast and in any direction”. 17 But, Germany was on a mission to achieve 
greatness as well and the resulting conflict came to have a profound impact on the 
course of human history. Faced with the enormity of human suffering that the war 
has exacted, it is easy to overlook the profound impact it had on the nature of the 
relations between states: on international relations. This is what Morgenstren wrote 
about the world of the 1911 century,
Before 1914 there was freedom of travel without passports, freedom 
of migration, and freedom from exchange control and other monetary 
restrictions. Citizenship was freely granted to immigrants. Short term 
or long-term capital could move unsupervised in any direction, and 
these movements took any form. Direct foreign investments were 
common and welcome; securities of other countries were freely traded 
on most stock markets. Transfer of profits was unhampered and 
foreign investments were not confiscated after they have begun to 
show yield. Monetary standards in most countries were firmly 
established in gold... Gold coins of all countries found their way 
easily in all directions... It is also noteworthy that international 
financial and commercial transactions before 1914 were among
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individuals (and corporations) and rarely among countries dealing as a
whole... National boundaries were thus of small importance... 18
This description sounds thoroughly modem, but it is not biased. Distinguished 
scholars of strikingly different philosophies, Keynes, Stolper, Schumpeter and A. J. 
P. Taylor among them, agree that 19* century was one of remarkable openness and 
interaction between states. 19 The reason for dwelling on this point is the contrast 
between the openness of the world in the 19* century and nationalist separatism of 
the 20* century. This contrast is readily discernible on both, international and 
domestic levels. Writing in the 1930’s, Stolper observed with respect to the former, 
“The free movement of capital has ceased. So has the free movement of emigration. 
Men and money both lie shackled under the might of the state... The choking of free 
movement in manpower and manpower is being intensified by the choking of free 
movement of commodities”. The changes in the international area were mirrored on a
domestic level.
Just as the war for the first time in history established the principle of 
universal military service, so for the first time in history it brought 
national economic life in all its branches and activities to the support 
and service of state politics - made it effectively subordinate to the 
state... Not supply and demand, but the dictatorial fiat of the state 
determined economic relationships - production, consumption, wages, 
cost of living... [At] the same time, and for the first time, the state 
made itself responsible for the physical welfare of its citizens; it 
guaranteed food and clothing not only to the army in the field but to
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the civilian population as well... Here is a fact pregnant with 
meaning; the state became for a time the absolute ruler of our 
economic life, and while subordinating the entire economic 
organisation to its military purposes, also made itself responsible for 
the welfare of the humblest of citizens.. .20
The end of the WWI did not bring a return to the pre-war disposition. Quite the 
opposite has, in fact, happened as the Great Depression only reinforced the statist 
tendencies among world’s most powerful nations. This shift away from the free 
markets was exacerbated by the rise of two totalitarian ideologies: fascism and 
communism. As Mussolini observed, fascism stood against all the underlying 
principles of laissez-faire liberalism. “Against individualism”, he wrote, “the Fascist 
conception is for the State... [It] reaffirms the State as the true reality for the 
individual”. “The only liberty that can be a real thing”, he continued, “[is] the liberty 
of the State”. Therefore, Mussolini concluded, “everything is in the State, and 
nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside the State. In this sense
Fascism is totalitarian... Outside of the State there can be neither individuals nor 
groups”...
As Ebeling writes, Keynesian economics played a vital role in the 
entrenchment of state’s role in people’s lives. Keynes proposed that the government 
could, by means of monetary and fiscal policy, adjust the levels of productivity and 
employment. If his theories were to work, however, governments had to have the 
power to restrict the flow of capital, raise taxes and tariffs, control imports and 
exports and manipulate exchange rates. All of these required a radical limitation of 
individual freedom. In fact, Keynes himself recognised that his theories were “much
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more easily adopted to the conditions of a totalitarian state, than... under conditions 
of free competition and a large degree of laissez faire”.66 Keynes then correctly 
observed that his theories had a greater chance to succeed under the Nazis than in the 
West.n As was mentioned before, with the growth of governmental interference in 
the economy came the tremendous expansion of the welfare state. The welfare state 
originated in Germany, where Bismarck instituted it in order to appease the strong 
German socialist movement. With time it grew to include “direct income transfers 
between various groups in the society; state provision of retirement plans and health­
care insurance and services; .. .minimum wage laws, regulatory practices, licensing 
procedures, workplace health and safety standards subsidies and direct government 
expenditures for various goods and services.. .”.24
All of these redistributive practices required massive tax revenues that 
obliterated any meaningful conception of private property rights and, concomitantly, 
individual autonomy and freedom. The individual became dependent on the state’s 
good will. This good will could be lost if the individual were so unwise as to voice 
disagreement or criticise the government. The welfare state also distorted the 
economy by siphoning capital away from its most productive uses, producing 
economic distortions of which the stagflation of the 1970’s was the farcical 
culmination. As a result, nations that adopted statist economic policies bankrupted 
their populace or, in the less extreme cases, simply mortgaged their future. Today it 
is clear that people with greater economic freedom are also more prosperous. It is 
these, economically free peoples, who score highly even on the UN’s Human 
Development Index. According to this index, even among developing nations, more 
freedom means less poverty. Another well-known index, composed by the Cato and 
Fraser institutes, shows similar trends. It has Hong Kong in first place, followed by
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Singapore, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Ireland, 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Canada comes in the 13* place, 
Germany in the 15*, Japan in the 20th, Italy in the 24* and in the France 34*. It will 
come as no surprise that China, with its significantly greater interference in the 
economy, comes only in the 81si place, while India comes in 92"7 and in Brazil the 
96* place. Russia, with its chaotic and corrupt transition from Communism, has 
come in the 117* place out of the 123 economies considered. Countries like 
Myanmar, Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra 
Leone register at the very bottom of the scale.25
It would be inappropriate to end here, however. The 20* was not just a 
century of economic mismanagement, whatever its repercussions on the lives of the 
people across the world. Lest it be forgotten, the 20* century was also the bloodiest 
century in history. States have always waged war against each other, often for 
dubious reasons. But, by far the most appalling abuses in the 20* century were 
perpetrated by states, not against other states, but against their own populations. Here 
it is quite striking how different the 20* century was from the 19*. A comparison of 
abuses perpetrated by the Tsarist and Soviet regimes, for example, clearly illustrate 
this point. Unlike in Western Europe, where the rule of law took hold and was now 
respected, Russia lagged behind. As a consequence, its contemporaries regarded 
Tsarist Russia as the ultimate among tyrannies. Yet, in nearly a century between 
1825 and 1917, less then 4000 people were executed throughout the entire Russian 
Empire for political reasons. The Communists exceeded that number in the first four 
months in power?6 In fact, the killings in the USSR reached a point where it was no 
longer possible to even try to hide them. Thus, when Lady Astor asked Stalin, “How
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long will you keep killing people?” Stalin replied, “The process will continue as long
27as... necessary .
This is not to suggest that large-scale abuses of human rights did not happen 
before the 20 century, but the brutality of that century’s greatest offenders is 
unprecedented. It is not coincidental that the intensification of brutality exercised by 
the governments against their own people went hand-in-hand with the state’s 
acquisition of unprecedented power, much of which originated in the state’s take­
over of the economy. Nor is it coincidental that the states that appropriated for 
themselves absolute control over the economy - like Nazi Germany and Communist 
USSR - were also absolutely evil and murderous. The relationship between the 
oppressive power of the state and economic centralisation will be discussed at length 
in the chapters to follow.
The cost in human lives of the growth of the power of the state is not easy to 
calculate. But, some scholars have spent their entire lives to do just that. Rummel’s 
sombre estimate is that in the 20* century approximately 203 million people have 
died because of war and democideht However, aggression of the government against 
its own citizens accounts for over 169 million people killed. To put it differently, out 
of the above 203 million people killed, 83% victims were killed by their own 
governments. Of these, some regimes were much more murderous than others. The 
USSR tops the table with almost 62 million killed between 1917 and 1987.
Communist China comes second with over 32 million of its citizens killed between
1949 and 1987. Nazi Germany comes third with almost 21 million killed and 
Nationalist China comes in the fourth place with over 10 million killed. Next in line 
is Japan, followed again by China (areas controlled by Maoist forces between 1923
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and 1949), Cambodia, Turkey, Vietnam, Poland, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia. The list,
of course, continues.
The above statistic does, however, reflect only total numbers of people killed. 
When it comes to total number of people killed over the time that the regime was in 
power, the picture changes somewhat. Here Communist Cambodia tops the table 
with an 8.16% annual killing rate. There the Khmer Rouge killed at least 2 million 
people in less than four years! Cambodia is followed by Turkey under Ataturk with 
2.64%, fascist Croatia with 2.51%, Communist Poland between 19-45-1948 with
1.99%, “Young Turks” Turkey with 0.96%, Czechoslovakia between 1945-1948
with 0.54%, Mexico 1900-1920 with 0.45% and the USSR between 1917-1987 with 
0.42%.30 To recapitulate, the growth of the state during the 20* century is correlated 
with a huge increase in the aggression of the state against its own populace. 
Moreover, the frequency of the denial of liberty and, often, the right to life itself is 
correlated with the degree of totalitarianism. The greater the concentration of power 
in the hands of the government, the greater the chance of its misuse. As Rummel 
stated, “Power kills; absolute power kills absolutely”..1
II. Two Types of Liberalism
A state, then, has one of two ends in view; it designs either to promote happiness, or 
simply to prevent evil..32
- Wilhelm von Humboldt
What, then, should the role of the state be? Bearing the abuses of the 20* century in
mind, where should liberty end and government begin? “Liberty”, as J. S. Mill once
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famously described it, “consists of doing what one desires”.^ But, such definition of 
liberty is meaningless, for it is clear that in a social setting no man can do what he 
wants without being constrained by natural obstacles and by the similar desires of 
other men. Liberty, at least in its classical form, is thus better understood as non­
interference by other men. As Berlin put it, “The fundamental sense of freedom is 
freedom from chains, from imprisonment, from enslavement by others. The rest is 
extension of this sense, or else metaphor”?4 This classical or negative definition of 
liberty is quite different from the revisionist or positive one, which claims that men 
are not truly free if they are prevented, even if only by their circumstance, from fully 
realising their potential, hi this view, therefore, the true essence of freedom must 
embody not just freedom from constraint but also an entitlement to certain things in 
life, be they material or not. Though Wilhelm von Humboldt was first to articulate 
this distinction between positive and negative liberties, Berlin’s thesis is better 
known. Like Humboldt, Berlin came to see negative liberty as preferabte?7 With 
regard to the former he wrote,
I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no human being 
interferes with my activity,.. If I am prevented by other persons from 
doing what I want I am to that degree unfree; and if the area within 
which I can do what I want is contracted by other men beyond a 
certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, 
enslaved. Coercion is not, however, a term that covers every form of 
inability. If I say that I am unable to jump more than 10 feet in the air, 
or cannot read because I am blind... it would be eccentric to say that I 
am to that degree enslaved or coerced. Coercion implies the
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deliberative interference of other human beings within the area in 
which I wish to act??
Clearly, in this view, freedom is merely political in nature. Anything beyond it, such 
as “economic freedom” and “economic slavery”, is not covered by the term. Though 
it is self-evident that if A is too poor to afford a loaf of bread or anything else that is 
not legally banned, A is not free to have it, this inability cannot be described as a lack 
of freedom in the negative sense. Of course, if A believes to have been prevented 
from receiving what is his due, A can truly be described as being deprived of his 
liberty. The validity of this statement, however, depends on A’s understanding of the 
functioning of a particular social and economic system. In such cases, it is up to A to 
prove that the harm done can, in fact, be ascribed to an external human agency. As 
Rousseau put it, “The nature of things does not madden us, only ill will does”?? 
Positive liberty, on the other hand,
...derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own 
master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on 
external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be instrument of my own, 
not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object...
I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer - deciding, not being 
decided for...I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as thinking, 
willing, active being, bearing responsibility for his choices... I feel 
free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the 
degree that I am made to realise that it is noth?
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Clearly, in this instance freedom is comprehended in a fundamentally different 
manner. Here freedom means freedom not just freedom from, the oppression by other
men, but also freedom from nature. This freedom from nature can mean as little as 
the tackling of a particular kind of natural obstacle, like A’s inability to pay for his 
healthcare, or as much as a perfect realisation of A’s “true” potential. The presence 
of the self, as A knows it, and “true” self, perhaps understood as an attainment of an 
ideal state of A’s being, assumes that A might not necessarily be aware of the latter’s 
existence. This, in turn, assumes that there might exist an “impartial” authority that 
“knows better”?. Of course, such departure from purely negative understanding of 
freedom has both economic and social implications. In the economic sphere, A’s 
attainment of A’s true potential can raise costs that have to be met by others. In the 
political sphere, this differentiation between “perfect” and “imperfect” conceptions 
of the self raises a prospect of the social insistence on a particular, subjective, 
definition of what is “best” for an individual - a concept that is distinctly illiberal in 
both definition and practice.
This, then, is the Berlinean distinction between the negative and positive 
types of liberty. The negative kind consists of A not being prevented from attainment 
of his goals by human agency, while the positive kind assumes an attainment of a 
self-mastery unconstrained by nature. Of course, Berlin has been criticised for the 
shortcomings of his distinction between the two kinds of liberty. Murray Rothbard 
and Jeffrey Friedman, to give just a couple of examples, point out some of the 
problems with Berlin’s definitions.40 In fact, Berlin himself was prone to change his 
mind with regard to both negative and positive liberty and to fluctuate between 
espousing the virtues of the free market at one point and criticising it for inhumanity 
at another. But, Berlin seems to provide a good, if not excellent, starting point for
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this discussion, not least because so many other scholars have used his terminology 
in the past. Raymond Aron, for example, saw liberty in terms similar to Berlin’s. He
wrote,
[Among] the freedoms proclaimed by the Atlantic Charter there are 
two that would have been ignored by traditional liberals - freedom 
from want and freedom from fear - because want and fear, hunger and 
war, were inherent to human existence throughout the centuries. That 
poverty and violence have been as of now eliminated no one believes: 
that one day they might be why not hope? That the ambition to 
eliminate them is new and shows an arrogance that... Tocqueville 
would not have shared or approved is beyond doubt. For this ambition 
emerges from equating the tyranny of things with the tyranny of 
men... only men can deprive other men of the right to select a 
government and worship a god. But what men are responsible for and 
what men can conquer want and fea??*1
Of course, these different understandings of liberty were mirrored in the 
development of a political system called liberalism. As Gray wrote, despite the 
variations within it, liberal tradition shares four commonalities. Firstly, liberalism is 
individualistic in its emphasis of the moral primacy of the individual over the 
collective. Secondly, it is egalitarian in its conferment of equal moral status on all 
individuals. Thirdly, it is universalist in its affirmation of moral unity of all people, 
according only secondary importance to the peculiarities of their cultural
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development. Fourthly, it is meliorist in its belief in the improvability of social and 
political arrangements*?
Gray sees the roots of the modem conception of liberty in antiquity. Liberty
for the Greeks, however, was less individualistic than its modem offshoots. The
concept of freedom applied primarily to the community, in the govemance of which 
the individuals were allowed to participate.4? Though this “democratic” form of 
governance was in itself remarkable, individuals were by no means immune from the 
interference of the community. Although it would be wrong to speak of the ancients 
as tmly liberal, it was during this time in human history that the Sophists articulated 
their belief in the universal equality of men, and the legitimisation of law and state 
through social contract. They also believed that the only legitimate outcome of law 
was, “the security of the individual and [that] the functions of the state... [were] all 
negative functions having to do with the prevention of [man made] injustice”.""
It is interesting to observe that two and a half thousand years later the proper 
scope of government is once again being debated. This very thesis wishes to defend 
the notion of negative functions of the government against those who would have it 
otherwise. Like negative liberty, positive liberty too has its precursors. In antiquity, 
Plato led the original backlash against the tolerance and openness of proto-liberal 
Athens. His critique contrasted Athenian imperfections with an ideal society. Not 
surprisingly, this ideal society did possess some features of the illiberal, regulated 
and militaristic Sparta. That said, the ancient roots of liberal tradition would be 
incomplete without the highly individualistic Roman legal tradition. Based on the 
equality of its citizens, Roman law specifically outlawed discrimination of citizens 
based on their social rank. Likewise, the Roman statutes pertaining to private 
property had a profound impact on the Western property laws. In addition,
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Christianity, which is sometimes seen as an impediment to liberal society, might 
similarly have contributed to the growth of nascent liberalism by emphasising the 
equality of all souls and the individual’s struggle for salvaiion^
In modem European intellectual history, Thomas Hobbes enjoys a reputation 
for advocating authoritarianism. But, his understanding of the “State of Nature” and 
man’s inalienable right to self-preservation are individualist and egalitarian in the 
liberal sense. Despite these individualist pretensions, Gray cautions, Hobbes was not 
a liberal, because of his rejection of meliorism and the possibility of human progress. 
Locke, therefore, is often presented as the first person to articulate a coherent liberal 
philosophy.46 According to Locke, divine or natural law protects the right to liberty 
and private ownership of property. As he wrote, “Man... hath by nature a power... to 
preserve his property - that is, his life, liberty, and estate - against the injuries and 
attempts of other men”. Moreover, because all men are “by nature all frt^e, equal, 
and independent”, none can be deprived of his liberty “and subjected to the political 
power of another, without his own consent”."8 Of course, in Locke’s view liberty and 
private property are inseparable. Therefore, the proper scope of government’s 
responsibility must be their protection. He wrote, “The great and chief end, therefore, 
of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is 
the preservation of their property”.4* In practice, Locke’s influence can still be seen 
in the USA. The Constitution of Alabama, for example, claims “The sole object and 
only legitimate end of government is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, 
liberty, and property, and when the government assumes other functions, it is 
usurpation and oppression”.5* Scepticism regarding the power of government has 
been a part of the American culture since the War of Independence. Not surprisingly,
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therefore, the American Declaration of Independence, like Locke, based citizens’ 
rights in God and not in the arbitrary decisions of the government.
By the end of the 18* century, the two strands of liberalism could not longer 
coexist in a Motionless way. As long as the two opposed royal absolutism, their 
differences remained submerged. The events surrounding the French Revolution 
changed all that. The question was no longer how to achieve liberty, but what to do 
with it. As Bethell writes, before the French Revolution, most people accepted the 
human condition as permanently flawed and imperfect. The people were, he argues, 
resigned to live in “present imperfect”. With the closing of the 18* century, however, 
this “present imperfect” was replaced with “future perfect”. “The imperfection of 
human nature”, Bethell writes, “was [now] thought to be only temporary. A greater 
human perfection was to be expected in the future. This lay at the heart of the idea of 
progress - a new idea in the world, and a dangerous one”.5* In France, Diderot and 
Condorcet emphasised human reason and almost blind belief in human progress. In 
Britain, William Godwin mirrored their belief in the perfectibility of mankind. 
Ignoring the basic tendencies associated with man’s humanity, the above 
philosophers believed that society could be fashioned into a predetermined image by 
appealing to human reason. There was nothing reason could not solve. As Godwin 
wrote in a manner typical of the time, “It is impossible that a man would perpetrate a 
crime, in the moment when he sees it in all its enormity”.52 Obviously, since then 
Europe has learned otherwise. As Berlin pointed out, this blind faith in progress was 
soon transformed into expectation of progress. This expectation in turn acquired an 
aura of inevitability that was to prove immensely damaging in its Communist and 
Fascist fomss. Clearly, the fault of the above approach lay in the super-imposition 
on human conduct of subjectively defined concepts such as the “forces of history”
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and “progress”. The result of this super-imposition was a profoundly anti-liberal 
treatment of individuals, which, far from being treated as autonomous, became tools 
in the hands of the self-appointed overseers of “progress”.
The central cause of the deeply anti-liberal outcomes of the above 
philosophies rests in their denial of the existence of certain immutable human 
characteristics and impulses that may be called “human nature”. This ultra­
reasonableness brought with it a belief that mankind could be moulded into a 
particular shape guaranteeing a particular outcome."* Helvetius, for example, 
explained that imperfect human nature could be “reformed” through governmental 
reguationn.55 G. V. Plekhanov, the founder of Russian Marxism, was so impressed by 
Helvetius that in 1895 he wrote an essay on the latter’s work. In that same year he 
befriended a young Russian revolutionary, V. I. Lenin.®® Like Helvetius, Godwin too 
spoke of a process of “improvement of mankind”, through which men could be 
“made”.®? Yet, it would be wrong to think that Godwin’s attraction to social 
engineering was inspired out of his love for his fellow men. He had a very low 
opinion of them, famously asserting that the British lower classes had “the 
contemptible insensitivity of an oyster”.5? It is perhaps for this reason that he thought 
a through remake of mankind was in order.
In fact, the belief in human malleability and disdain for humanity seem to go 
hand in hand. George Bernard Shaw, for example, saw the working classes as 
“detestable” people, who “have no right to live”.5* Shaw got to see social engineering 
in practice and after his return from the USSR he wrote, “Putty is exactly like human 
nature. You can twist it and pat it and model it into any shape you like; and when you 
have shaped it, it will set so hard that you would suppose that it could never take any 
other shape on earth”. This was in 1931 - a year before Stalin decided to remodel
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and reshape the demography of the Ukraine by withdrawing food from its 
population. Following is an eyewitness account of what was to happen.
In the spring of 1933 one third of the people in the village were 
starving. The others had a little food and ate once a day to keep from 
swelling. ...In March 1933 all the people from the collective farm 
went to the authorities, asking for bread. They were not even allowed 
to enter the courtyard. On March 28, 1933, we were shocked by the 
news that Myron Yemets and his wife, Maria, had become cannibals.
Having cut off their children’s heads, they salted them away for meat. 
...Chairman Boyko arrested them himself, and about six hours the 
GPU began to question them. “Who has so cunningly persuaded you
to do this...? You know that this is the work of our enemies to cast
dishonour upon our country, the Soviet Union, the most advanced 
country in the world. ...Myron and Maria were sentenced to ten years 
in prison. However, they were shot about three months later because 
even the Soviet government was ashamed to let them live.**
Yet, as Shaw saw it, Soviet government “has shaped the Russian putty very 
carefully... and it has set hard and produced quite a different sort of animal 
[emphasis added]”.®* In retrospect, it is clear that the Soviet government did not 
produce a “different sort of animal”, although it clearly forced some of its people to 
descend to animal savagery. Rousseau was yet another misanthrope led astray by the 
idea of man’s perfectibility. As he famously said to James Boswell, “Mankind 
disgusts me”.55 This disgust clearly applied to humanity in its present form.
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Therefore, like Godwin and Shaw, Rousseau set his sights on a creation of a perfect 
commonwealth. Not surprisingly, his design required individuals to surrender all 
their rights “without retaining a remnant of them” to the will of the demos or volonte 
generale. Rousseau hoped for his system to work through an equal sacrifice of 
liberty by all the members of the commonwealth.®3 He wrote.
Whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to it by 
the whole body: this in fact only forces him to be free. .. .Those who 
dare to undertake the institution of the people must feel themselves 
capable, as it were, of changing human nature, of transforming each 
individual... into a part of a much greater whole; ...of altering the 
constitution of man for the purpose of strengthening it.®*
Rousseau’s vision, like Plato’s, was plagued by his failure to appreciate the differing 
and often conflicting goals among the people. Ultimately, Rousseau’s desire to create 
a paradise on earth meant that individual freedoms, which he himself believed to be 
inalienable, perished in the bonfire of liberties called the French Revolution - an 
upheaval that Rousseau contributed to creating through his writings.
The decades following the French Revolution saw the return of liberty in its 
negative sense. Constant tried to re-create the lost balance between individual 
autonomy on the one hand and social intervention on the other along these classical 
lines. Thus, in direct contrast with Rousseau, Constant explained his understanding 
of freedom in purely negative terms. As he saw it, each citizen had the right to proper 
treatment under law, which excluded arbitrary arrest, detainment, execution, and 
maltreatment. He had the right to express his opinion and to choose his employment.
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He had the right to private property - to its enjoyment as well as its abuse. He could 
move without hindrance or explanation and could associate with anyone for whatever 
reason. He had religious liberty and the right to influence the government, either 
through the ballot box or through p^ttltLioi®.®5
Unlike Constant, whose concern was primarily directed at the terror of 
revolution, Tocqueville feared the majoritarianism he encountered it in the USA.® 
He wrote, “The greatest dangers for the American republics proceed from the 
omnipotence of the majority”. As he then elaborated, the power of majority in the 
USA knows no impediments so “.. .as to make it heed the complaints of those whom 
it crushes upon its path. This state of things is harmful in itself and dangerous for the 
future”. According to Tocqueville, people did not have the right to do “anything”. 
The very notion of unrestrained democracy was “impious” and “detestable” to him. 
Clearly, Tocqueville felt that majoritarianism could be used in ways incompatible 
with individualism and freedom. He, therefore, argued that the righteousness of an 
act was not simply determined by a decision of a majority, but also by a clear 
conception of justice, which the majorttariao decision should reflect. He wrote, “A 
general law, which bears the name ofjustice, has been made and sanctioned, not only 
by a majority of this or that people, but by a majority of mankind. The rights of every 
people are therefore confined within the limits of what is just”. With such a universal 
notion of justice in mind, Tocqueville felt, it is possible to refuse to obey a majority 
decision. This ability to rely on a concept of justice higher than a decision of 
majority is especially important, because people may behave in self-interest that is 
often incompatible with justice.
The rights of minorities, Tocqueville insisted, had to be protected. “A 
majority taken collectively is only an individual, whose ...interests are opposed to
39
those of another individual, who is styled a minority. [A] .. .man possessing absolute 
power may misuse that power by wronging his adversaries, why should not a 
majority be liable to the same reproach”, he asked. With a gift of clairvoyance, 
Tocqueville goes on to narrate what was become a central theme of the American 
constitutional debate, the innumerable clashes between the American right and left, 
and a source of an age long philosophical debate about the proper scope of individual 
liberty and governmental interference therein.
In my opinion, the main evil of the present democratic institutions of 
the United States does not arise, as is often asserted in Europe, from 
their weakness, but from their irresistible strength. I am not so much 
alarmed at the excessive liberty, which reigns in that country as at the 
inadequate securities which one finds there against tyranny. An 
individual or a party is wronged in the United States, to whom can he 
apply for redress? If to public opinion, public opinion constitutes the 
majority; if to the legislature, it represents the majority and implicitly 
obeys it; if to the executive power, it is appointed by the majority and 
serves as a passive tool in its hands. The public force consists of the 
majority under arms; the jury is the majority invested with the right of 
hearing judicial cases; and in certain states even the judges are elected 
by the majority. However iniquitous or absurd the measure of which 
you complain, you must submit to it as well as you can. .. I do not say 
that there is a frequent use of tyranny in America at the present day; 
but I maintain that there is no sure barrier against it, and that the
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causes which mitigate the government there are to be found in the 
circumstances and the manners of the country more than in its law's.
In the British Isles, the Scots responded to the nascent radicalism of Diderot and
Condorcet. Unlike the French radicals, for whom liberalism came to rest in the blind 
reliance on reason, the Scots defense of liberty rested in the fact of man’s imperfect 
knowledge. As David Hume, one of the Scots’ most pre-eminent philosophers, 
wrote, “[I suspect] that the world is still too young to fix many general truths in 
politics which will remain true to the latest posterity. •• [Our] art of reasoning is still 
imperfect in this science, as in all others, but we even want sufficient materials upon 
which we can reason”.69 Unlike other, more supercilious scholars, Hume reasoned 
that the imperfection of human knowledge militated against social programmes, the 
results of which one could not be sure. He wrote, “It is not fully known, what degree 
of refinement, either in virtue or vice, human nature is susceptible of; nor what may 
be expected of mankind from any great revolution in their education, customs or 
principles”.70
As can be seen, instead of relying on transformation of men into something 
they were not, Hume thought of ways to restrain men’s shortcomings and even to 
channel these shortcomings in beneficial directions. He thus determined that stability 
of possessions, transfer of property by consent, and keeping of promises were the 
only areas of governmental enforcement. This was necessary because of man’s 
limited goodness, intellectual limitations, and scarcity of resources.71 In keeping with 
the aforementioned intellectual scepticism, Hume’s philosophy was not based on 
assumptions other than those readily observable in human conduct throughout the 
ages. He wrote, “[It] is more easy to account for the rise and progress of commerce
41
in any kingdom, than for that of learning... Avarice, or the desire of gain, is an 
universal passion, which operates at all times, in all places, and upon all persons”.72 
In contrast, he saw the “love of knowledge” limited in influence, for it required 
“youth, leisure, education, genius and example”/® In politics, Hume fancied himself 
a sceptic of over-generalisation. In economics, however, he permitted himself to 
make more general observations. His reason was that whilst in economics one could 
usually rely on human search for gain to make human action patterned and 
predictable, in politics one had to rely on other, less predictable variables. This 
distinction will be further explored below.
Millar and Ferguson influenced the Scottish intellectual scene as well. Their 
particular contribution consisted of establishing a link between private property and 
limited government. As the two thinkers opined, only societies with private property, 
no matter how unequally distributed, could sustain liberty and justice. Having been 
influenced by the experiences of the English Civil War, both saw the question of 
inviolability of private property as central to the conflict. In other words, the 
institution of private property became a guarantee against the tyranny of the state. As 
Millar wrote, “The farther a nation advances in opulence and refinement... [the 
more] it has occasion to employ a greater number of merchants, of tradesmen and 
artificers; and the lower people, in general, become thereby more independent in 
their circumstances, they begin to exert those sentiments of liberty which are natural 
to the mind of man, and which necessity alone is able to subdue”/4
The contributions of the above scholars aside, the best known of the thinkers 
of the Scottish Enlightenment is Adam Smith. Smith was the first to determine that 
society developed in stages, the culmination of which was the free market system. He 
also determined that economic changes and political changes were interrelated and
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that the free market system “found its natural counterpart in a constitutional 
order.. .[that guaranteed] civil and political liberties”.75 He wrote,
All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus 
completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural 
liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he 
does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his 
own interest his own way, and to bring both industry and capital into 
competition with those of any other man... The sovereign is 
completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform 
which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for 
the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge 
could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of 
private people, and of directing it towards the employments most 
suitable to the interests of the society.76
Thirdly, Smith recognised the individual and his actions as central to “every social 
explanation”.77 In practice, Smith’s view was similar to that of Lady Thatcher, who 
stated, “There’s no such thing as Society. There are individual men and women, and 
there are families”.78 What he meant and, arguably, what she meant, was that the 
“social” element of human existence was really a result of independent actions of 
innumerable individuals selfishly attending to their respective ends. As Smith wrote, 
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves 
not to their humanity but to their self love”.79
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Smith’s individualism was linked with his conception of “natural liberty”, where 
every man was entitled to the greatest liberty compatible with the similar liberty of 
other men?. Noticeably, Smith’s “natural liberty” meant freedom only from hate and 
oppression. It denied equality except for equality before God and under the law. As 
Hayek observed, it is probable that this type of equality is the only equality possible 
in a system that both relies on the rule of law and at the same time attempts to 
preserve the basic tenets of liberalism.81 And yet, this is precisely the direction the 
philosophy of liberty has moved in following the period of Scottish enlightenment. 
The liberal pendulum swung once more in the direction of excessive rationalism that 
was to provide the intellectual roots for Nazi and Communist tyrannies. Not for the 
first time, it was the good intentions of the intellectuals like Bentham and J. S. Mill 
that set the course of “revisionary liberalism” and replaced the “classical liberalism” 
of Constant, Tocqueville, and Smith??
Although, as Gray shows, Bentham’s philosophy retained many of the ideas 
of the classical liberals, including the necessity for free trade, his utilitarianism 
profoundly radicalised the role government played in the lives of private individuals. 
The Scots understood utility in terms of “spontaneous emergence of social 
institutions” and used it to assess social systems in their entirety. Bentham, on the 
other hand, used it to evaluate “specific measures of policy”. Bentham’s 
abandonment of general maxims as practical guides for the decision-making of the 
lawmakers and his insistence that social institutions could be subjected to “rational 
redesign”, amounted what Hayek called the “constructivist fallacy”.??
Though the interventionist implications of Bentham’s departure from 
classical liberalism are obvious, it was J. S. Mill who completed the above 
transformation from the laissez faire approach of governance to that of statism of
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Godwin and French philosophers of the eighteenth century. To be sure, parts of 
Mill’s work restated the classical liberal beliefs. “The only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community”, he wrote, “is 
to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant”.84 And again, “If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one 
person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing 
that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing 
mankind”. Here Mill’s understanding of liberty is clearly negative. Then, a change
occurs.
Mill makes a distinction between production and distribution in 
economic life, such that distributive arrangements are held to be 
altogether a matter of social choice, which suppresses the classical 
liberal insight into the character of economic life as comprising a 
whole system of relations among which productive and distributive 
activities are inextricably mixed. It is this erroneous distinction, rather 
than Mill’s exception to the rule of laissez faire or his occasional 
flirtations with socialist schemes, which marks his principal departure
from classical liberalism and which constitutes his real connection
with liberal and Fabian thinkers. In making this distinction, Mill 
...created a system of thought which legitimated the interventionist 
and statist tendencies which grew ever stronger throughout the latter 
half of the nineteenth century in England. Significant as an influence 
in leading Mill’s own thought in an illiberal direction was French 
Positivism and, especially, the work of August Comte..., whose
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historicist and elitist conceptions exercised a strong hold over Mill...
In this respect... Mill may be said to have imparted into English 
thought the illiberalism of the French ideologues.86
Within forty years of Mill’s death, there ended a century of progress and 
achievement. Mill’s departure from classical liberalism brought to an end its 
theoretical development, while the WWI brought to an end its practical application. 
Today people live in a world that was bom out of the two World Wars. Totalitarian 
ideologies of the past, combined with the emergence of the powerful Leviathans 
necessary to fight total wars of the twentieth century have created a society, which 
impacts the lives of individuals on a scale unprecedented only a hundred years ago. 
As Ebeling writes, people today are unable to move freely because of the 
government- issued passports. The government also decides which countries its 
citizens can enter. Likewise, the people’s ability to make purchases overseas is 
limited through taxation. Many products are forbidden from being imported 
altogether. Domestically, the state limits the variety of products available to 
consumers through safety and fairness regulations and the number of products 
imported from overseas is limited by import quotas. People are asked to send their 
children to state-approved schools and mandated to accept state pension schemes. 
Before they can pursue a career, people must be certified and licensed by the state. 
When hiring, they have to observe racial and gender quotas and pay them the 
government-mandated minimum wage. In addition, their freedom of speech is 
constrained through government-enforced political correctness.87
It is true that the intellectual renaissance of classical liberalism did occur
under the stewardship of Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, Henry Hazlitt,
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Milton Friedman, Israel Kirzner, James Buchanan, Robert Nozick, Murray Rothbard 
and many others. It is also true that the collapse of Communism and the contributions 
that Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan made to the minimisation of the 
state interference in the economy have begun to swing the pendulum. However, it 
would be mistaken to assert that the relationship between the individual and the state 
is anywhere near the classical liberal ideal or even the actuality of less than hundred
oo
years ago. Clearly, the business of redefining the relationship between the state on
one hand and individual freedom on the other hand remains unfinished. Some of the
people who share this view have even assumed a new name - libertarians.
Libertarianism is a broad church, but its basic tenets are as follows. When it comes to 
the economy, the state should focus on the protection of private property, 
enforcement of contracts and prevention of fraud. The state should also intervene 
when life and liberty of individuals are threatened. But, when it comes to private 
morality, the state should stay out of individual lives altogether.89
But, it is important to mention that the libertarians are not the only people 
trying to change the nature of the interrelation between the individual and the state. If 
anything, a counterattack is already under way to stop libertarian ideas from coming 
to dominate social poiicy.90 The most recent and perhaps the most influential strand 
of this counterattack both in domestic politics and, increasingly in international 
relations, is what is usually called the ‘Third Way'. The Third Way's potency rests in 
its ability to convey a message of moderation. It proclaims to have found a way to 
combine the efficiency and the economic growth of the free market with “social 
virtues” that the market is said to be lacking. It claims to utilise the best about both, 
capitalist and socialist systems. It is being promoted as a way that will give
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capitalism “a human face”,91 Whether this is tine, will be a subject of the chapters to
come.
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Chapter Two
History tells us that, not only is it unwise to try to hold back innovation, it is also not
possible over the longer run. Generation after generation has experienced episodes 
in which those rendered technologically obsolescent endeavored to undermine
progress... In the end,, these attacks did not prevail, and long-term advances in 
standards of living resumed. Nonetheless, the campaign to expand free trade is never 
won. It is a continuing battle.1
- Alan Greenspan
The previous chapter showed how the WWI brought about the end of the liberal 
order and of the separation of the individual and the state. It had also ended the high 
degree of interaction between the states. The new order was characterised by varying 
degrees of oppression of the individual in the domestic sphere and protectionism and 
war in the international sphere. The liberal order of the 19th century was governed by 
the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment. Knowledge and reason were understood to 
be limited and liberty was valued, because it ensured the emergence of competing 
ideas. Complementing this intellectual market place was the free market economy. 
Its benefits were self-evident and laissez-faire found its main support amongst the 
poor people who saw it as the only means to better their lot. Not surprisingly, 
aristocrats, whose livelihoods depended on protectionism, spearheaded the 
opposition to the free market.
Eventually, the free market triumphed, but it was not to last. The worst 
abuses against the life and dignity of the people throughout the 20th century 
happened under those regimes that rejected the gradualism of the market process.
52
Neither Marxism nor Communism accepted the limitations on human wisdom and 
strove to achieve perfection in human affairs through regulation and outright 
compulsion. Statism and social engineering by means of which the idealists operated 
finally began to be reversed in the 1980’s. Neither Thatcher nor Reagan went far 
enough in reversing the scope of the state. In fact, they often used the power of the 
state to suit their own goals. But, they have initiated the process of reform, not least 
by changing the language of political discourse. As Reagan stated, “hi this present 
crisis government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem”.2 
Thus, along with the defeat of Communism, the greatest achievement of Thatcher 
and Reagan must rest in reinstating the classical liberal concept of limited 
government as an alternative to the statist vision that has dominated the 20th century.
But, more than a decade since the fall of Communism, can it really be said 
that classical liberalism has made much headway? If so, how does it work in 
practice? If not, what hindered its progress? And, how does globalisation fit into all 
of this? The first part of this chapter will look at the different ways in which 
globalisation affects the political, economic, and cultural spheres. Globalisation, as it 
is generally understood, involves increasing economic interaction between 
progressively more compatible free market economies. Its is driven in large part by 
the collapse of competing socio-economic ideologies and a number of important 
advances in technological development. Increased competition, which has resulted 
from increased economic interaction has lowered the costs of living and increased 
prosperity. This increased competition was not the only effect of globalisation, 
however. Markets, in the words of Alan Greenspan, have also “rendered many forms 
of government intervention ineffective”. These new inhibitions on the powers of the 
state are welcome news for many, but a source of unease for others. As will be
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shown, this opposition to globalisation is growing. The second part will look at 
globalisation juxtaposed to the free market ideal. As will be shown, though it is true 
that many tariffs have been rescinded, much protectionism remains. Environmental 
and health and safety regulations, and policies that aim to protect the “common 
good” and “fair” trade, serve to protect domestic economies from foreign 
competition. The contemporary international economic order can, therefore, be at
best described as interventionist or mixed.
I. Globalisation: Return of the Liberal Order?
In many important respects, the past half-century has represented an uneven struggle 
to repair the close linkages among national economies that existed before the First 
World. War.3
- Alan Greenspan
International Relations emerged as a separate academic discipline following the 
conclusion of the WWI and grew under the influence of the events that led to the 
WWII. As has been mentioned in the first chapter, following the WWI, the state 
grew quite exponentially and “realism”, which came to dominate the discipline, 
reflected this growth. The realists likened international relations to a billiard game, 
where the constituent units of the system, the nation-states, were, like the billiard 
balls, independent. Similarly, national sovereignty, like the impenetrable shell of a 
billiard ball, insulated the states from outside interference.4 As for the interaction 
between these units, the realists oscillated between the “classical” realist position that 
ascribed its belligerent character to greed and selfishness intrinsic to human nature,
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and the neo-realist position that blamed frequent international conflict on the 
conditions inherent in the anarchical structure of the international system itself. This 
anarchical structure was characterised by the lack a global enforcer of rules and 
peaceful solutions of disputes that arose out of conditions of scarcity of resources, 
and the existence of war as an effective way of solving of these disputes.5
Concomitantly with these political aspects, realism saw the economic 
functioning of the nation state along nationalist lines.5 As Gilpin writes “...central 
idea [of the nationalist school was] that economic activities are and should be 
subordinate to the goal of the state building and the interests of the state”? Some 
authors have pointed out that the submission of prudent conduct of the economic 
affairs to the national interest inevitably involved a painful choice between the 
provisions of “guns and butter”? In other words, increased military spending 
inevitably materialised at a cost to welfare provisions and an increase in inflation and 
debt. The realists responded to this criticism by arguing that a strong state is in fact 
the only guarantor of the welfare of its citizens? Realists were able to make this 
claim, because of their belief that, like in the political relations among states, the 
economic interactions between states are essentially based on a zero-sum principle. 
The net gain of one state, the theory mirrored mercantilist tradition, resulted in a net
loss of another state.
In the 1970’s, however, there began to emerge developments that were seen 
as challenging to realism’s continued dominance. A number of scholars, Rosenau, 
Keohane and Nye among them, began to point out aspects of interdependence among 
the nal^io^n-stt^tcjh.th Their studies focused on the interactions among developed 
nations, where the advancements in transport and communications grew fastest. 
According to this theory, interdependence undermined the sovereignty of the nation­
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state, thus depriving the state of both, its importance and its singularity as a
constituent unit of international relations. This new theory was given considerable 
credence by a number of international developments. Firstly, in 1971, the growing 
expenditure on the war in Vietnam and on the welfare programmes of his 
predecessor, forced US President Richard Nixon to devalue the US currency by 
abandoning one of the main pillars of the Bretton Woods economic order, namely the 
convertibility of the US dollars into gold. A measure that was intended to guarantee 
post-WW2 financial stability thus ended. The exchange rates, which were under the 
Bretton Woods system intended to move within a thin fluctuating band sanctioned 
and guaranteed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were left to float freely.
Secondly, in 1973, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ 
(OPEC) decided to quadruple the prices of oil. The impact of this measure on the 
world economy cannot be understated, since the panic it created plunged the world 
into recession and caused unprecedented rates of inflation in both the USA and in the 
European Economic Community (EEC)?* Both of these decisions clearly signified 
how decisions taken by one state or a group of states affected the rest of the world. 
Whatever the arguments the interdependence school put forward, the tme 
interconnectedness of the nation-states remained partially obscured during the 
remainder of the Cold War. This was so, because the Cold War, especially after the 
demise of the Nixon-Kissinger detente with the USSR and the onset of the so-called 
Second Cold War, was conducted according to core realist premises. Following the 
defeat of communism in 1989 and the collapse of its principal protagonist, the USSR, 
however, global interdependence re-emerged under a new name: globalisation. But, 
what is it? Greenspan writes.
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Globalization,.. involves the increasing interaction of national 
economic systems. Of necessity, these systems are reasonably 
compatible and, in at least some important respects, market oriented. 
...Globalization ...has been driven importantly by advances in 
technology. By lowering the eosts of gathering information and 
conducting 1x8118,1^0^, new tednl^loi^ie s have reduced market 
frictions and provided significant impetus to the process of broadening 
world markets. Expanding markets, in turn, hive both increased 
competition and rendered many forms of government intervention 
either ineffective or perverse. The recognition of this prospeaity- 
efhnncing eea-chnnge fi world ma^rkt^Ss and ...of the 
counterproductive consequences of pervasive intervention has led 
many governments to reduce tariffs and trade barriers nnd ...to 
deregulate markets. These actions themselves have further promoted 
the very globalization that, interacting with advancing technology, 
spurred the deregulntory initiatives in the first place. The result of this 
process has been an advafce nnd diffusion of technical change that 
has raised living standards in much of the world.12
So, as Gaeenspan confirms, over the past decade globalisntion hns come to be 
understood primarily as nn expression of the centripetnl forces present in the market 
economy. Defined in its broadest sense, the market economy cnme to be seen as n 
driving force behind the wide variety of chnnges apparent in the world today. Some 
hive even described these changing effects of globalisation as uncontrollable nnd 
irreversible.13
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Of course, the economic factors that Greenspan chooses to focus on are only a part, 
albeit a crucial one, of the entire picture. The concept of cultural homogenisation has 
recently gained international prominence because of frenzied attacks around the 
world on that ultimate symbol of cultural globalisation, the McDonalds’s fast-food 
chain. Cultural homogenisation is, however, also present in the corporate sector, 
where English had already triumphed as the contemporary lingua franca and in the 
electronic media, which promptly anglicised as well. It is also true that because of 
the western domination of the economy, globalisation is often seen as a synonym for 
westernisation. As Thomas Friedman recognised, in the contemporary world even 
the most robust cultures find themselves under pressure and look for ways to 
suniive?* In France, for example, the government mandates the number of French 
songs on the radio and French films in the cinemas. As a result, many movies of poor 
quality are made. These movies are intended never to be screened. Instead, they are 
used to fill the government-mandated quotas. Importantly, Friedman points out that 
cultural globalisation is not all about “push”. It is also about “pull”, as many people 
around the world actually desire to feel modem and, very often, American?? It is 
perhaps a symptom of globalisation that a young protester in Tehran can march 
through the streets, shouting “Death to America”, while wearing “Made in USA” 
Levi jeans.
There are other aspects of globalisation. Migration, for example, has grown 
with the improvements in transportation?? Welfare provisions and tolerant political 
attitudes make the West the obvious destination for people from all over the world. 
Unlike previously, when immigration came at no significant cost to the budget of the 
receiving country, the legal costs of processing of the immigration claims and the bill 
arising from welfare provisions for the immigrants and their families make
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contemporary immigration a major fiscal as well as logistical problem. Thus, many 
of the European Union (EU) countries, to give an example, have recognised the need 
to coordinate their immigration policies. There is also the growing importance of the 
environmental issues. Though there is a disagreement about the extent of 
environmental pollution and even the very existence of global warming, there can be 
no doubt that the environmental lobby has used the technological revolution to its 
advantage. The environmentalists are one of the most successful representatives of 
globalisation, mobilising public opinion around the world with singular effect.
As Held argues, all the above effects of globalisation place the realist concept 
of the centrality of the nation-state under increasing pressure. Proliferation of IGO’s, 
NGO’s and a plethora of international regimes, all contribute to the increasing 
limitation of national autonomy. Some territorial developments, especially the ones 
in Europe, even suggest an emergence of a political model not unlike that of the 
medieval period, when the sovereignty over a particular people or a particular 
territory was shared by a number of different rulers.1'' With shared sovereignty comes 
military cooperation. For example, the EU has already reached an agreement on the 
eventual creation of a common European army. Considering that military power is 
usually seen to epitomise the sovereignty of a nation, many see the increasing 
regulation of military power as yet another aspect of globalisation. *2
As far as realism is concerned, there are two issues of immediate interest. 
Firstly, the sovereignty of the state seems to be eroded by, amongst other things, 
rapid and voluminous international financial flows. States are forced to take 
sovereignty-compromising measures in order to avoid the displeasure of the markets. 
Among these, the theory goes, is the growing fiscal and monetary circumspection. 
Secondly, the technological advances over the past ten to twenty years have
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fncilitated tremendous improvements in communications between previously isolated 
pressure groups. Many of these groups hive now united to form influential non­
governmental oagnnisatione. The environmentalist movement and human rights 
watchdogs, Amnesty International among them, are good examples of this trend. But, 
does the existence of these organisations, as some scholars argue, compromise the 
centricity of the nation-stntes ae the only viable actors if the international arena?1? If 
so, what is the impact of globalisation on the structure of international relations? 
Before answering this question, it is necessary to look more closely nt the realist 
theory.
Kenneth Waltz’s Systemic Theory of international aelntions emphnsises the 
state's territorial position ifd military strength ns deciding fnctors in that state’s 
behaviour. As such it forms one of the most potent underpinnings of renlism 
proper. In Waltz's view, the system was in n position of supremacy over its units. 
Quoting Durkheim, Wnltz asserts, “whenever certain elements combine nnd thereby 
produce, by the fact of their combination, new phenomena, it is plnif that these new 
phenomena reside not in the original elements, but in the totality formed by their 
union.”21 Exlranolation of Durkheim’s argument thus enables Wnltz effectively to 
deny the state the freedom to act out of considerations other thin those of the 
1.1^^ international system. It wns because of this “independent” ifd anarchical 
system, nnd ite ability to transform different units into similnrly functioning actors 
that prompted Waltz to sny that functional differentiation, or internal attributes of the 
states, could “drop out” of the analytical consideration of nation-state behaviour. The 
stntes that do not conform to the requirements of the system ifd focus on goals other 
thin those of security ire bound to suffer at the hinds of their more ruthless
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counterparts. To put it differently, Waltz’s argument is that “bad money drives out
good money”.
Ruggie criticised Waltz’s theory for its inadequate account of change in the 
international system. Ruggie based his argument on the analysis of change from a 
medieval, hierarchic and papacy-dominated international system to a modem, 
anarchic and individual state dominated international system. He argued that 
transformation of the international system from medieval to modem was based on 
the concept of gradual individualisation of property and subsequent exclusiveness of 
the nation-states. Consequently, Ruggie proposed that the change of the intemational 
system from an hierarchical to anarchical order occurred because of the change of 
“the principles on the basis of which the constituent units... [were] separated from 
each other.”22 On this basis, Ruggie concluded that functional differentiation was in 
fact fundamental to the process of change in the intemational system.22
By extrapolation, internal attributes of states could, sometimes in the future, 
serve as modus operandi for systemic change again. In defence of his theory, Ruggie 
also defined a concept of a “determinant of change”, or a quantitative method 
through which the change of the intemational system could be made observable. 
Ruggie saw the determinant of change in Durkheim’s concept of “dynamic density”, 
which could here be understood as a quantity and volume of transactions, 
interactions, and co-operative activities between units of the system.24 In Ruggie’s 
thinking, pressure created by increasing density of transactions between the actors, in 
this case nation-states, could cause a change of the entire system. In other words, 
greater dynamic density could produce a greater possibility of a profound alteration 
of the system. The alteration Ruggie was thinking of was one of a change of the 
intemational system from that of belligerent anarchy alluded to in the introduction to
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that of some sort of hierarchy based on principles of cooperation. As can be seen, 
therefore, criticism of Waltz’ s systemic theory of constituent units jealously guarding 
their sovereignties and relying on power to protect their interests, focuses on 
economic interdependence as a way through which Durkheim’s principle of dynamic 
density could indeed change the very essence of the intemational system. In what 
follows, this chapter will look at three different perspectives on the impact of 
globalisation on intemational relations as identified by Held and his collaborators in
their 1999 book Global Transformations.
II. Hyperglobalisers’ Guide to theNew World Order
Surtout, Messieurs, point de zele.
- Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand
Having said the above, is it plausible that such a transformation of intemational order 
has occurred or is occurring? One author, who believes that this is indeed the case 
and that the intemational system has been “irreversibly” changed, is the former head 
of the McKinsey Consultants and a principal proponent of the hyperglobalising view, 
Kenichi Ohmae.26 The strength of the market associations, Ohmae asserts, means 
that national governments have “lost” control over their economies and are now 
relegated to the management of the social consequences of globalisation^ Ohmae’s 
view is based on his analysis of the growing investment and information flows, as 
well as the growth of individualism and the relative decline of national consciousness 
as a factor in the economic decision-making in the West.22 Moreover, Ohmae seems 
to see the erosion of the nation state as a determining unit of intemational relations
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continuing, until its replacement with ever-closer regional establishments, not unlike 
the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).29 Indeed, some facts support 
at least a part of what Ohmae is saying. In 1994, for example, direct US investment 
overseas totalled $612 billion, an increase of 9.2% from the previous year. In the 
same year $504 billion was invested in the USA from overseas, an increase of 8.6% 
from the previous year. Again in 1994, USA exported $840 billion worth of goods 
and services and imported $955 billion of the same. This was, respectively, an 
increase of 11% and 15.5% from the previous year.** Despite these indicators, there 
are a number of problems with Ohmae’s assertions.
Globalisation is mostly applicable to the industrialised countries, and while it 
is true that the countries of former communist Eastern Europe and Russia have now 
embraced the free market, globalisation in the Third World is at best ambiguous. The 
above multi-billion dollar investments, to give one example, happened mainly 
between the USA and Europe, with Asia coming a distant third. In the late 1990’s 
this disparity was further exacerbated by the Asian economic crisis and the lingering 
weakness of the Japanese economy. It is precisely because it is difficult to see what, 
if any, influence globalisation has on, for instance, the failed African states that the 
absolutist nature of Ohmae’s pronouncements is somewhat difficult to accept?1 This 
is a problem that Thomas Friedman looked at in his work. In it Friedman contrasted 
his visit to the highly mechanised Lexus factory in Japan, where 300 Lexus sedans 
are produced per day by 310 robots and an astonishingly low number of 66 people, 
with one of the innumerable disputes between the Israelis and the Palestinians who, 
in his words “were still fighting over who owned which olive tree”.?? Of course, the 
Israeli-Palestinian problem is hardly an exception. Territorial conflicts abound
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throughout the world. As the problems between Ethiopians and Eritreans, Indians 
and Pakistanis, Sierra-Leonians, Sudanese and many others are analysed, it seems 
clear that it is usually the poorest and the most desperate that embrace “the olive 
tree” as the last object to hang on to. Others acknowledge the continued North-South 
divide, point to the global inequality in the standards of living, and argue that this 
inequality contributes to the fermentation of nationalism and fundamentalism with 
potential results similar to those described by Huntington in his Clash of 
Civilisations. Of growing importance is their observation that in the presence of such 
gross inequality in both political and economic prowess, the shape of the “new world 
order” is a shape preferred by the mighty; a world that the weak have little say in 
creating and, consequently, little stake in upholding^
Similarly, Ohmae’s assertion about the “irreversibility” of integration seems 
to be unfounded. European history, be it ancient or modem, provides many examples 
of phenomenal growth of trade, prosperity, knowledge and technological advance 
followed by decline in both material and intellectual sense. The collapse of the 
literate, artistic and prosperous Mycenaean Civilisation may serve as an example. 
When it ended in mid-eighth century BC, it was replaced by a period known as “The 
Dark Age”. This period was illiterate and artistically primitive. However, this “Dark 
Age” was probably not the first and certainly not the last. The collapse and the 
dissolution of the Western half of the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries 
AD with its extensive administration, commerce, prosperity and peace was replaced 
by yet another era commonly referred to as “The Dark Ages”. Though the 
intellectual life and scientific discoveries continued in Byzantium and in the Arab 
world, science and philosophy in Westem Europe came close to extinction as the 
intellectual life was consigned almost solely to Christian monasteries. Indeed, with
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originals lost or destroyed, much of Renaissance scholarship had to rely on the 
Arabic translations of the works of many of ancient scholars, Aristotle among them. 
Moreover, the rule of law, which had characterised the life in the Roman Empire, 
disappeared and was replaced by the rule of the strongest and most ruthless members 
of the community. Last but not least there is the example of the above-mentioned 
collapse of the classical liberal economic order that dominated the second half of the 
19* century and its replacement with protectionism, chaos and, ultimately, war. One 
can predict anything, so it seems, except for the future."*
III. Sceptics: Not So Fast...
What ever sceptic could enquire for; For every why he had a wherefore.35
- Samuel Butler
It is the historical precedent of economic interdependence in the 19tl1 century that the 
free market scholars focus on. These “sceptics” argue that the current levels of 
interaction rise neither to the ideal of an integrated global market, nor to the levels of 
intemational trade in the 19th century?? Enlargement of the freedom of the markets, 
sceptics continue, is driven by a highly regulatory intemational treaty system and not 
by the amorphous forces of global capitalism envisaged by the hyperglobalisers. 
Once more, the EU is the case in point, for the origins of this most advanced of all 
regional experiments based in a post-WWII political decision to oppose the 
expansion of Communism and in an attempt to prevent yet another conflict between 
Germany and France. It also ought to be remembered that the roots of every decision 
to enlarge the European “free market” can be found in one of the appropriate pan-
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European treaties, which are often Byzantine in their detailed attempt not to disturb 
the social equilibria of the member states.37 Moreover, the sceptics argue, the current 
regional free-trade tendencies are qualitatively different from the liberal trade 
relations of the 19th century, because then the trade was truly inter-national, while the 
current “free-market” regime masks, often clumsily, high levels of regional 
protectionism. Indeed, as Weiss points out, regionalisation and globalisation might 
be perceived as contradictory and not, as Ohmae understands them, as a stepping-
stone from the former towards the
Certainly, when it comes to economic protectionism, the sceptics have a 
point. As has been mentioned, the nationalist understanding of economics is one of a 
zero-sum game. Gain acquired by one state, in other words, means a loss for another. 
Therefore, the theory goes, it is necessary for the state to gain as much as possible in 
order to maximise its economic and, consequently, its military power. In essence, 
therefore, the nationalists regard everything as subordinate to the needs of the 
military complex and its practical employment, the furthering of the national interest 
of the state. Consequently, nationalist decision-makers have a tendency to adopt 
policies which might prove detrimental to health of the economy in the long term. In 
the short-term, though, these policies appear beneficial to the immediate needs of the 
state. The nationalists oppose the process of economic interconnectedness. As they 
rightly observe, economic cooperation means reliance of the state on trade with 
others and, consequently, compromises its sovereignty and independence.40
This “nationalist” understanding of economics is inseparable from the 
concept of protectionism. Protectionism can take many forms. Using tariffs, for 
example, the states prevent competing goods from entering their borders freely, thus 
preserving their artificially inflated employment levels. Protectionism also comes in
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the form of subsidies to inefficient companies, thus having a double negative effect 
of wasting the taxpayers’ money on inefficient companies and the wasting of private 
earnings on goods, the value of which is artificially high. The effects of these 
protectionist policies on the intemational system should be obvious. Countries that 
adopt them retreat into their borders and intemational trade collapses. This is, 
broadly speaking, the kind of policy followed during and after the Great War. Today, 
this nationalist philosophy enjoys some outspoken support. Ross Perot and Pat 
Buchanan, to give one example, have taken a very negative view of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The two have argued that the agreement 
would harm the USA by opening its labour market to the influx of cheap Mexican 
labour. In fact, the opposite has happened. In the year 2000, the USA had 0% 
unemployment and enjoyed the longest economic growth in its history. It would be 
wrong to assume, however, that protectionism is gone. As will be discussed below, 
all countries in the world today engage in some sort of protectionist activities.
What about the issue of national sovereignty? Clearly, a growing maze of 
transnational networks and a growing number of cooperative intemational and 
supranational organisations with varying degrees of influence and responsibility, 
strain the realist emphasis on “independent” nation-states as the sole important actors 
in intemational relations. In the EU, for instance, it is the European Court of Justice 
and not the national government that has the final say in a number of legal areas, 
adjudicating the disputes between its members and, more importantly, between its 
constituent members and individual citizens. Britain, for example, was taken to this 
Court by a number of disgmntled tenants living in the flight-path of the aeroplanes 
flying to and from London Heathrow Airport. They sued the British government for 
excessive noise and won. Because of the mling, a good-night’s sleep is now a
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fundamental human right and Britain will now be obliged to limit and, perhaps, 
eliminate noisy planes from London’s sky.** Until recently, it has been possible to 
argue that the European integration process did not really affect the most important 
elements of national sovereignty; the military and foreign policy.*? Recent 
developments in the EU, however, saw the establishment of a EU Commissioner for 
Foreign Policy and the establishment of the pan-European rapid reaction force. The 
Nice Treaty went further, laying the framework for the eventual emergence of a 
common European army.
Even though the decisions concerning the EU are, largely, political and not 
economic in nature, this self-evident pooling of sovereignty is a reality. At a regional 
level, however, there is an increasing amount of shared sovereignty aimed, at least as 
far as the continental protagonists of the “ever-closer” European integration are 
concerned, at a creation of a federal Europe, does not really mean much as far as the 
overall power of the state is concerned. As Morgenthau argued, “Nothing in the 
realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the world 
into states will be replaced by larger units of quite different character, more in 
keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral requirements of the 
contemporary world.”4* Kissinger essentially seconded Morgenthau’s view by 
pointing out that European integration was the only way through which the European 
countries could block the process of sliding into “irrelevance”.4" For Kissinger, 
therefore, European integration was essentially a natural outgrowth of Morgenthau’s 
concept of power politics, aimed at maximisation of nations’ military capabliittes.45 
The EU, the sceptics worry, is thus simply being transformed into a superstate with 
the powers of this creation mirroring the powers of the individual states and perhaps
stronger.
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So, the sceptics appear to be right as to the shortcomings of the contemporary version 
of the free market. As far as the laissez-faire ideal is concerned, there is still a long 
way to go. On the other hand, it is imdeniable that, when it comes to economics, 
states do cooperate more than they have done since the beginning of the WWI. This 
poses some interesting conundrums for the realists. As has been shown, economic 
cooperation, the concomitant emphasis on the benefits of free trade and common 
interest enshrined in a common desire for economic prosperity is a belief firmly 
rooted in the 19th century liberalism. Carr, whose work effectively launched realism 
as a distinct theory, attacked this belief. As Carr showed, the concept of common 
interest was a chimera enforced by a governing elite in order to promote its own 
selfish int^c^r^e^^t.77 Some contemporary theorists, however, defend interdependence by 
combining it with Carr’s criticism of common interest. Thus, integration of national 
economies might be seen in the self-interest of the states themselves?. Keohane 
articulated this idea in his “regimes theory”, where he argued that a realist 
assumption about selfishness of interests in international relations is compatible with 
economic cooperation and interdependence.77 The nation-states, in other words, 
cooperate based on self-interest and reciprocity. How is this possible?
Carr’s argument is based on Rousseau’s “stag hunt” or “prisoner’s” dilemma, 
which asserts that certainty of cooperation is impossible, because satisfaction of 
immediate self-interest will prevent long-term commitment to cooperation. Rousseau 
wrote, “Assume that five men... come together at the time when all of them suffer 
from hunger. The hunger of each will be satisfied by the fifth part of a stag, so they 
‘agree’ to co-operate in a project to trap one”. But, if one of them grabs a hare that 
comes within his reach, the trap collapses. “The defector obtains the means of 
satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape. His immediate
69
interest prevails over consideration for his fellows.”49 What the dilemma does not 
say, however, is that there is, so to speak, “always another day”, when the hunt will 
have been repeated and those who have not cooperated the day before will not be 
asked to join in the hunt again. Therefore, they will go hungry. This “repetition” 
transforms prisoner’s dilemma into a prisoner’s game, where the actors are 
encouraged to play often, thus eroding the risk of defection from communal 
obligations. The “game theory” makes it possible to accept that cooperation creates 
“obligations” which, although they are hierarchically unenforceable, are nevertheless 
workable, because they are based on reasons of self-interest.
IV.Transformationalists
While the realists seem wrong in seeing no change vis-a-vis the position of the state 
as it used to be, the sceptics cannot deny that the world is not undergoing profound 
social and economic changes either. Though right in pointing out the shortcomings of 
contemporary globalisation in comparison with its 19th century predecessor, the 
statist arrangement of today is not what it used to be. An increasingly vocal group of 
scholars, who cover some of the emerging middle ground by accepting the changing 
effects of globalisation, while not seeing these effects as either irreversible or 
uncontrollable, are the transformationalists. Their main argument is that the 
“governments and societies across the globe...[have] to adjust to a world in which 
there is no longer a clear distinction between international and domestic, external and 
internal affairs”. International flows of capital made possible by the wonders of 
modem technology and communications, they argue, are clearly changing the world, 
often enforcing fiscal circumspection among national governments and sensitivity to
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the requirements of foreign private investment, thus progressively chipping away 
from national sovereignty some of its most important attributes.
To begin with, globalisation of trade and finance are often seen as the forces 
behind the process of globalisation. In fact, this view is probably mistaken. As has 
been shown before, barriers to trade and finance are not falling simply because the 
market economy needs it. Economic history provides a never-ending catalogue of 
governmental interference in the fimctioning of the market economy, for a wide 
variety of reasons and often with full knowledge that such interference will be 
harmful in the long-term. Neither does the answer to economic liberalisation rest in 
the states’ powerlessness to stop the globalisation of trade. It rests in the states’ 
unwillingness to do so. Some have suggested that this is so, because the states do not 
want to put themselves at a disadvantage in attracting foreign investment vis-a-vis 
countries that nourish environments conducive to foreign investment. Thomas 
Friedman calls this process of convergence of capital returns, lending rates and 
profits, “the golden straightjacket”.?? Of course, Friedman’s own view is that fiscal 
and monetary responsibility is good in itself, a notion opposed by Gray, who sees the 
above homogenisation as a negative development 21 Both Friedman and Gray, 
however, see only one side of the picture. True, some degree of economic 
deregulation has undoubtedly occurred - especially in the financial sector. In other 
areas, in health and safety, for example, the trend has been in the opposite 
direction.5?
A better explanation seems to be that following the collapse of communism 
alternatives to some sort of liberal understanding of economics are no longer 
available. Like the protectionists, the Marxists believe that umestricted trade 
contributes to destructive exploitation of one participant by another. This Marxist
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view, however, does not focus on the exploitation of one state by another, but rather 
on the exploitation of the international working class by the international capitalist 
class. Exploitation, the Marxists claim, is inherent in the capitalist system of free 
trade. Similarly in decline is the offshoot of Marxism, the dependency theory. 
According to this theory, the world is divided into two parts: the core and the 
periphery. The core is comprised of the Western industrialised nations, while the 
periphery is made up of the under-developed regions of the world. The dependency 
theorists see the latter group as being exploited by the former. However, the 
spectacular rise of the “Asian Tigers” such as Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea 
and Taiwan have illustrated that it is possible, through participation in the free 
market, for poor countries to obtain unprecedented levels of development.53
It remains true that although any country can, at any time, erect trade barriers 
around its borders and stop the flow of capital, such actions are very rare. Even 
communist North Korea and theocratic Iran, both of which opted for international 
isolation in the past, have recently begun a process of liberalisation. Similarly, 
following the Asian crisis of 1997-8 out of all the countries afflicted, only Malaysia 
introduced significant restrictions on the movement of capital. The South Korean 
answer to the Asian crisis, on the other hand, was further liberalisation. The South 
Korean economy got into trouble in December 1997 when, following the Thai 
meltdown, investors pulled out of the South-East Asian markets. The Korean 
economic management was not particularly sound and the South Korean government 
lied about the size of her national debt and foreign currency reserves. Her economy, 
however, was not as corrupt as, for instance, Mahatir's Malaysia and Suharto's 
Indonesia. Yet, following the crisis, South Korea did not shut her doors on the 
economic interconnectedness. In fact, she has learned the appropriate lessons and her
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Ministry of Finance now sends out e-mails to foreign investors detailing her foreign 
currency resevees.54 In short, capitalism works better than any of its competitors.
Thus, with communist and protectionist philosophies greatly undermined by, 
it has to be said, their own historical record, the doctrine of the free markets is now 
being adopted, albeit imperfectly, across the world. This is particularly important, 
because of the impact free markets have on the extent of the welfare state. As 
Ebeling writes, governmental provision of “social programmes” cannot be assured 
under the conditions of the free markets. “Goods may come in that out-compete 
minimum wage sectors of the economy; foreign goods may incorporate technologies 
and features attractive to the buying public, but which the domestic producers cannot 
readily match.” As a result, some businesses may find it necessary to retrench a part 
of their workforce and the tax revenue and, consequently, welfare spending may 
decline. 44
It is for this reason that the transformationalists worry that at the 
distributional level globalisation may result in the growth of poverty. But, it is 
unclear why they reject the expectation that all strata of society will benefit from an 
absolute increase of the wealth that the free market usually brings about. Likewise, 
their concern with “downward pressure” on the real wages of low-skilled labourers, 
which they expect not only to stagnate but actually reverse, is also curious.44 After 
all, capitalism’s selling point is precisely its historically documented ability to 
contribute to an increase in the absolute levels of wealth in society, however 
divergent its relative distribution. “To most economists the evidence is impressively 
persuasive that the dramatic increase in world competition - a consequence of 
broadening trade flows - has fostered markedly higher standards of living for almost 
all countries that have participated in cross-border trade’’?. But, why is international
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trade so important to prosperity? As will be discussed below, this is because trade
encourages innovation and replacement of old technologies by new. Greenspan
writes.
Standards of living rise because the depreciation and other cash flows 
of industries employing older, increasingly obsolescent technologies 
are marshalled to finance the newly produced capital assets that 
almost always embody the cutting-edge technologies. This is the 
process by which wealth is created incremental step by incremental 
step. It presupposes a continuous churning of an economy in which 
the new displaces the old.58
Indeed, never before has affluence been as widespread as it is now among the 
contemporary Western middle class and capitalism is the reason for it. It is, 
therefore, regrettable that governments present the fiscal responsibility necessary for 
economic stability as “unfortunate”. It is appalling that governments are able to make 
election promises, be it on welfare or other issues, and then break these pledges 
because of “inescapable” market forces. It is equally regrettable that multinational 
companies perpetuate these myths by not having the courage to dissent. One
commentator writes,
[With] their enlightened mission statements, progressive stakeholder
strategies, flower-motif logos and 57-point pledges of ‘corporate 
social responsibility’, [the companies] implicitly say that they have a 
case to answer: capitalism without responsibility is bad. That sounds
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all right; the trouble is, when they start talking about how they will no 
longer put profits first, people (rightly) think they are lying. If, as 
these defenders of economies without borders lead you to conclude, 
global capitalism is a cause of democratic paralysis and a cloak for 
old-fashioned corporate venality, even instinctive liberals ought to 
side with the sceptics.59
The truth of the matter is, of course that companies do care about profit above all 
other considerations. Profit is the reason why a tremendous variety of foods appear in 
the shops every morning, all nicely packaged, safe, and ready to eat. To put it 
differently, the whole “point of a liberal market economy is that it civilises the quest 
for profit, turning it, willy-nilly, into an engine of social progress”. In fact, 
companies that “compete with rivals for customers and workers .. .will indeed worry 
about their reputation for quality and fair dealing - even if they do not value those 
things in themselves. Competition will make them behave as if they did”.60
A much more persuasive argument concerns the impact trade makes on the 
workforce. Regardless of whether it is blue-collar or white-collar, there is little doubt 
that the risk of job obsolescence has increased in recent years, with workers having 
to regularly up-grade their skills. The trauma of adjustment to these more fluctuating 
economic conditions, which are the very reasons for increased levels of prosperity, is 
real. But, job security is not a fundamental human right and the responsibility that all 
people have to take to plan and to insure for time out of work is thus by no means 
diminished. If the government does have a role to play, then this should involve 
enabling the workforce to retrain and to enhance its skills. One “remedy” that must 
be avoided is protectionism. As will be shown in the chapters to follow,
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protectionism will disable capital movements towards the most productive areas of 
the economy. This will hinder innovation and production of goods that the 
consumers value most. It is true, of course, that some jobs will remain protected, but 
the workforce as a whole will suffer, for every protected job will mean a diminished 
opportunity for other workers. It is also important to remember that domestic trade 
affects distribution of jobs as well. “The relative balance of supply and demand in a 
competitive market economy determines the mix of employment”, Greenspan 
explains. “When exports fall or imports rise, domestic demand and relative prices 
have invariably adjusted in the long run to leave total employment generally 
unaffected”.61
Having considered the particular effects of globalisation, what is the overall 
impact of globalisation on the structure of international relations? Can it still be said, 
as realists would have it, that the world resembles a billiard game consisting of 
independent units with impenetrable shells, continuously competing against one 
another in a system of anarchy? Or, can it be said that the centripetal forces of 
globalisation support Durkheim’s thesis of a dynamic density, thus changing the 
international system to something new? If so, what is the nature of this new system?
Contrary to the views of the hyperglobalisers, the process of globalisation is a 
dynamic and open-ended process. Consequently, its final imprint on the structure of 
the international system is not yet discernible. The evidence at hand, however, seems 
to support the transformationalist thesis of growing interaction and cooperation 
among the developed nation-states. Interestingly, these states cooperate despite the 
cost to their sovereignty. Thus, as Keohane had predicted, when faced with long-term 
benefits of cooperation, states do actually choose to cooperate. As has been shown 
above, this cooperation is enhanced by a broad agreement amongst the governments
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in the developed world on a range of issues that have previously prevented such 
cooperation. Possibly the most fundamental area of agreement concerns the free 
market and its variations as the way of achieving development and, ultimately,
prosperity.
The lessening of national sovereignty, critics of globalisation argue, does 
come at a cost. As the transformationalists worry, globalisation induces renegotiation 
of the power, the ftmction and the authority of the national government.. According 
to these scholars, globalisation constrains the ability of the national government to 
interfere in the running of the economy and its engagement in different types of 
social engineering. This, they believe, is bad, because of the resulting growth of 
inequality. The proponents of the free market differ from the above position by 
seeing the decline of governmental interference in the economy as positive. As they 
point out, only free markets can produce prosperity for all. Yet, they are only too 
ready to point out that the freedom of the markets is at best partial and that many of 
the statist attitudes and regulations remain. As will be seen below, not only is the 
freedom of the markets partial, there is a growing unease about the effects of 
globalisation and a growing pressure to reverse the trend of liberalisation. Of course, 
this conflicting view of globalisation is central to this debate and it will be of concern
for the remainder of this thesis.
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V. Free Market, Capitalism andlnterventionism
There is simply no other choice than this: either to abstain from interference in the 
free play of the market, or to delegate the entire management of production and 
distribution to the government. Either capitalism or socialism: there exists no middle
way.
- Ludwig von Mises64
Moritz Bonn once wrote that there are three distinct ways in which international
economic relations can be conducted. The first way is exclusively by corporations 
and individuals. The second way was exclusively by governments, while the third is 
by individuals and corporations on the one hand and governments on the other 
hand.65 Before WWI international trade happened almost entirely among individuals 
and corporations, but then fell under governmental control. During the WWH, the 
allied leaders saw the need for a vigorous international trade and established the
Bretton Woods system, which consisted of the World Bank, the IMF and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). But, Hazlitt wrote, this did not mean a 
return to the pre-1914 liberal order.
[The Bretton Woods system] ...is primarily cooperation among 
governments. As in the thirties, it is governments that are going to
take matters in hand. But instead, as in the wicked thirties, of 
restricting trade and making economic war upon each other, this time, 
we are told, the governments are going to direct and stimulate trade in 
the interest of peace. It is a pleasant fantasy; but there are gravest
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reasons for doubting that it will ever be realised... For government
officials, even when they really understand (which is very rarely) the 
basic economic forces they are trying to control, are almost never 
disinterested. They are almost certain to reflect the special interests of 
the pressure groups represented by bureaucrats of one nation are 
certain to clash with those pressure groups represented by bureaucrats 
of another. And these conflicting interests, precisely because they are 
represented by their representative governments, are far more likely to 
clash openly, directly and politically than in the world of genuine fi'<3e 
trade.66
Hazlitt was proven right, for as Tumlir observed, post-war protectionism arose out of 
special interests of the industry, which used political connections to insulate itself 
from outside competition. Though many of the inter-war period elements of 
protectionism, such as subsidies and trade restrictions remain, contemporary 
protectionism is not overtly antagonistic. Unlike its precursor, protectionism today 
combines a wide range of special interests, often in both the importing and exporting
countries and Tumlir believes that it is for this reason that it will that much more 
difficult to dislodge. 67 Like Hazlitt, Ebeling believes the post-war protectionism was 
inevitable. As he argues, international trade got entangled in protectionist policies 
because of the welfare state’s obsession with “social good”, “national interest”, 
general welfare” as well as the need to satisfy the demands of protected sectors of 
industry and protected parts of the population?8 Thus, by the 1970’s the OECD 
countries had once more come to maintain a plethora of protectionist policies. These 
included tight foreign exchange controls, restrictions on foreign investment, price
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and wage controls, state-directed programmes and intergovernmental de^^.69 It was 
then that there emerged a global preoccupation with “fair” and “just” trade as 
opposed to free trade. According to this idea, free trade price, which is arrived at 
through decisions by billions of disinterested people-consumers around the world is 
somehow inherently unfair and needs to be replaced with a price reflecting the needs 
of “social justice”. But, as Bhagwati argues, just about anything done in the name of 
“fair trade” by one state can be interpreted as “unfair” by another. More likely than 
not, “fair trade” will become synonymous with protectionism and reinforce 
government’s appetite for management of economic relations, “with bureaucrats 
allocating trade according to what domestic lobbying pressures and foreign political 
muscle dictates”.^
The 1980’s did, of course, reverse the trend somewhat. But, even with the fall 
of Communism many protectionist practices remained in place. As Henderson 
writes, neo-hberal hegemony is a myth. Liberalisation of the economy has not spread 
to education, health and delivery of other social services. Similarly, most OECD 
countries continue to pursue highly illiberal policies in agriculture, of which the 
Common European Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the clearest example. Many trade 
restrictions and limits on investment remain in place, as do restrictive measures 
intended to protect the environment and the safety of the workers. Meaningful 
freedom of contract in employment remains elusive. Governments remain highly 
involved in securing contracts for their nationals, exercising both their financial and 
political muscle to achieve “favourable” outcomes. Even “free-market governments” 
continue to behave in mercantilist fashion. Margaret Thatcher, for example, has 
exercised her influence to secure contracts for British firms in the case of the Pergau 
Dam.71
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In the 1990’s, much hope had been placed in the GATT’s successor, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Though the WTO is much hated by the opponents of free trade, 
the WTO itself is not a free trade organisation. Under WTO arrangements, it is the 
governments and not the markets that are to raise standards of living and ensure full 
employment, hi the pursuit of these goals, governments are permitted to impose 
tariffs and other protectionist measures. As Ebeling writes, the WTO is expected to 
do the impossible. It is mandated to liberalise international trade “in the political and 
economic context of national policies of welfare-statism, interventionism, 
protectionism, and indicative planning to foster the maintenance of growth of 
privileged industrial and agricultural sectors of the respective national economies of 
the various member nations”^
If not “free market”, how should the current international economic system 
be called? In answering this question, it is perhaps sensible to start by distinguishing 
capitalism from the free market. Clearly, with all the contemporary restrictions in 
place, the free market is not a reality and unlikely to become so anytime soon. In 
order to be free, the market should possess the following characteristics. It should be 
defined by private ownership of all means of production and their use by private 
owners, be they individuals or corporations. Consumer demand should be the sole 
determinant of the usage of these means of production. The laws of supply and 
demand should determine the prices of goods and labour. Successes and failures of 
businesses should be determined by the ability of these businesses to make a profit. 
Profits should be determined by the ability of the businesses to provide the public 
with that which the public wants. Provision of public needs should be done in an 
atmosphere of free competition. There should also be a free banking system and 
currency should be issued by competing private banks. Most importantly, there
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should be a minimalist government restricted to the protection of life, liberty and 
property.73 That said, the free market is an ideal to be aspired to.
Secondly, the contemporary meaning of “capitalism” can sometimes mean 
the anti-thesis of the free market. Economic interactions between people and nations 
today are fraught with distortions intended to suit the special interests of particular 
groups and big corporations alike. It is for this reason that terms such as “statism” or 
“corporate statism” should instead be used. Although it is questionable whether the 
term “capitalism” is even appropriate, it is a term that has come to depict 
contemporary economic interactions and it shall, therefore, be used. But, it is 
important to bear in mind Milton Friedman’s warning; “Defence of the free market 
does not mean defence of the big corporations”?4 That is not to say that “capitalism” 
is, as some of its opponents maintain, evil or indefensible. Historically speaking, 
capitalist societies have been more conducive to the preservation of human freedom 
than other socio-economic systems. And, if this thesis succeeds in conveying that 
human freedom is desirable, then capitalism and, preferably, the free market are 
desirable too. It is also a matter of historical records that despite its imperfections 
capitalism has performed better as far as the creation of wealth, the raising of the 
standards of living and general prosperity are concerned, than any of its competitors.
In fact, it is precisely because of the intervention of the state in the economy 
that many of the social problems occur. Yet, those who do not understand the 
workings of the free economy or those who set out to deliberately deceive, blame 
“capitalism”. But, as Ebeling articulates, it remains unclear how capitalism is to be 
blamed for, for example, unemployment. After all, the state has undermined the 
emergence of a free and competitive labour market through the imposition of 
minimum wage laws, legalisation of trade union monopolies, the establishment of a
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variety of social benefit schemes that remove incentives to work, and by collecting 
ever-increasing taxes that make hiring of new personnel difficult. It is equally 
illogical to blame capitalism for pollution and environmental degradation. Again, the 
state has refused either to specify, or to enforce, meaningful private property rights 
and has thus prevented, as Coase showed, internalisation of negative externalities. 
Critics also blame capitalism for inflations and recessions. This is especially 
ludicrous, considering that “for practically the entire 20th century it has been the 
state’s monetary and fiscal policies that have been responsible for causing 
macroeconomic fluctuations in employment, output and prices through government’s 
use of purely paper monies, central banking and deficit spending”^ But ironies do 
not stop there. Capitalism is blamed for poverty, but it was the state that has imposed 
high taxes and a myriad of regulations that work as disincentives to investment and 
growth. Similarly, capitalism is blamed for the worsening of gender and racial 
relations. This is clearly nonsensical. The state has first discriminated against certain 
racial groups and it now tries to compensate for past discrimination by imposing 
“new tribal collectivism in both public and private sectors, in which ethnic, racial and 
gender quota rules increasingly determine an individual’s fate in terms of 
opportunities for higher education, employment and income eaming”.96 It is the state 
and not capitalism that has first created, and now exacerbated, social tension by 
politicising the lives of individuals to a point where people see other “ethnic, racial 
and gender groups as threats to their own advancement, and therefore enemies in the 
battle for political power and the financial disbursements”^
The point to remember here is that far from being the source of many of the 
problems that its critics associate with the free markets, there is a compelling 
argument to show that the opposite is true. Many of the contemporary social
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problems have either been caused by or have been exacerbated by, the interfering 
hand of the state. If anything, the market has proved itself repeatedly as a way of 
bringing people together. As has been shown in the first chapter, trading centres of 
Amsterdam and Florence epitomised in their time levels of tolerance unknown 
elsewhere. But, nothing demonstrates the contrast between the constructive role 
played by capitalism and the destructive role played by the state than apartheid in 
South Africa. As Sowell writes, white employers habitually defied “the apartheid 
laws to hire more blacks, and in higher positions, than permitted by the government”. 
The market demanded more black labour and capitalists complied, irrespective of 
what the government had said. Similarly, in the South African housing market, the 
market triumphed over zoning laws as whites sold their houses to blacks, creating 
black neighbourhoods in areas officially designated as “white”.78 Also in the USA, 
Cowen writes, market demand for blues and rock and roll broke down racial 
prejudices in the recording and entertainment industry, enriching and promoting 
black entertainers in the process. Ironically, this newly-found outlet for black talent 
was denounced as crassly commercial^ And yet, there are still those who claim that 
the free markets have gone far enough and that, if anything, there is a need to 
reinstate the state in a more prominent role. It is to these critics of the free market
that this thesis will now turn.
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Chapter Three
We ask that the government undertake the obligation above all of providing citizens 
with adequate opportunity for employment and earning of living. The activities of the 
individual must not be allowed to clash with the interests of the community, but must 
take place within its confines and be for the good of all... We demand profit sharing 
in big business. We demand a broad extension of care for the aged... the government 
must provide an all-around enlargement of our entire system of public education... 
The government must undertake improvement of public health — by protecting mother 
and child, by prohibiting child labour... We must combat the... materialistic spirit 
within and without us, and are convinced that a permanent recovery of our people 
can only proceed from within on the foundation of the common good before the 
individual good.
- National Socialist German Worker’s Party Programme (ca. 1920)
As has been shown in the previous chapter, globalisation is changing international 
relations. National sovereignty is no longer as absolute as it used to be. Instead, states 
are finding it advantageous to cooperate. The accumulated effect of this cooperation 
is the diminishment of the number of areas where the state can, or does, act alone. 
That is not to say that states have stopped behaving in a selfish fashion, trying to get 
the best deal possible. They still do. But, they also realise that often the best outcome 
can be achieved in cooperation with others. The issues are, however, more 
complicated. Trade liberalisation, to give the most significant example, exposes 
national economies to pressures that prevent the governments from engaging in a 
number of previously acceptable activities. For example, for much of the 20* century
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governments used monetary policy to inflate the size of its employed populace. One 
of the reasons for doing so was the pursuit of “full employment”. The other reason 
was the claim that the govermuent is necessary to protect the citizens from the 
“instability” and “harshness” of the market. Of course, the alleviating effect of the 
above monetary measures has proved to be at best temporary. In the long run, 
inflation contributed to the overall slow-down of the economy, necessitating 
corrective countermeasures that were often more painful than would have been 
otherwise needed. But, empirical evidence to the contrary, the state is still seen as the 
protector of the least fortunate. Because of the monetary and, sometimes, fiscal 
discipline that it imposes, as well as the concomitant diminishment of the areas of 
governmental interference in the economy and the scope of “social welfare”, the free 
market is often seen as an enemy of “social progress”. Thus, even though the process 
of trade liberalisation is by no means complete, all movement in the said direction is 
seen to be dangerous. Those that hold these views demand that the markets be 
“tamed”. Before the specific manifestations of these ideas in contemporary politics 
and international relations can be looked at, it is necessary to say a little about the 
history of opposition to free markets. As will be seen, the dislike of the markets is 
not new. In the words of Hayek, hatred of capitalism is eternal as well as universal.
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I. Taming the Markees
If countries worldwide are becoming more similar, it is not because corporations are 
imposing some uniform set of goods and services, but because human beings share a 
similar set of needs and wants.2
There is, as was mentioned, a growing opinion that unconstrained globalisation and 
unfettered markets can be potentially dangerous. This distrust of the free market is 
observable from some of the proposals to restrain it. These include the proposals by 
the UN’s Commission on Global Governance, which seeks to “reform” the “existing 
structures” of international order through an “articulation of a collaborative ethos 
based upon principles of consultation, transparency, and accountability”3. The aim of 
the Commission is to create a more “democratic” and “equitable” world, where 
“social distribution” is based on the evolved loyalty and duty of individuals to wider 
human groups? In doing so the Commission believes that it represents positive 
concerns for humanity as opposed to the self-serving destructive ones, represented by 
“impersonal workings of the markets” and “unconstrained competitive and self­
serving instincts of individuals”? Clearly, the Commission believes that the markets 
are not only disruptive, but also lacking in humanity. The fact that the markets are 
based on the unconstrained, competitive and self-serving instincts of individuals, 
therefore, prompts the Commission to suggest, among other things, a system of 
checks and balances in order to insure that the market operates in the “framework of 
social responsibility”? One of the concrete proposals is the creation of a global 
forum intended to provide “leadership” in the economic field vis-a-vis the provision 
of “global public goods”, such as the systemic financial stability, healthy
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environment, equity and social cohesion.7 This Economic Security Council would 
have an overreaching role extended to the workings of international financial 
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO in order to assure their 
compliance with democratic and equitable economic relations among nations?
As will be seen, much of the opposition of the free market is philosophical 
and intuitive. However, it is also important to realise that much of this opposition is 
rooted in the selfishness of special interest groups. The European farmers, for 
example, have much to lose from liberalisation of European agriculture and the 
concomitant end of the CAP subsidies. But, their demonstrations are often described 
in terms of protests against American cultural imperialism and the like. Likewise, 
European and American industries lobby for anti-dumping duties out of concern for 
their own well-being, ignoring the benefits that cheaper products bring to the 
consumers. These special interest groups collude with politicians, who are in turn 
promised electoral support, bribes and so on. As Henderson writes, these lobbyists 
are successful in winning over not just politicians, but the public as well. “Typical 
voters”, he writes, “have ideas and opinions concerning what is fair, just and 
acceptable, and as to what actions are likely to promote social or national goals of 
which they approve”.9 So it happens that many voters are not very keen on trade 
liberalisation and entertain false economic beliefs. Among these are,
• that industries or activities can be classed as either essential or non­
essential, or ranked in order of priority
• that govenmients should ensure self-sufficiency in essentials, and 
provide systematic support to products, industries and sectors which 
have high priority
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• that when transactions take place across national boundaries, the state 
is involved, so that intemational competition is primarily between
states
• that exports represent a gain to each country, and imports a loss
• that tariffs, import restrictions and export subsidies serve to increase 
total employment
• that administrative actions to reduce or constrain the size of labour *
force - such as compulsory reductions in working hours, enforced
early retirement, or tighter restrictions on immigration - will ease the *
problem of unemployment 1
• that actions undertaken for profit, or more broadly from self-interest, 
are open to questions as such
• that extending the scope of markets is liable to increase the extent of i
unpredictability and instability within economic systems, and of \
insecurity for the people who live and work in them
• that within countries, ‘unfettered’ market processes favour the rich 
and powerful, rather than poor, so that typically their outcomes are 
arbitrary and unjust
• that freedom of intemational trade and direct investment flows places 
poor countries at a disadvantage, relatively if not absolutely etc.10
Underlining all these misconceptions is the unifying belief that the betterment of the
people’s fortunes can come only through governmental intervention. This view is 5
essentially statist and can apply to both, right and left of the political spectrum. But, 
it contains an element of Marxist dialectic that sees the world in terms of “us” against
91
“them”. Totally lost in this view is the possibility that the economy could ever 
function to the benefit of all. The past experience of the free market delivering an 
almost uninterrupted improvement of living conditions to those peoples who lived 
under it is simply discarded. Be it by design or not, the most potent tool used by the 
opponents of the free markets is the constant widening of the supposedly 
“victimised” groups. The Marxist dialectic, m other words, had ceased to be applied 
merely to the relations between the proletariat on the one hand and the bourgeoisie 
on the other hand. Today’s conflicts, neo-Mai'xists say, abound not just between rich 
and poor, but also between men and women, blacks and whites, gay and straight, 
young and old, etc. hi order to tackle this inexhaustible array of victimisation, 
governments around the world are asked to pass ever-growing number of laws 
concerning human rights, equal opportunity, anti-discrimination, affirmative action 
and so on. As Henderson argues, every instance of unequal outcome is seen as a 
proof of unfair discrimination.11 This preoccupation with disparities, whatever these 
may be, is already reflected in the vocabulary of the opponents of globalisation. In 
the standard anti-globalisation literature, such as the Human Development Report, 
such terms as “marginalisation”, “deprivation”, “exclusion”, disenfranchisement” 
and “victimisation” abound. As will be seen below, in the UK “social exclusion” had 
already been recognised as “the” problem to tackle. Thus, when a recent report found 
average per capita income in Cornwall below that in Southern England, the Deputy 
Prime Minister John Prescott immediately concluded that the “Cornish people are 
deprived” and called for their “empowerment”.12
This reliance on external reasons as sources of inequality is central to the 
views of such Cosmopolitans as Held and Giddens. As they see it, the contemporary 
state is responsible for the “maintenance and reproduction of systemic inequalities of
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power and resource, distorting decision outcomes in favour of particular 
interests...”13 At the core of their proposal for reform, therefore, is the expansion of 
the democratic decision-making. The practical application of such proposal rests in a 
creation of a decision-making process where individuals can meet and deliberate 
their laws as equals.14 Of course, such an association is quite impossible for as long 
as individuals and groups remain widely disparate in what the Cosmopolitans call 
their “nautonomy” or “the asymmetrical production and distribution of life-chances, 
which limit and erode... [their] possibilities of political participation”.*3 Nautonomy 
rests in a variety of sources. Amongst these are the access to welfare, healthcare, and 
work, which need to be as widespread as possible if the people are to be able to 
participate in the political decision-making in a meaningful way. *3 But clearly, most 
if not all of the nautonomic discrepancies can only be rectified if the wealth in the 
society is distributed in a way that will both limit disproportionate access of the few 
and enlarge the access of the many. In the area of economics, therefore, the 
Cosmopolitans accept that some form of a watered-down capitalism is the best 
economic system available, but maintain that unconstrained capitalism creates and 
enforces unequal distribution of resources. Nautonomy, in other words, is largely 
caused by the inegalitarian system of free market economics and must, therefore, be 
tackled through a tough fonn of “distributive justice”.*
Similarly, in the international arena, internalisation of responsibility is 
rejected out of hand. Thus, Third World poverty is blamed on colonisation, 
overpopulation, lack of natural resources and, most importantly, economic 
exploitation. According to the Marxists, capitalism is by nature an imperialist 
economic system that leads to war. As Lenin put it, “imperialism is the highest stage 
of capitalism”.i3 Colonisation and the WWI, therefore, are the prime examples used
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by the Marxists in order to prove the validity of their theory and to attack the liberal 
economic system. The basis of this argument rests on the concept of exploitation,
which maintains that labour and materials are the source of all economic value. The
profit that a capitalist accumulates consists of the part of the value of the labour of 
the employee that is not returned to him in wages. 19 This is what Marx now famously 
called the “surplus value of labour”. By keeping this surplus, Marxists continue, a 
businessman “exploits” his employees.
However, if profits consist of the part of the value of employees’ labour that 
is not returned to them, then, logically, investment should flow to countries with low 
wages. In fact, in the last twenty years only one percent of direct foreign global 
investment went to sub-Saharan Africa, the region with lowest wages on Earth. 
Conversely, in 1994, nearly half of direct US investment of $612 billion was invested 
in Europe. In the same year, nearly half of direct investment in the USA came from 
Europe. All this despite lower, sometimes much lower, overhead costs being 
available elsewhere in the world. The reason for this discrepancy is that returns on 
investment in sub-Saharan Africa are well below returns elsewhere.21 In other words, 
contrary to Marx, the cost of labour is at best a minor part in the capitalist decision­
making.
The same was tme during the colonial period, when wages were much more 
important a part of the cost of manufacturing. Between 1911 and 1913, more than 
four times the amount of British capital was invested in Canada as in all of Britain’s 
African and Asian colonies, where the labour was infinitely cheaper. In fact, more 
British money was invested in the USA than in Canada. Yet, wages in the USA were 
higher than wages in Canada and both USA and Canada had wages higher than the 
ones in Europe. Also, the greatest French investment in Africa was in Algeria, where,
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due to the presence of a large European community, wages were much higher than 
elsewhere in French African possessions. The reason why there was so little 
investment in cormtries with cheap labour was that returns on investment were tiny 
or non-existent. Perhaps the most glaring example of the Marxist fallacy are the 
former German colonies, which were, in fact, consistently making a financial loss;.22
To sum up, whatever the driving force behind European imperialism, it was 
not based on sound economic logic. It flew in the face of profit-maximisation, which 
is the sine qua non of capitalism. In reality, prosperous states conduct most of their 
business with other prosperous states.22 Their prosperity is, therefore, not dependent 
on exploitation, but on mutually advantageous trade. Thus, the states that participate 
in free trade grow richer, while states that adopt isolationist and collectivist policies 
do not. No example better illustrates this point than the difference between the 
capitalist Taiwan and Communist China. As is known, in 1949 China and Taiwan 
separated following a long civil war. Both countries shared the same population, 
language, and culture; their incomes per capita per were the same. By 1997, 
however, the Taiwanese GNP per capita was $13203. Three years later, a comparable 
figure for China was only $780.2?
Despite all these facts, the left continues to oppose the enlargement of the 
freedom of the markets. Some of the most vocal have been the radicals protesting in 
Seattle, Prague, Nice and, most recently, Gothenburg?. The strategy of these groups 
is to mirror the meetings of the global bodies most associated with the growth of 
globalisation, such as WTO, IMF, and the World Bank and to protest, often 
violently, against the perceived injustices of globalisation. During the recent protests 
in Prague, for instance, the left-wing protesters expressed their conviction that 
capitalism is responsible for the poverty in the Third World. One of the protesters,
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sporting a green hat decorated with dollar signs and claiming to be a caricature of a 
capitalist, said “I have children for lunch and I kill people in many countries of the 
world”.26 The banners of the protesters also showed their anti-capitalist sentiments. 
Some of them read “Capitalism Kills” and “Make Love Not Trade”.22
Similarly, an anti-globalisation forum, taking place in Porto Alegre, Brazil, 
mirrored the recent 2000 Davos meeting. Entitled, the “World Social Forum”, the 
conference discussed, “...how to produce and distribute wealth for all; how to 
construct financial system that will tend to equality; how to transform scientific 
development into human development; and how to explore the limitations and 
possibilities of planetary citizenship”. Present were some of the most renowned 
political leaders of the contemporary left. Among them, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, 
member of Lionel Jospin’s cabinet, who articulated his criticism of globalisation as 
being against “a world in which domination of capital and of the financial markets 
works against democracy, and works against the need for long-term investment in 
health, in education, in culture”. [Mr Jospin himself was recently forced to 
acknowledge his involvement in the Trotskyite International Communist 
Organization. According to sources, Jospin had maintained contacts with the
no
movement for over 20 years. ] Ahmed Ben Bella, the first president of independent 
Algeria was there too. He demanded, “a moment’s silence in memory of his dear 
fnend Che Guevara and spoke of the light which shone from his dead body in those 
pictures which were printed everywhere, which illuminates our way still”?.
It must be borne in mind that not all groups opposing the free market are on 
the left of the political spectrum. However, because the concern of the right is 
different, in the sense that it does not focus on the centrality of the “inequality thesis” 
that is at the heart of this argument, it will be looked at only briefly. The right-wing
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vision, then, is more in line with the mercantilist vision of the world. In the USA, for 
example, the 1990's marked the rise of the “paleoconservative” movement centred 
on the US presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan. His intellectual credibility 
supported by writings of Llewellyn Rockwell, Justin Raimondo and Hans Hoppe, 
Buchanan's political programme emphasised the isolationist “America First” foreign 
policy, economic protectionism, and opposition to immigration. Seeing them as a 
triumph of vulture capitalists, Buchanan earned his reputation through his opposition 
to the Gulf War, NAFTA, and the GATT. On the moral side of the argument, 
Buchanan's peloeconservatives emphasised cultural traditionalism and defence of 
America's European and Christian identity. The Christian right has, of course, 
always been suspicious of excessive individualism and moral relativism, and 
globalisation has come to be perceived as exacerbating both of these qualities. Seeing 
its deeply felt beliefs under threat, the Christian right stepped up its emphasis on the 
traditional family values as well as its attacks on the advocates of abortion and gay 
rights®
It should also be recognised that opposition to globalisation is not limited to 
the developed countries only. Though it is true that developed states are most heavily 
affected by it, the underdeveloped world feels the changes too. Samuel Huntington's 
Clash of Civilisations went a long way in describing the unsettling impact of 
globalisation on other cultures, Islam in particular. Paradoxically, Huntington's own 
understanding of the process as synonymous with Westernisation has come under 
increasing strain precisely because of the increasing dissatisfaction with globalisation 
in the West. Clearly, the extreme left and the extreme right, be they in the developed 
or the underdeveloped world, see globalisation negatively. Though differing in the 
emphasis on what they perceive are the negative outcomes of globalisation, both
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movements strongly believe globalisation to be offsetting and destructive to their 
preferred ideals of society. This unlikely alliance is best documented by the 
following example. As has been reported, on the very day NAFTA, one of the 
landmark treaties epitomising the contemporary globalising trends, went into effect 
despite the vigorous opposition of the American right, the Marxist Zapatista National 
Liberation Army rebelled in the Mexican province of Chiapis claiming that NAFTA 
meant “a death sentence” for Mexican indigenous population.3?
II. Hatred of theMareets
These were people who believed everything about the Soviet Union was perfect, but 
they were bringing their own toilet paper.32
- P. J. O 'Rourke
This growing opposition to free market is not new. As Hayek argued, hatred of 
commercial activities is both eternal and universal.?? For example, Cyrus the Great, 
Emperor of Persia in the sixth century BC, thus responded to a Spartan warning, “I 
have never feared people of such a type that they have a place set aside in the middle 
of their city where they gather to perjure themselves and deceive each other”. As 
Herodotus explained, “Cyrus flung these words at all Greeks because they have 
established market-places, in which they buy and sell”.?4 Of course, the Persian 
society could not function without trade and commerce. But, as Farron points out, the 
Persians located their markets “in the outskirts of their cities and towns”.?? 
Comparable dislike for commercial activities was widespread throughout the ancient 
world. In the Odyssey, for example, Odysseus is insulted because he resembles a 
captain of a merchant ship “with his mind set on greedy profit”.?6 Also, writing in the
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4th century BC, Plato observes through one of his characters, “all the classes engaged 
in retail and wholesale trade ...are disparaged and subjected to contempt and 
insults”.37 Then he offers advice on how a city can protect itself against.
The first [rule] is to employ traders as little as possible; the second is 
to assign to that [commercial] activity those men whose corruption 
would be the least loss to society; the third is to find a way by which 
those engaged in commerce would not so easily be infected by 
shamelessness and meanness of soul.38
Plato also insisted that only non-citizens should be allowed to trade and a citizen who 
breaks this rule be put in jail and urged that the government should dictate prices and 
profits. As Farron writes, Plato’s writings merely “systematised and subjected to 
law the de facto situation in Athens at Plato’s time, where resident aliens conducted 
most commercial activities”.40 Similarly, Aristotle felt that commercial “exchange is 
justly condemned for it arises not from nature but from people profiting at others’ 
expense”.41 The Roman upper class also stigmatised trade. Romans, like the Greeks 
before them, believed in the myth of a Golden Age without commerce.42 Some of the 
greatest minds of the Republic took a dim view of trade and money-lending. Thus, 
Cicero narrates, Cato believed that agriculture was the honourable way of earning a 
living. When asked, “What about lending money?” Cato answered, “What about 
murder?”43 Perhaps not surprisingly, the Latin word for merchant, mercator, could 
also be construed as a term of abuse.44
Of course, the Holy Scriptures also provide justification for anti-business 
sentiments. The only violent act of Christ, for example, is when he chases the traders
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out of the Temple in Jerusalem. In the same vein, St Paul asserts, “The love of 
money is the root of all evil”.45 Thus, the Council of Lyons ruled in 1274 that 
individuals or communities harbouring usurers for more than three months would be 
excommunicated or interdicted.. At that time, in addition to being denied confession and 
absolution, the usurers were prohibited from receiving a Christian buna"® On the 
Protestant side, Martin Luther observed, “The greatest misfortune of the German nation 
is easily the traffic in inte^^^l^... The devil invented it”.47 The Koran also contains 
passages specifically prohibiting Muslims from usury. Likewise, it forbids profit­
making. “Deal not unjustly (by asking more than your capital sums), and you shall 
not be dealt with unjustly (by receiving less than your capital sums) [original 
explanations]”, it says.55 The Jewish religion also forbids certain economic activities. 
The Israelites are, for example, bamied from loaning money at interest to fellow 
Jews. At one point, lending money is listed as a culmination of such crimes as 
idolatry, adultery, and robbery.49
It will, therefore, come as no surprise that Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedv 
places usurers, blasphemers and sodomites in the lowest part of the 7‘ circle of Hell. 
Dante has done this, because he believed that, like the sodomites, usurers too have 
committed “unnatural” acts;.5® The opposition to the market reached its climax in the 
last century, when Nazis and Communists came close to eradicating it throughout the 
world. Hitler, Farron observes, like Cyrus and Plato before him, “assumed that 
‘subterfuge and swindling’ are synonymous with commerce and that nations who 
practice it must be cowardly”.51 So, he often used the word “shopkeeper” as a form 
reproach. At the height of WWII, for example, “shopkeepers” was one of the most 
common derogatory terms he used to denote the American and the British peoples. In
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the same vein, the Nazis often contrasted “Helden” [heroes] with their polar opposites, 
“Handler” [merchants].52
But, why is the opposition to market activities so widespread? The first 
reason has to do with what might be called “intuitive egalitarianism”. As Hayek 
writes, left-wing intellectuals are prone to “rationalising and carrying to extremes 
certain ambitions which spring from the normal intercourse of men... The most 
powerful of these general ideas which have shaped political development in recent 
times is... the ideal of material equality”. Egalitarian intellectuals, Hayek continues, 
thus perceive any action that increases equality as justified.53 This is certainly true 
when it comes to the Cosmopolitans, who justify restriction of private property in 
terms of the contribution this makes to the overall goal of equality. The 
Cosmopolitan goal of equality, in other words, is incompatible with differences in 
wealth possession and these differences must, therefore, cease to exist. Of course, 
opposition to a meaningful conception of private property is inextricably linked to 
the acceptability of the free market economic system; a system the very existence of 
which depends on the said inviolability of private property.
And, here comes the second problem. As Held writes, ownership of personal 
items, such as “shirt on one’s back” is acceptable, while ownership of “IBM shares” 
is not. It can hardly be lost that the difference between the types of private property 
that Held draws is based on a perception that their acquisition is somehow 
fundamentally different and that the acquisition of the latter is somehow morally 
deficient. But, what is it that makes wealth acquisition through trade, stock exchange 
and capital investment so unacceptable to a Cosmopolitan? The differences in 
possession of private property in a free economic environment arise out of different 
economic activities, such as trade, commerce, usury and, ultimately, capitalism.
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However, the single most important factor that ties all these forms of free enterprise 
together, are the much-maligned acts of self-interest and profit-making. Be it the 
ancient world, where the precursors of modem businessmen traded wine across the 
Mediterranean Sea; agricultural societies, where the predecessors of the modem 
bankers lent moneys to those desperate to get through the barren months of the year; 
or the contemporary world, where phamiaceutical companies sell dmgs to the sick, 
all these economic agents prospered and prosper through successful exploitation of
human needs and desires.
As was shown above, profit-making activities have always been perceived as 
morally deficient, unjust and, therefore, wrong. As a result, market activities have 
always been regulated to a far greater degree than any other part of the life of a 
coimnunity.54 Of course, opposition to creation of profit out of interactions between 
men is a fundamental tenet of Communism and, as will be shown, Nazism. The very 
insinuation that people do work in order to make money, as opposed to, for example, 
“helping” their fellow men by self-sacrificing themselves on their behalf, is 
abhorrent to the Communist mindset. Not surprisingly, therefore, the South African 
Minister of Justice, Penuell Maduna has recently lambasted the South African 
magistrates for demanding higher wages. In a confirmation of Johnson’s dictum that 
patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel, Maduna accused the magistrates of 
“unpatriotic” behaviour. Magistrates, he continued, ought to serve the community 
and not “make riches”. “When I studied law”, Maduna shared with his audience, “I 
wanted to serve my people, not reap financial rewards”.55
The socialist intellectuals in the UK and USA have renewed their attack on 
the profiteering aspect of capitalism as well, hi the USA, after admitting that the 
word “socialism” has lost its forcefulness, Richard Rorty remarked that his fellow
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“American leftist intellectuals stand in need of a new political vocabulary”. “I 
suggest”, he continued, “that we start talking about greed and selfishness rather than 
bourgeois ideology”?® Similarly, Marquand writes, “Central to almost all [socialist] 
groupings... were words like ‘co-operation’, ‘commonwealth’ and ‘fellowship’... 
[T]he term that encapsulated the essence of the socialist ideal was fratermty...” 
Capitalism, on the other hand, represents for Marquand a “relentless pressure to 
commodify all social goods”, to reduce all human intercourse to a “bottom line” of 
loss and profit.57 But, can Marquand deny that Communism, rather than encouraging 
human intercourse, put an end to all forms of civil society? Or does Marquand feel 
that regardless of what the Communists did, at the very least they were not motivated 
by greed? If so, he is wrong. Conquest writes,
Corruption of every possible type flourished in all the Communist 
countries. But it is not only that the USSR, for example, became a vast 
kleptocracy, it is also the case that even the supposedly pristine 
revolutionaries were anything but immune. .. .Milovan Djilas, then a 
Yugoslav Communist leader, was shocked at how his victorious 
partisans, on entering Belgrade, seized villas, cars, women, and so on.
The same was, of course, noted of the Sandinistas when they entered 
Managua??
To this abhorrence of the profit motive there must also be added the air of 
patronising self-righteousness with which the left treats the expressions of people’s 
preferences. No example illustrates this better than the contemporary craze against 
the American food chain McDonald’s. McDonald’s is a typical example of a
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commercial enterprise that grows from strength to strength by providing the public 
with something that the public wants. Nobody forces the public to eat there, but the 
public does so anyway. Yet, the anti-globalisation protesters have determined that, 
somehow, the people are being wronged. And. so, the protesters find themselves in a 
paradoxical position of protecting “the people” from “the people” themselves. Of 
course, there is absolutely nothing new about the aura of self-righteousness. As is 
well known, the Communist “guardians” in Eastern Europe knew the people’s “true” 
desires just as well. Expression of a differing opinion, of course, was synonymous 
with suffering from false consciousness, which, in turn, mandated, incarceration in a
mental institute or worse.
The philosophical grounding of this viewpoint maybe found in the writings of 
Antonio Gramsci. According to Gramsci, interests and preferences of actors are 
shaped by culture, politics, law and lrnowledge. When it comes to the economy, the 
theory goes, behaviour of actors takes place within a certain structure of ideas, 
culture and loiowledge. Clearly, therefore, objectivity of such behaviour cannot be 
assumes. More likely, actors’ behaviour will depend “upon prevailing beliefs and 
patterns of thinking in the world economy, many of which are embodied in 
institutions”. Not surprisingly, these prevailing beliefs and patterns of thinking will 
mirror the beliefs of the dominant power. Thus, Woods writes, the Gramscian 
explanation of the recent upsurge of free market thinking simply reflects “US 
interests in the global economy, successfully projected through structures of 
knowledge (it became the dominant paradigm in top research universities), through 
institutions (such as the IMF which became forceful proponents of neo-liberal policy 
prescriptions), and tlirough broader cultural beliefs and understandings,. .”59
104
Of course, at no point do the Gramscian scholars take into account the possibility that 
the effects of free trade may be compatible with people’s preferences; that the 
convergence toward the neo-liberal paradigm may be a result of rational preferences 
of millions of people who lived under socialism and chose to rid themselves of it. 
This inability of the left-wing intellectuals to see common people’s preferences as 
rational and legitimate may rest in what Chesher and Machan call the dualistic view 
of human experience. This dualism concerns the largely artificial distinction between 
the temporal and the spiritual experience and its hierarchical systematisation with, 
not surprisingly, intellectual pursuits emerging at the top. The fact that the 
intellectuals have a stake in preservation of this hierarchy and their subsequent 
privileged position at the top of the social ladder will not be lost. Nozick writes,
From the beginning of recorded thought, intellectuals have told us 
their activity is most valuable. Plato valued the rational faculty above 
courage and the appetites and deemed that philosophers should rule; 
Aristotle held that intellectual contemplation was the highest activity.
It is not surprising that surviving texts record this high evaluation of 
intellectual activity. It is not surprising that surviving texts record this 
high evaluation of intellectual activity. The people who formulated 
evaluations, who wrote them down with reasons to back them up, 
were intellectuals, after all. They are praising themselves.60
Whatever the case, it is quite telling that the people, who never forgave the smallest 
shortcomings in the West, were prepared to overlook the grossest violations of 
human rights in the East. Thus, Lincoln Steffens, the well-known exponent of
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American corruption, returned from the USSR saying “I have seen the future and it 
works”. Returning from East Germany, Dr, Ralph Abernathy commented about this 
most oppressive of all East European dictatorships, “Every minute of my stay in your 
wonderful country was filled with joy and valuable political experience. I go back to 
my country the richer for having learned to know and appreciate the German 
Democratic Republic”. The American social critic Scott Nearing said of East 
Germany that it “was governed wholly without coercion”. Similarly devoid of truth 
was Walter Duranty’s report that the famine in Ukraine had not happened. [Duranty 
was later to receive the Pulitzer Prize for his journalistic exertions.] Manning Clark, 
the famous Australian historian, said of Lenin that he was “Christ-like, at least in his 
compassion”. Similarly, the French novelist Romain Rolland described Geimikh 
Yagoda, the chief of the Soviet secret police, as “sensitive and intellectual”. Then 
there are Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who together with the historian Sir Bernard 
Pares and Harold Laski, the one-time chainnan of the Labour Party, maintained that 
the Communist show trials were “genuine exercises in truth and legality”. Laski was 
later to say of Vyshinsky, the man responsible for the above trials, that he was “a 
man whose passion was for law reform... He was doing what an ideal Minister of 
Justice would do if we had such a person in Great Britain”. Owen Lattimore said of I.
F. Nikishov, the head of the Soviet Gulag system, that he had “a trained and sensitive 
interest in art and music and also deep sense of civic responsibility”. Few can top H.
G. Wells’ impression of Stalin. He wrote,
I have never met a man more candid, fair and honest, and to these 
qualities it is, and nothing occult and sinister, that he owes his 
tremendous undisputed ascendancy in Russia. I had thought before I
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saw him that he might be where he was because men were afraid of
him but I realise that he owes his position to the fact that no one is
afraid of him and everybody trusts him.
Stalin’s executions and purges of 1936-1938, George Orwell writes, “were 
applauded by lifelong opponents of capital punishment”. “It was considered... proper 
to publicise famines when they happened in India”, he continued, “and to conceal 
them when they happened in Ukraine”. Guy Burgess and other homosexuals 
venerated the USSR, even though homosexuality was criminalised there until the end 
of Communism. In Communist Cambodia, homosexuality was punishable by death. 61 
Many left-leaning Jews continued to speak glowingly of the USSR, despite Stalin’s 
anti-Semitism. Eugene Lyons “records the admiration for Soviet industrialisation 
expressed by a couple of California back-to-nature, hand-loom faddists”. Even 
Christian dignitaries found words of praise for the godless dictatorships. Sherwood 
Eddy, leader of the YMCA, wrote,
Russia has achieved what has hitherto been known only at rare periods 
of history, the experience of almost a whole people living under a 
unified philosophy of life. All life is focused in a central purpose. It is 
directed to a single high end and energised by such powerful and 
glowing motivation that life seems to have supreme significance. It 
releases a flood ofjoyous and strenuous activity [emphasis added].62
Foucault approved of both, Maoist purges and Khomeini’s fundamentalism. In what 
was to become the typical response of the leftists to any criticism levied against
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them, Foucault had convinced himself of moral equanimity between the USSR and 
USA. As he stated, “What could politics mean when it was a question of choosing 
between Stalin’s USSR and Truman’s America?”®3 Then there is Jean-Paul Sartre, 
who upon his return from Russia in 1954 stated, “Freedom of criticism in the USSR 
is total”.64
As D’Souza shows, authors of influential textbooks used at high schools and 
colleges did their part to perpetuate socialist myths. In 1982, the renowned 
Sovietologist Seweryn Bialer claimed that “The Soviet Union is not now nor will it 
be during the next decade in the throws of a true systemic crisis, for it boasts 
enormous unused reserves of political and social stability”. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 
stated, “those in the United States who think the Soviet Union is on the verge of 
economic and social collapse” are “wishful thinkers who are only kidding 
themselves”. Paul Samuelson, a Nobel Prize-winning economist wrote in 1985, 
“What counts is results, and there can be no doubt that the Soviet planning system 
has been a powerful engine for economic growtli... The Soviet model has surely 
demonstrated that a command economy is capable of mobilising resources for rapid 
growth”.®5 Similarly, McCoimell’s Economics claimed as late as 1987 that “the 
Soviet growth rate has generally exceeded that of the United States in the post-World 
War II period as a whole”.®® hi the same year, Robert Solow, another Nobel Prize 
Wiimer stated, “I still believe the institution of private property has to keep proving 
itself’ and then referred to Proudhon’s dictum that “property is theft”.®7 Only months 
before the collapse of Communism, Lester Thurow, an MIT economist wrote, “Can 
economic command significantly... accelerate the growth process? The remarkable 
performance of the Soviet Union suggests that it can... Today the Soviet Union is a
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comtry whose economic achievements bear comparison with those of the United 
States’’.68
It is Imown now that the communist countries falsified their economic data,
sometimes exaggerating them and sometimes inventing them. No wonder then that in 
1989, the US Department of Commerce estimated that per capita income in East 
Gennany was higher than that in West Germany and that East German GDP per 
capita was higher than that of Japnn!®9 Yet, no lesser figure than John Kenneth 
Galbraith was willing to believe these statistics. As he stated
That the Soviet system has made great material progress in recent years 
is evident both from the statistics and from the general urban scene...
One sees it in the appearance of solid well-being of the people on the 
sheets... and the general aspect of restaurants, theatres, and shops...
Partly, the Russian system succeeds because, in contrast with the 
Western industrial economies, it makes full use of its manpower... The 
Soviets [do not] have our Veblenian leisure class - the considerable 
number of people who are released by material wellbeing from 
manual and mental toil.7®
Galbraith said this in 1984. Within a year of this statement Gorbachev revealed to the 
world that the Soviet economy was in deep trouble. Four years later the socialist 
experiment collapsed in its entirety. In 1999, Galbraith’s life-long work of 
misleading of the American public as to the advantages of socialism and 
shortcomings of their own economic system earned him the Presidential Medal of 
Freedom - the highest honour an American civilian can receive. Harvard University
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President, Neil L. Rudenstine, commented, “This is an honour in which all of us 
rejoice. For a good deal more than half a century, Ken Galbraith has brought 
intellectual incisiveness, generosity of spirit, stylistic elegance, sheer sanity, and
71great good sense to the world of our public discourse”.
It is implausible that all the above people were cheated by the Communist
propaganda. At least on some occasions, be it in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia 
in 1968, the brutality of the Soviet regime should have become obvious. But, blinded 
by the idea of equality and abhorrence of the free market, the left was largely silent. 
Even with the demise of Communism and opening of the Soviet archives, through 
which the Red Terror became apparent, many on the left are not prepared to face the 
reality. No example shows this better than Michael Ignatieff s “The Late Show” 
inteiwiew with a prominent historian, Eric Hobsbawm. Ignatieff asked Hobsbawm to 
explain his long membership of the Communist Party. Hobsbawm replied that he 
“didn’t have an option”. “You see”, he continued, “either there was going to be 
future or there wasn’t going to be a future and this [Communism] was the only thing 
that offered an acceptable future”. Ignatieff then probed Hobsbawm on the 
justifiability of the suffering that the Soviet people endured under their Communist 
rulers. Hobsbawm replied that in retrospect the suffering involved in the Soviet 
experiment was “probably only marginally worthwhile”, because of the type of state 
that the Soviet Union turned into. Pressing the issue, Ignatieff asked, “What that 
comes down to is saying that had the radiant tomoirow actually been created, the loss 
of fifteen, twenty million people might have been justified?” Hobsbawm’s response 
was, “Yes”.72
The radiant tomorrow that Hobsbawm spoke of was the Coimnunist ideal of 
equality. In his mind, this was a goal worth pursuing and indeed, dying for.
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Moreover, as he stated, it was the only “acceptable” future and no alternative was 
feasible. Obviously, Hobsbawm was not the only academic to share this view. As has 
been shown, thousands of people across the world felt the same and some still do. In 
a recent article entitled “The People’s Paradise Crumbles”, John Gittings narrated the 
following story from his trip to North Korea. As he was walking through the empty 
shopping malls, his North Korean minder mused, “People don’t need to buy goods so 
much”. “Our government”, he said, “supplies the essentials through the public 
distribution system. There may be less quantity compared to the past, but we equalise 
the rich and the poor”.73 What this statement shows is that the notion of equality has, 
as in Hobsbawm’s case, assumed a position of central importance in the political 
language and thus in the struggle of the governing elite to legitimise its own hold on 
power. It does not matter that North Korean Communism has obviously failed to do 
what the Marxists intended - that is, to improve the lives of everyone. Neither does it 
matter that they have instead made lives miserable for everyone but the tiny 
governing elite. What matters, is that everyone suffers equally.
But, Keimeth Minogue wrote, “as radicals have lost plausible utopias of one 
kind or another - from the Soviet Union to Cuba they have become more 
ferociously intolerant of the society in which they live”?4 Herbert Marcuse, for 
example, used to champion his concept of “repressive tolerance” in a belief that 
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are “deceptive alibis for oppressive state 
power”. “Liberating tolerance”, he wrote, “would mean intolerance against 
movements from the Right, and toleration of movements from the Left”. Indeed, 
Marcuse even sanctioned “extralegal means” in suppressing the anti-Leftist 
opposition. As he continued, “Different opinions... can no longer compete 
peacefully for adherence and persuasion on rational grounds: the ‘marketplace of
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ideas’ is organised and delimited by those who determine the national and the 
individual interest, hi this society... the false consciousness has become the general 
consciousness.. .”.75
If it wants to keep its ideals relevant in the post-1989 world, Conquest argues, 
the left has no choice but to reinvent history. The radical scholars must, therefore, 
keep the casualties of Communism low, treat the oppression under Communism as 
minor matter, favour “dispassionate” scholarship of Communism over a 
“judgmental” one, deny the validity of the word ‘totalitarian’ and strive to present 
Stalinism and Maoism as normal.76 Indeed, ferocious rewriting of history is already 
beginning. John Le Carre, for example, claimed that “capitalism was today killing 
many more [people] than Communism ever had”. Nigel Nicholson claimed that 
Solzhenitsyn “had betrayed his country just as Anthony Blunt had his”, Recent CNN
Cold War television series claimed that Stalinism in the USSR was offset in the USA 
by McCarthyism.77 Then there is Mike Davis’ book entitled Late Victorian 
Holocausts that claims that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, between 30 
and 60 million people died as a result of capitalism and so on.78
Likewise, in the newspapers and magazines across the UK, the shortcomings 
of the free markets are once-again hotly discussed. Eric Hobsbawm, for example, 
recently expressed his concerns. He evoked the Asian economic crisis and the 
unsatisfactory economic transformation in Russia to argue that markets, allowed to 
run rampant, spell disaster. Consequently, he argued, there is a need for the most 
powerful governments to take a coordinated action to control and to regulate them. 
The main problem today, Hobsbawm reasoned, is to distribute wealth. “Doing 
something about the growing inequality and social maldistribution”, he wrote, should 
be the role of the nation-state. “It is time for the Labour Government to remember”,
112
he continued, “that its major objective is not national wealth but welfare and social
fairness”,79
Similarly, the former defender of the free markets, John Gray, has now turned 
against them. The main focus of his criticism is what he sees as the extreme 
rationalisation of the social life. According to Gray, the neo-liberal dogma is 
assuming an air of infallibility that requires all facets of public life confonn to it.2° 
This dogmatism applies especially to the teachings of F. A. Hayek. Hayek’s theory 
of the spontaneous emergence of the free market, Gray now argues, is a sham for its 
freedom can only be guaranteed and defended by the s^^tee1 In order to do so, the 
state has to engage in social engineering comparable to that of the communists.22 
One of the biggest dangers ahead. Gray contends, is an increase in intra-national and 
international mequaHly. He then evokes the events of 1929 to show both that the 
markets are not to be relied upon and to point out that the state is the natural means 
of protection for the people against the excesses of the markets.84 He then uses the 
arguments about the instability of the markets made by the financier George Soros. 
Soros has over the past decade become very critical of the dangers inherent in 
“unconstrained” capitalism. In his autobiography, he stated, “The collapse of the 
global marketplace would be a traumatic event with unimaginable consequences. Yet 
I find it easier to imagine than the continuation of the present regime”,®
Then there is Neil Clark, who bemoaned the arrival of the free market in his 
adopted homeland, Hungary. Professing to have left Britain because of the effects of 
Thatcherism on British society, Clark commended the post-communist Hungarians 
for their high degree of social cohesion, education and culture. His hope, he writes, 
was that Hungary would be able to preserve “the solid social achievements of the old 
[communist] system”..® Today, Clark continues, his hopes are dashed. Crime is high.
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educational standards low and the health service moves from crisis to crisis. Culture
too is suffering from capitalism. “Saturday night prime-time television”, he reflects, 
“usually featured poetry reading and a classical music concert. Now, on a Saturday 
night we can choose between nearly 20 channels, almost all of them showing mind- 
numbingly inane game shows or American ‘action movies’ resplendent with blood, 
gore and expletives.’^
Finally, there is Michael Prowse, who recently commented on the “galloping 
Americanisation of British life”. “Britons”, he wrote, “like Americans now work all 
hours: the workaholism that started in the City has become a national disease”, “The 
London traffic”, Prowse continued, “is now relentless seven days a week. Every 
Sunday has its rush hour as the shoppers flood into the malls to pay their respects to 
Mammon. When I ventured out this week, I began to understand what Karl Marx 
meant when he wrote of ‘commodity fetishism’ [italics addeV].”C Cultuaal life 
suffers too, it seems, for children and young people can find nothing on the television 
that will broaden their horizons. “My point is simply”, Prowse concludes, “that 
market alone cannot create either a good society or happy citizens. ...If society 
becomes too thoroughly ‘mai'ketissd’, if the principle of private pursuit of personal 
gain becomes too dominant, then people become greedy and selfish. Britain is now 
running that risk”.7®
114
III. Hypocrisy
” ...[And] from the nothingness of good works, she passed to the somethingness of
ham and toast with great cheerfulness. ”90
- Charles Dickens
As Robert Lacey wrote, “The pursuit of equality has been one of the great religions 
of the twentieth century, and like all religions it has generated more than its fair share 
of hypocrisy”.91 Indeed, some the greatest opponents of capitalism have been the 
same people, who not only enjoyed the fruits of capitalist progress, but who also 
participated in quintessentially capitalist activities, such as money lending.®2 
Following German unification, for example, the Junkers, the mral gentry class, felt 
most threatened by the expansion of the free market and led the opposition against it. 
Yet, it was the Junkers, who spearheaded the highly speculative railway construction 
enterprise. Some of the noblemen closest to both Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm 
engaged in trade with ferocity.92
Similarly, many critics of materialism were more than willing to partake in 
the market process when it suited them. Beethoven, for instance, valued his artistic 
independence, but found that selling music was by far the most effective way of 
ensuring that independenee.94 Gauguin made his money as a stockbroker - the 
archetypical capitalist activity. He then left France for Tahiti in the hope that his art 
would appreciate in value whilst he was gone. On the island, “he constantly 
monitored the value of his pictures in France”.®® T. S. Eliot, the voice of a 
“disillusioned” generation, worked for Lloyd’s Bank. The leaders of the French anti­
establishment cultural revolution of the 19® centuiy, including Cezanne, Degas,
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Delacroix, Manet, and Monet, lived off their families. As Cowen writes, most of the 
funds the above revolutionaries lived off were of commercial origin. The venomous 
Verlaine also lived off his parents, as did Baudelaire and Flaubert.96 Shakespeare 
wrote his plays for money. Bach and Hayden sold their music.97 Mozart wrote, “my 
sole purpose is to make as much money as possible; for after good health it is the 
best thing to have”.98 Benvenuto Cellini wrote, “I’m a poor goldsmith, and I work for 
anyone who pays me”.99 While receiving his Oscar, Charlie Chaplin said, “I went 
into the business for money and the art grew out of it”.100
Politicians’ attitudes towards the role of the market in society, especially 
where the provision of health care and education are concerned, matter greatly. 
Should, the question goes, the market forces be allowed to determine the education 
of the nation’s children? Should the market determine the care for the elderly? These 
are fundamental questions and the answers given are, usually, negative. Health and 
education, it is often said, need to be left to the public-spirited civil servants, not the 
“greedy” capitalists. And it is from these “greedy” capitalists that the welfare state 
claims to protect the most vulnerable members of the society; children and the 
elderly. The truth, however, is not so simple. The welfare state damages the interests 
of the poor and this is recognised even by the advocates of the welfare state, who are, 
incidentally, the first ones to opt out from it.
US federal employees, for example, are exempt from mandatory contribution 
to Social Security. Instead, they have given themselves the right to invest in private 
pensions schemes, thus reaping greater future benefits than the rest of the population 
can. Members of the Hispanic and Black Congressional Caucuses, who ferociously 
defend public education in the USA from any mention of vouchers, send their 
children to private schools. According to the Heritage Foundation survey, 70% of the
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Hispanic and 30% of the black members of congress do so, even though only 6% of 
the Hispanic and 4% of the black families send their children to private schools. 
Other great advocates of the welfare state and public education. Bill Clinton, A1 Gore 
and Jssse Jackson among them, have also been hypocritically providing for their 
children’s futures by sending them to private schools;?01 But, this is also the practice 
of the teachers working in the public sector. For example, 46% of whits and 56% of 
black public school teachers in the Chicago area choose to pay fees for private 
education.107 Similarly, the Canadian politicians have built for themselves a Senior 
Executive Clinic, serving exclusively the “900 deputy ministers, assistant deputies, 
departmental directors and heads of special agencies” as well as “65 senators, 166 
members of parliament and 198 senior executives”.® This should prevent them from 
having to suffer delays in provision of medical care that the public has to put up with.
Despite this practical acknowledgement of ths benefits that thv market brings, 
many people continue to advocate policies aimed to further constrain it. Clinton, to 
give one example, wanted to nationalise healthcare in the USA. Next chapter will 
analyse an elaborate example of such conflicted vision. As will be seen, the 
Cosmopolitans acknowledge the superiority of the market mechanism, when 
compared with its socialist competitor, and then proceed to explain why the very 
aspects that make capitalism so effective should be restricted or baimed altogether. 
The stock exchange, for example, is clearly a place without future in the 
Cosmopolitan proposal. Yet it is precisely thv stock exchange that enables the market 
to direct capital in directions where it will be most useful. It is, in other words, one of 
ths very aspects that make capitalism mors efficient than any other economic system 
in human history’.
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Chapter Four
The lesson given to mankind by every age, and always disregarded - that speculative 
philosophy, which to the superficial appears a thing so remote from the business of 
life and the outward interest of men, is in reality the thing on earth which most 
influences them, and in the long run overbears any influences save those it must itself 
obey.1
-J. S. Mill
The preceding chapter looked at the opposition to free markets in general terms. As 
has been seen, there is a long tradition of left-leaning intellectuals opposing market 
forces, preferring instead the guidance of the state. The underpinnings of this 
opposition are manifold. Firstly, there is the bias of these intellectuals in favour of 
activities directly connected to the welfare of the mind. Welfare of the body, 
however, has been frowned upon at least since the time of Plato. Secondly, there is 
the intellectuals’ unease with the concept of profiteering and the feeling that actions 
leading to accumulation of wealth through trade are immoral. This is so despite the 
fact that in a free market economy profits normally arise out of providing the 
populace with what the populace wants. Thirdly, there is the connected issue of the 
intellectuals’ arrogant belief in the superiority of their own wisdom and a feeling that 
the masses of people need to be led and directed in a certain way. Fourthly, there is 
the issue of inequality. There is a large number of intellectuals who believe that 
equality before the law is not good enough; that true equality must also be material 
equality or equality of outcome. The free market is seen to be encouraging this 
inequality. Underlying all this is the mistaken view that all people and all groups are
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capable of achieving approximately the same degree of material well-being and that, 
when this is not the case, inequality is in itself a sign of discrimination somewhere 
along the line. This is the view held by the Cosmopolitan school of thought and it 
will be discussed it in the first part of this chapter. The second part of this chapter 
will offer a different view of inequality. As will be shown, the spread of the free 
markets does, in fact, encourage a more even spread of wealth. That is, countries 
which embrace capitalism end up with a more dispersed - albeit unequal - 
distribution of wealth. This is so, because unlike in tribalism, feudalism or socialism, 
in capitalism wealth camiot be maintained by means of force, with one small group 
of people expropriating for themselves privileges unavailable to others.
I. The Cosmopolitans and The Third Way
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the 
Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to 
repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty 
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without
understanding.2
- L. Brandeis
Some of the fiercest critics of the social changes associated with the growth of the 
free markets are to be found amongst the ‘transformationalists’. In much of the 
literature, the transfon-nationalist school is linked with a much wider body of 
thinking, which is becoming increasingly influential in philosophical and theoretical 
circles in the social sciences and which is also begimiing to have an impact on
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practice. This wider approach is usually termed “Cosmopolitan” . Over the last ten 
years in particular, these two trends have also become linked with a more general 
policy-oriented trend in centre-left governments and policy institutes, usually 
refeiTed to as the ‘Third Way’.4 The link between policy intellectuals and 
governments are complex and overlapping and could be the subject of a thesis by 
itself. However, this chapter will focus on the intellectual core of the argument as 
manifested in some of its key intellectual figures. These will be Giddens and, most 
relevant for international relations, David Held.
In their work, Giddens and Held share an emphasis on class, social exclusion 
and the “excesses” of the free market. Giddens’ other close intellectual proximity is 
to the current British government and its Prime Minister, Tony Blair. It was to 
Blair’s politics that Giddens lent intellectual credibility by articulating Blair’s 
programme in his now famous 1998 book The Third Wav. The book was appraised 
across the moderate left wing of the political spectrum. Blair called it “...a global 
attempt to apply progressive values in new ways”. Romano Prodi, the former Italian 
Prime Minister and the current President of the European Commission stated, “We 
need new thinking about democracy and economic development. Tony Giddens 
gives us some vital clues about how to achieve these aims”. Similarly, President 
Cardoso of Brazil commended Giddens for marking “a major further development in 
the evolution of the left”?
Giddens’ intellectual development was, it seems, marked by the collapse of 
Communism and the rise of the neo-liberal economic doctrine exemplified by 
Thatcher and Reagan. As a result, Giddens and many others found it inevitable to 
accept capitalism, while at the same time emphasising the need for tackling its 
apparent excesses? This seeming conflict between unconstrained capitalism on the
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one side and public welfare on the other side is a growing area of study and a 
concern that with increasing frequency determines the direction and the tone of 
public debate. Giddens’ own approach to the problem is a departure from the 
previous left-wing policies. The Third Way, he writes, recognises the demise of 
Socialism for what it was, a fundamentally flawed socio-economic system. 
Consequently, Giddens argues, New Labour has to embrace some of the neo-liberal 
reforms. As such, Giddens seems to recognise that the former social system based on 
an unsustainable plethora of entitlements without the accompanying need for 
responsible behaviour was, in the long run, unworkable.7 His recent work. The Third 
Wav and its Critics, exemplifies Giddens’ acceptance of some form of neo-liberal 
socio-economic understanding. It is here that he answers the variety of criticisms 
from the left of the political spectmm. The book is significant, because it shows how 
far to the left this guru of the Third Way is willing to go in order to blunt the
criticism of the extremists.
Giddens’ opening is in line with the expected. “Decent society”, he says, 
requires social goods that markets cannot provide? Moreover, unregulated markets 
are inherently unstable, but regulated markets are “peaceful”.? In order to regulate 
them, Giddens proposes a) surveillance of the capital movements, b) establishment of 
the lender of last resort and c) waging a global war on poverty. 10 Domestically, too, 
the markets do not produce optimal results and should not be excessively relied on.11 
Although it is true that in the past both the government and the markets have been 
the problem, Giddens continues, laissez-faire has gone too far. Therefore, what is 
needed is more government, not less.’? The economy must be constrained in the 
interests of “social justice” and “social solidarity”.’? These two, in his view, are the 
ultimate goals in public policy decision-making. Of course, the offshoot of this
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emphasis on “social justice” is the left-wing commitment to egalitarianism. He 
writes, “Third way politics look... to maximise equality of opportunity. However, 
this has to preserve a concern with limiting inequality of outcome too. The chief 
reason is that equality of opportunity can generate inequalities of wealth and income 
- that then hampers opportunities for subsequent generations”.14 And, because today 
the free market has resulted in the enlargement of material inequalities, the “morally 
compelling solution” is to take from the rich and give it to the poor.'5 The essential 
pillars of such “solution” are, firstly, progressive taxation, albeit, not as extremely 
polarised as before and, secondly, the inheritance tax.'5 These should, ideally, move 
society closer towards limiting social exclusion, another major concern of the Third 
Way. Social exclusion, as Giddens defines it, “refers to circumstances that affect 
more or less the entire life of an individuals, not just a few aspects of it”.'5 The 
ultimate test of Third Way social policy rests in its ability to reduce numbers of 
those, who would otherwise be left behind.'5 But, it is Held who provides the most 
detailed proposal for reform.
Cosmopolitans see the globalisation-induced changes as an opportunity for 
the “reconstitution” of the power, functions and authority of national governments. 
Why this “reconstitution” of the proper scope of governmental intervention should be 
welcomed is made clear by Held's claim that “...the state has been locked into the 
maintenance and reproduction of systemic inequalities of power and resource, 
distorting decision outcomes in favour of particular interests...”'9. There are a 
number of issues in need of clarification. Since it is the problem of “inequality” that 
Held sees the greatest need of and opportunity for rectifying, it is obvious from the 
start that the pursuit of “equality” will be central to this discussion. The question then 
becomes, what sort of equality is Held thinking of? The inequality Held begins by
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referring to, is one of “access” to political decision-making. Held obviously believes 
that not all the people can enjoy what they are rightfully entitled to and that is, equal 
say in matters of public policy. Held’s “Cosmopolitan project” is thus clearly rooted 
in the belief that the contemporary democratic model makes political equality at best 
theoretical. Why, however, should equality of political access be good or desirable? 
Clearly, Held believes that inequality of access to political decision-making results in 
the unequal distribution of resources. His point of departure, therefore, is a 
presupposition that political inequality results in material inequality. Logically, 
therefore, it must be expected that were the access to political decision-making equal, 
the material distribution would become equal too. However, this equation works the 
other way as well. Material inequality results in political inequality. Therefore, the 
only possible solution is to rectify both inequalities. Moreover, such equalisation has 
to happen synonymously. Failure to do so will result in the perpetuation of one type 
of inequality and, consequently, postponement of the other type of equality. Held’s 
entire argument is thus an interplay between the two types of inequality and a search 
for a way to rectify them.
How is this rectification to take place? The above statement clearly implies 
that the rectification of inequality in political decision-making shall have to happen 
as a result of tackling of the problem of “democratic deficit”. However, this can only 
happen if the democratic base is broadened to include all those eligible to participate. 
Failure to do so will result in the reaffirmation of the contemporary system that 
serves only the interests of “particular groups”. Indeed, Held points out that there is a 
“tension” between the very ideas upon winch the contemporary state is built and the 
fulfilment of true democracy.20 Thereoore, a rethinking of the “fundamental 
conditions of a democratic polity and the limitations of existing accounts of
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democracy” and the consequent proposal for greater democratic participation in 
global governance is at the heart of the Cosmopolitan plan for the rectification of 
inequality.21 Thus Held's Cosmopolitan project is no less than an advocacy of a new 
model of democracy; an employment of the opportunities provided by the offsetting 
effects of globalisation for the refonn of the whole democratic model. At the core of 
Held's proposal for the expansion of democratic decision-making is his re-definition 
of the principle upon which global governance should rest. This he calls the 
“principle of autonomy” where,
Persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations 
in the specification of the political framework which generates and 
limits the opportunities available to them; that is, they should be free 
and equal in the detenmnation of the conditions of their own lives, so 
long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of 
others.22
The Principle's function, therefore, is twofold. Its first function is to provide an 
egalitarian framework for political action. This is the principle's positive or creative 
function. But, there is also a negative or limiting function. This is also to reconcile, in 
a better way than the present model of liberal democracy does, individual right to 
self-determination with the necessary constraints on popular sovereignty. What do 
these “constraints” mean and why are they necessary? Traditionally it has been 
understood that, besides an area subjected to the control of the government, or the 
public sphere, there should also be a private sphere safe from such interference. As 
has been seen in the first chapter, the establishment of a proper bomdary between the
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determining power of the state on the one hand, and the autonomy of the individual 
on the other hand is a subject of fundamental importance in political theory.
Of course, reconciliation of the public and private spheres of socio-economic 
life is inextricably intertwined with the question of freedom, equality and socio­
economic policy in general. Should, for example, the government mandate “social 
provisions”? Are the people entitled to medical help? If so, are they also entitled to 
aid during unemployment? If so, do they have a right to a certain number of holidays, 
working hours and lunch-breaks? The list goes on. Clearly, there is no agreement on 
such universal entitlement scheme, just as there is no agreement on the scope of 
governmental control. Occasionally, there are attempts to do just that. The European 
Declaration of Fundamental Rights, for example, explicitly mentions a number of 
“social provisions” that the Europeans should enjoy as a matter of rights. But, 
immediately, questions arose. Was the Declaration legally binding or not, the 
politicians and legal experts asked? Could the European Court of Justice be used to 
enforce these new rights, even if these were not included in the present British legal 
system? What about national competitiveness? How would Britain compete against 
nations that did not sign this document and were, consequently, unburdened by its
costs?
In fact, this disagreement between what the government should and should 
not do became synonymous with the distinction between political rights, such as 
freedom of expression, and economic rights, such as entitlement to healthcare. These 
in turn came roughly to coiTi^i^jpond with Berlin’s distinction between negative and 
positive liberty. During the Helsinki Accords, for instance, the USA insisted on the
inclusion in the final document of what the Americans called the First Basket of 
Rights. All of these were negative in nature. Thus, the Americans argued, the people
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of the Communist Bloc should be free from coercion when exercising their right to 
assembly, to worship and to free expression of their thought. The Soviets, on the 
other hand, insisted on the inclusion of a number of positive freedoms, which came 
to be laiown as the Second Basket of Rights. Among these were a right to universal 
welfare and healthhc-a.23 In fact, the emphasis on the different baskets of rights 
clearly elucidated the differences in the political philosophies of the USA and the 
USSR. The American political system, much like the one in Britain, is steeped in the 
tradition of fighting against political oppression. Its legitimacy rested on allowing the 
populace to make the best of life free from political oppression. The legitimacy of 
Communism, however, rested on the Soviet ability to provide the populace with 
social and material well-being. In order to preserve the liberty of the individual, the 
American system accepted material inequality as inevitable. In order to promote 
equality, the Communists turned the USSR into a totalitarian state.
The following example should further elucidate the issue. Let it be supposed 
that person A needs healthcare but camiot afford it. According to the logic of positive 
liberty, he may still have the freedom or an entitlement to be provided with 
healthcare. Someone else must, therefore, meet the cost of such a provision. Very 
likely, such a person will be B, who has the money to cover not just his own 
healthcare but also the healthcare of A. Consequently, money will be taken from 
him. The positive freedom of person A, in other words, trumps the negative right of 
person B not to be coerced into sharing some of his earnings. The situation can also 
be reversed. Person B might be, according to the logic of negative liberty, entitled to 
be left in charge of his earnings. The negative liberty of person B not to be coerced 
into sharing his income, therefore, tmmps the positive right of person A to 
healthcare. The practical outcome of these two interpretations liberty could not be
129
more different. States that adopt some form of negative liberty as a guiding principle 
of political decision-making are generally seen to have a higher degree of personal 
freedom, but a greater degree of inequality. States that adopt some form of positive 
liberty are seen to be more equal, but less free. Of course, things can and do get more 
complex. The proponents of negative liberty argue that their system is, in fact, 
egalitarian for it guarantees equal protection from coercion to everyone. The 
proponents of positive liberty, on the other hand, argue that their system is about the 
freedom to choose from a variety of choices that would normally not be available.
Held's own intuition is to reject the first view and to adopt the second one. 
Negative liberty, he argues, does not only produce material inequality. The direct 
outcome of material inequality is a political inequality and the disenfranchisement of 
the majority. The problem with globalisation, therefore, is that it marks a departure 
from the days of greater equality and social welfare. By catering to the needs of the 
market, governments allow for an accumulation of wealth that threatens the very 
basis of democracy, especially the ability of all equally to participate in the decision­
making process. According to this argument, the laws are no longer made by the 
people and for the people. On the contrary, they are made on behalf of large 
colorations and vested business interests. Whatever this political system is, it is not 
a democratic one. Negative liberty, therefore, fails on both accounts. Not only does 
the lack of available choices make the people unable to fill their potential to its 
fullest, but it also fails to guarantee more than theoretical political freedom. Held 
writes, “some of the main threats to autonomy in the contemporary world can be 
related not to demands for equality for the majority to level social difference, as 
thinkers from Tocqueville to Hayek have feared, but to inequality, inequality of such 
magnitude as to create significant violations of political liberty and democratic
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politics”?4 The liberal democratic “promise of a community which is governed by a 
fair framework... which is... equally constraining and enabling for all its members”, 
Held continues, has clearly been compromised, thus making it unsatisfactory as a 
foundation of the future democratic stmcture.25 The practical application of the 
Principle of Autonomy, therefore, must mean transcendence of those aspects of the 
social life that prevent a creation of a common structure of political action where 
individuals can meet and deliberate the conditions of their association as equals. 26 
This, however, is impossible for as long as a material kind of inequality, which Held 
calls “nautonomy”, persists.
Nautonomic inequality, Held argues, rests in “the asymmetrical production 
and distribution of life-chances which limit and erode the possibilities of political 
participation”.27 Whenever there is nautonomy, in other words, “democracy becomes 
a privileged domain operating in favour of those with significant resources”^ But, 
what does Held mean by “life chances”? As Giddens writes, “life-chances” are 
“chances a person has of sharing in socially generated economic, cultural or political 
goods, rewards and opportunities typically found in his or her community.” Since the 
issue of nautonomy will be of central importance to this discussion in the following 
chapters, it is perhaps worthwhile to quote at length Held’s view on how nautonomy 
functions in practice.
Nautonomic structures are shaped by the availability of a diverse 
range of socially patterned resources, from the material (wealth and 
income) through the coercive (organised might and deployment of 
force) to the cultural — the stock of concepts and discourses which 
mould interpretative frameworks, tastes and abilities. The availability
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of such resources in a community depends evidently enough on the 
capability of groups to exclude ‘outsiders ’ and to control resources 
denied to others. The attempt to control, if not monopolise, any range 
of resources according to particular social criteria, such as class, race, 
ethnicity or gender, can be denoted a foim of ‘social closure’.. .the 
formation of dominant classes in different types of society was 
achieved via decisive control of resources, which often included not
only land or capital but also armed force and ‘esoteric knowledge’.
Any system of power in which particular life-chances and 
opportunities are subject to closure can create nautonomic outcomes 
and, thereby, undeimiine or corrode the principle of autonomy 
[emphases added].29
How can the presence of nautonomy be ascertained? How, in other words, is this 
important social phenomenon to be measured? Held provides the answer.
The prevalence of nautonomy in any given site of power can be 
assessed by a number of indicators including whether and to what 
extent people have access to that site; whether opportunities within it 
are open or closed; and whether outcomes, be they assessed in terms 
of education levels, jobs or a range of cultural activities, are biased in 
favour of certain groups or interests [original emphases].30
It follows logically that whenever a definable group of people exceeds the average 
level of performance or outcome, it makes the presence of nautonomic factors clear.
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Such a situation is thus obviously unjust and needs to be rectified. Or, to put it more 
directly, superior performance in any given activity of one distinct group over 
another necessitates correction. As will be seen below, this is a crucial point. Another 
point that needs stressing is Held's discovery of what he calls the “seven sites of 
power”. As he says, it is in these sites of power that nautonomy resides. Any 
conection of nautonomy must, therefore, assure equal access to all of them.3' The 
first site of power is “the body” and refers to the divergent patterns of physical and 
emotional well-being found in the world today. As he writes, chances of survival as 
well as prevalence of physical and mental diseases are disproportionately distributed 
among races, classes, genders and geographic locations. These, in turn, can be 
attributed to social closures or unfair dominance of one group over the resources 
available. The second site of power is “welfare” and refers to a public access to 
education, social security and a range of community semces.33 The third site of 
power is one of “culture and cultural life” and is concerned with symbolic orders, 
forms and standards, as well as ritual and aesthetic practices.34 The fourth site of 
power is that of “civil society” and applies to the ability of the individuals to pursue 
their own projects without direct outside interference.3'5 The fifth site of power and 
arguably the most important one, is that of “economy”. This, according to Held, 
comprises of “collective organisation of the production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption of goods and services”. This site includes access, for example, to the 
means of production and to the produced goods. The economy, Held maintains, “is 
the site of one of the main sources of stratification and nautonomy: social class”?. In 
a revealing section that follows. Held elaborates on the points he feels make 
capitalism the source of inequality:
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[In the past]...the peasant or worker had a significant degree of 
control over the process of labour and the routines of everyday life.
But with the birth of industrial capitalism this substantial degree of 
control was lost:. Once citizens entered the factory gates, their lives 
were largely determined by the directives of capital... One of the 
results of the capitalist form of ownership and control has been the 
creation of the plethora of forms of inequality, many of wh ich threaten 
the entrenchment of the principle of autonomy; for they affect the 
production and distribution of life-chances and participative 
opportunities. As Dahl succinctly put it, 'ownership and control of 
economic enterprises... contribute to the creation of great differences 
among citizens in wealth, income, status, skills, information, control 
over information andpropaganda, access to political leaders... After 
all due qualifications have been made, differences like these help in­
turn to generate significant inequalities among citizens in their 
capacities and opportunities for participating as political equals.' To 
the extent that modem capitalist relations produce systematic 
inequalities in economic and social resource, the stmcture of 
autonomy is profoundly affected [emphases added].37
Held also feels that the power of the economic actors and the national reliance on the 
performance of the national economy vis-a-vis international competitors, make the 
national decision-making biased in favour of busmess.22 The last site of power is that 
of “organised violence” and denotes the need for making sure that the organs of state 
power are not used to prevent parts of the population from participating in the
134
70 • • »political process. Clearly, all of the above have a profound impact on the ability of 
the people to participate in the political decision-making, but Held’s “sites of power” 
can really be nan'owed to a single prevalent one - the more equitable distribution of 
financial resources as a means towards purchasing the adequate health, welfare, 
protection, time to participate in the cultural and civil life, and, ultimately, the time 
and space to participate in the political decision-making. But, how does Held plan to 
make access to the economic sites of power more equitable?
Before going further, one point needs to be clarified. As has been seen, Held 
clearly maintains that nautonomy is caused when one group deliberately prevents 
another group from the enjoyment of opportunities normally found in society.4” 
However, Held also clearly feels that capitalism is an economic system particularly 
akin to inequality. Oppressive groups, in other words, find capitalism most 
conducive to their anti-social practices. This does not mean that Held wishes to 
abandon capitalism altogether. In fact, he seems to accept that capitalism is the best 
economic system available. But, he maintains in line with the general argument of 
the Cosmopolitans, that capitalism proper contributes to the unequal distribution of 
resources. The achievement of the principle of autonomy, which is the equal 
participation in the political decision-making, must happen though the tackling of 
the problem of material inequality known as nautonomy. Since, however, capitalism 
contributes to the perpetuation of material inequality, intervention to offset its 
inegalitarian outcomes is justified.41 Held’s regulatory propositions are twofold. 
Firstly, there is the issue of the independence of the business sector. Here Held 
argues that business has disproportionate impact on the governmental decision­
making. It, therefore, follows that this should change - presumably through greater 
gcveamnhntal regulation and involvement."’ Changes are also necessary in the
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decision-making process of the company itself, where the workers must be given a 
greater say. Naturally, Held assumes that greater democratisation will result in a new 
distribution of power between the business sector on the one hand and “the people” 
on the other hand. Moreover, Held suggests ways in order to make sure that 
investment acquires “social dimension”.43 These are issues that will be discussed in 
the subsequent chapters.
Secondly, there is the issue of rectifying the already present discrepancies in 
the distribution of financial resources. Here Held explores avenues through which 
access to productive property could be “broadened”. Held begins by clearly 
distinguishing between different types of private property. Turning to Dahl, Held 
differentiates between the wish “to secure possession of the shirt on.. .[one's] back... 
from the right to acquire shares in IBM and therewith the standard rights of 
ownership that shareholdings legally convey”. Held's distinction between the 
undoubtedly honourable and egalitarian manual toil on the one hand and the 
seemingly deplorable speculative investments in the market place on the other hand, 
could at first seem puzzling. After all, share ownership and financial speculation in 
order to secure the highest possible return on investment or “profit”, are 
quintessentially capitalist activities. The speculator's search for profit ensures 
investment for companies that are most likely to sell the sort of products that people 
want. The stock market, in other words, is the mechanism through which the 
capitalist machine receives the energy to perform; money.
In fact, Held's acceptance of capitalism is only skin-deep. Although he claims 
to recognise it as a system most conducive to prosperity, Held proceeds to argue in 
favour of elimination of some of capitalism's most essential features. He writes, 
“...[a] choice in favour of the standard rights of ownership is a choice against
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political equality and a common structure of political action. ...[Without] alterations 
in the system of private ownership and control, a necessary condition of democracy 
cannot be met.”44 In other words, the system of property rights associated with the 
contemporary market economy is unacceptable if an egalitarian outcome is to be 
achieved. A preferred solution, Held’s concluding remarks elucidate, is in fact a “co­
operative ownership”, such as “market socialism” and “associationalism”.45
Of course, nothing in what Held says is illogical or unexpected. An 
egalitarian society - one without material imbalances that hinder equal expression of 
political will - is impossible if the market’s independence is to be preserved. As 
Brian Barry, whom Held quotes as an authority on the subject, writes, democracy is 
incompatible with “severe forms” of inequality.46 hi fact, as Barry continues, if a true 
democracy is to be achieved, “less gross cases of inequality” are also unacceptable.47 
In other words, “no” democratic political order can “be regarded as legitimate if it is 
marked by structured discrepancies with respect to power, opportunities and 
choices”. Of course, Held maintains that oppressive egalitarianism of the kind seen 
under the Communists is not what he is arguing for. The application of the Principle 
of Autonomy, he writes, is solely deliberative. The nature of the decisions taken by 
this deliberative body is not necessarily a foregone conclusion.49 The nature of the 
decisions taken may not be a foregone conclusion, but Held obviously hopes for an 
outcome similar to the one argued for by Rawls thirty years ago.
As Rawls imagined in his A Theory of Justice, social arrangements should be 
negotiated behind the veil of ignorance. The actors, not knowing their own particular 
circumstances, are given an opportunity to decide not on “just” principles of 
association, but on a framework from within which “just” actions can be evaluated. 
The actors, Rawls assumed, will decide out of self-interest that a) all social primary
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goods, such as liberty, opportunity, income, wealth and the basis of self-respect itself 
are to be distributed equally, unless b) an unequal distribution of any of these goods 
is to the advantage of the least favoured. Because the outcome of the experiment is 
so obviously good, Rawls further maintained, failure to agree on the above principles 
could only be explained by the unreasonability of the actors themselves.50 Similarly, 
Held clearly believes that the actors participating in his thought experiment will 
agree on an egalitarian arrangement of society, where activities that would result in 
material and political inequality will be avoided and perhaps prohibited.51 But, this 
answer is a red herring. The deliberative body consisting of equal participants that 
Held envisages will never come about without the prerequisite and prior equalisation 
of nautonomic distortions. If anything, therefore, the deliberative body can only act 
as a rubber stamp on an act of thorough equalisation. But, neither does Held reveal 
what will happen if the people in his thought experiment decide against the sort of 
egalitarian structure he envisages. Since, as he believes, the egalitarian structure is so 
unequivocally good, could the actors be forced to comply with it? And if so, what is 
the fallback position? Is it Rousseau’s “general will” or is it Stalin’s “gulag”?
To summarise, Held writes with the intention of rectifying what he believes is 
the inequality of access to political decision-making. As he writes, such inequality is 
easily translated into material inequality, because the dominant political group 
conspires to keep others out. What is Held’s standard for proving that a) unequal 
access to the decision-making exists and that b) some groups are effectively 
prevented from achieving the normal level of success? Held clearly see equality of 
outcome as such an indicator. How, then, is the inequality of access resulting in the 
inequality of outcome to be rectified? This, he writes, can only be solved if all groups
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A.
start from the same material base; in other words, when their nautonomic
discrepancies have been tackled. i
Like any other philosophical argument, Held’s argument, too, rests on a set of
assumptions. On the primary level there is Held’s assumption that “inequality is bad «
in and of itself’. From there follows another assumption; that “we ought to do 
something about it”. On the secondary level Held clearly assumes a “causal 1
relationship” between the lack of participation of group A in the political process and /
its substandard performance. Conversely, Held assumes that superior access to the 
political decision-making by group B will result in its over-performance, or 
excessive power and riches. This set of assumptions results in the further, tertiary, 
level of assumptions. Firstly, Held assumes that, had the access to the decision­
making been equal, “all definable groups would perform the same”, or that all groups
I
are equally able to take the opportunities presented in the system. Secondly, he
assumes that the process is that of a zero-sum game. In other words, the superior
performance of group B can only be achieved at the cost incurred by group A. Since,
however, the superior performance of group B can only be attributed to its superior
and, importantly, “exclusionary access” to the decision-making, the discrepancy in
performance is “unjust”. It, therefore, follows that the rectification of the
J
discrepancies thus produced is itself “just”. From here it follows that the introduction
of the Principle will be both empowering as well as restrictive; increasing the access
of the “previously disadvantaged” and restricting the access of the “previously
privileged” will, therefore, both accompany the actualisation of the Principle of
Autonomy. Held, like Giddens, further assumes that “life chances” are created by the
“society” as opposed to the efforts of autonomous individuals.52 Assuming, in other
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words, that the social pie comes with no “entitlements attached”, to boiTow Nozick’s 
phrase, Held believes that equal scope of “life chances” can in fact be achieved.
Lastly, one more point needs to be clarified. Cosmopolitans in general and 
Held in particular are, of course, interested in the furthering of individual rights. 
Cmcially, however, the Cosmopolitans are forced to depart from having the 
individual as a point of reference. Clearly, Cosmopolitans would be foolish to assert 
that all individuals are, in fact, equal in their ability to succeed. Consequently, Held 
and others adopt the concept of “a group” to make their case for increased 
democratic participation. To put it differently, there is inequality in the world. There 
is also poverty. To say that person A is poor is meaningless, for such a person might 
have ended up in that position because of a number of objective circumstances, 
including his own laziness. The same cannot, however, be said of a specific group. 
None, at least in the Cosmopolitan framework of mind, would dare to assert that the 
poor in general are poor, because they are lazy. A group, consequently, might sound 
a tenibly amorphous concept, but in the hands of a person who is convinced that all 
groups are equally able to benefit from the opportunities present in the society, it is a 
powerfld force. It is, therefore, out of their conviction that all groups are equally able 
to succeed that the Cosmopolitans, seeing that there really is no such equality, 
extrapolate their arguments to the level of a group. Such a group can be just about 
anything in nature, so long, of course, as it under-perfomis. Only thus are the 
Cosmopolitans enabled to see modem society in terms of a stmggle of the less 
affluent gioup against the more affluent group, white group against the black group, 
male group against the female group and heterosexual group against the homosexual 
group. Only thus can the Cosmopolitans argue that they have the ammunition to
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prove that the world is in need of greater equality, an aim that Held finds 
“inseparable from a tough conception of distributive justice.. ,”5
The validity of Held’s views will be looked at in the succeeding chapters. 
But, what about their influence? Scholars disagree as to the impact of intellectual 
debate on the political spectrum.55 But, politicians often invoke the views of 
intellectuals in order to support their views. Even the Nazis, who prided themselves 
on their anti-intellectualism, sought to justify their policies by intellectualising them. 
Thus, be it by guiding it, or justifying it, intellectuals are indispensable to the growth 
of any movement. In Britain the language of social justice, fairness, equality of life 
chances, social inclusion and exclusion, and fulfilment of the fullest potential of 
every individual has already found its way into the language and political programme 
of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. During his speech at the 2000 Labour Party 
conference in Brighton, Blair stated,
[We] ...know the danger that in a changing world new forms of 
inequality and social exclusion are created... Our destination [is] a 
Britain where, in a world of change, everyone not just a few gets the 
chance to succeed... [We] want to reach our journey's end - that strong, 
fair and prosperous Britain for all...
These are our second-teim plans. .. .A cradle-to-grave poverty strategy.
A plan to harness new technology to spread prosperity to all, ... [Our] 
enduring mission [is] to offer everyone, not just the privileged few, the 
chance to succeed. ...To succeed as an economy we develop the talents 
of all. ...To be a fair society, we give opportunity to all.
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[This] .. .party that believes passionately in a Britain where everyone 
not just a few get a chance to succeedWe are in a fight and it's a 
fight I relish. .. .A fight for fairness... A fight for a new vision in which 
the old conflict between prosperity and social justice is finally 
banished to the history books in which it belongs [all emphases 
added].56
But, how is New Labour to achieve these goals? How is a just and fair society, where 
all will have the opportunity to fulfil their potential, to be created? Held, a scholar 
close to the Labour government, has come up with a plan. Of course, this does not 
mean that anyone will take it seriously. But, as is the case with many ideas, no matter 
how obscure at first, Held’s proposal might not stay what it is at present - simply a 
very interesting intellectual exercise. With time, his works and the works of others 
like him, could easily become guides and justifications for future policy-makers. It is 
for this reason that the rest of this thesis will be devoted to exploring it and refuting 
it. Of course, there is always a risk that Held’s work and its refutation will not make 
any impact at all. But, that is a risk that has to be taken. In this context, the 
intellectual battles between Friedrich von Hayek and Jolrn Maynard Keynes may be 
recalled. In 1931, Keynes produced his Treatise on Monev. Hayek slaved in order to 
produce a refutation that proved worthless, because Keynes announced that “he had 
changed his mind and no longer believed what he had said”.”7 Then, when The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Monev came out, Hayek refused to 
challenge it, for fear that Keynes would change his mind again. Keynes did not
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change his mind and this latter work became a bible of the planners for half of the 
last century. Mistaken ideas need to be refuted, or they win by default.
II. Inequality: How True Is It?
The rise of inequality, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, has become an obsession 
of policy makers. In fact, it is less steep and probably less permanent than they 
imagine, and is overshadowed by a remarkable reduction of world inequality.58
- Paul Ormerod
Clearly, Held’s main worry is that capitalism encourages material inequality, which 
then results in political inequality. Held’s assumptions and the moral as well as 
practical outcomes of the type of policies he hopes to institute will be looked at in the 
next chapter. This chapter will only look at inequality as an empirical phenomenon. 
As Paul Omierod maintains, when looking at inequality it is important to depart from 
a “snapshot” perspective. Thus, it is always possible to look at inequality at any 
given time and be horrified by its extent. However, social mobility associated with 
capitalism also needs to be considered. There an altogether different picture emerges, 
for unlike in the feudal or socialist societies, prosperity is by no means a preserve of 
a particular class of people. In fact, most people in capitalist societies spend their 
lives moving across different income groups with ease. One study, for example, has 
shown that four-fifths of the people who were in the bottom 20% of the US income 
earners in 1979 were no longer there in 1988. By 1988, more had reached the top 
bracket than stayed at the bottom.59 Similarly, a Michigan University study of social 
mobility found that less than half of the families the researchers followed between
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1971 and 1978 stayed in the same quintile of income distribution during that 
period.60 Thus, it seems, that the notorious top 20% and the bottom 20% of the 
populace really represent a constantly changing groups of individuals.
One of the reasons why domestic inequality is constantly overemphasised and 
mobility underemphasized is labelling. The definition of what it means to be “poor” 
is constantly changing - reflecting the progress that capitalist societies make. Thus, 
poverty in the West, unlike poverty in the Third World, seldom means poverty in 
absolute terms. Rather, it is relative, signifying degrees of disparity between groups 
irrespective of how high the standard of living of the “poor” may be. The 1990 
census in the USA, for example, found that over half of the people defined as “poor” 
had a car, almost half had air-conditioning and twenty thousand poor families owned 
a Jacuzzi or a heated swimming pool.6' Labelling of the “rich” is also problematic. 
For example, in 1992, a household could qualify for a place in the top 20% with 
about $58 000. In order to gain a place in the top 5%, a household needed an income 
of about $100 000. But, the statistics seldom qualify how many people there are in 
the household. It is, therefore, perfectly possible to have a five, six or even seven 
member household share an income of $58 000 and still qualify as “rich”. Similarly, 
a household with an income of $100 000 may belong to the top 5% bracket, but with 
two children at college, a mortgage to pay, taxes and insurance to take care of, that 
sum might not be enough to stay above water.62
A similar problem also presents itself when talking about absolute poverty. 
The concept that the poor get poorer and the rich get richer goes back to the Reagan 
years. Yet, these statistics continuously underemphasize the true disposition of the 
poor. The 1990 census, for example, ignored the $150 billion in annual transfer 
payments to the lowest income earners in the USA. This comes to over $11 000 per
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family per year.77 Another way to overemphasise the gap between the rich and the 
poor is to ignore particulars of often widely diverging cases. For example, some 
American activists have set themselves on determining the extent of “hunger” in the 
USA. One such study has done so by considering how many people in the USA are 
eligible for food stamps and then subtracted from this number the actual number 
receiving food stamps. The outcome was a study claiming that millions of Americans 
were “hungry”. A closer examination shows, however, that some of the “hungriest” 
counties happened to be fanning communities that grew their own food and had, 
consequently, no need for food stamps.6? Another such example concerns the divide 
between incomes of people by age. As Sowell points out, there are those who see any 
sign of disparity in earnings as a sign of class divide, ignoring the fact that people 
belong to different income brackets at different times of their lives. Middle-aged 
people, for example, earn more than young adults do. Thus, in 1991, people between 
the ages of 45 and 54 earned 47% more than people between the ages of 25 and 34. 
There are those who see this as sinister forces at work. A more likely scenario is one 
where middle-aged people capitalise on their superior experience and knowledge to 
earn higher salaries?. The favourite way of accentuating the rich-poor problem, 
however, is to look the other way when a contradictory piece of evidence appears. It 
is, thus, a little known that the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Center for 
Disease Control study that examined people from different social strata found “no 
evidence of malnutrition among people with poverty-level incomes, nor even any 
significant difference in the intake of vitamins, minerals, and other nutrients... The 
only exception was that lower-income women were slightly more likely to be obese 
[i.e.: the opposite of starvation]”.66
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The complexities involved in measuring inequality are also present in the most 
tmsted and most widely known measure of inequality in the world, the so-called 
“Gini Coefficient”. But, as will be seen, a careful analysis of what Gini actually 
shows paints a very different picture from what is nonnally assumed. The Gini is 
used by the World Bank to determine the levels of inequality across the world. Its 
value can rest anywhere between 0 and 100, with the higher number indicating a 
greater degree of inequality. The Gini value in a country with complete quality of 
possessions, therefore, would be 0. Conversely, in a country where one person 
owned everything, Gini value would be 100. This does not mean, of course, that the 
higher value must inevitably mean greater hardship on the part of the poor. Because 
Gini measures degree of inequality solely between different groups in different 
countries and irrespective of the rest of the world, it is often the case that the poor in 
a rich but unequal country are, in absolute tenns, significantly richer than the poor in 
egalitarian but poor countries. Bearing that in mind, in 1996 the World Bank
determined the maximum Gini Coefficient level at 63 and minimum level at 18.
According to the Bank, the greatest differences in wealth were to be found in Sub­
Saharan Africa and Latin America. The Gini value there was, on average, in the 
upper 40’s. The OECD countries, on the other hand, were much more egalitarian 
with Gini around 30. In Britain, Gini is estimated to be in the mid-30’s, while in the 
USA in the low to mid 40’s. France, which has been historically disdainful of Anglo- 
Saxon version of “rampant” capitalism, has Gini coefficient higher than that of the 
UK. Moreover, the French Gini varies greatly from one province to another. Per 
capita income in Nord-Pas-de-Calais is 40% lower than that in Ile-de-France and so 
on. Overall, the data seem to suggest that inequality in developed countries is smaller 
than that in under-developed nations.67 This supports the belief that capitalism does,
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in fact, encourage greater dispersion of wealth. But, it must be pointed out that at 
least some of that greater equality is created by the multibillion-dollar transfers 
between different parts of the population that most Western countries engage in.
Clearly, domestic economic inequality in the West is profoundly exaggerated. 
But, so are the doomsday scenarios concerning inequality in the rest of the world. 
Williamson's research for example, points to a significant correlation between 
economic interconnectedness and convergence in standards of living during the 
period between 1870 and 1913. As he also shows, the period of “de-globalisation” 
that followed the begimiing of the WWI brought about “divergence in living 
standards”. Similarly, greater economic intercoimectedness between nations in the 
second half of the 20th century “again coincides with a period of convergence [in the 
standards of living]”.* This convergence in living standards, Ormerod argues, must 
be ascribed to the economic development of Asia and the effect this development had 
on the aggregate levels of inequality around the world. He writes, “The economic 
success of East Asia... has liberated millions of people from lives of unremitting 
drudgery and toil, and has sharply reduced world income inequality”?. Maddison, 
who carried out a thorough research of national incomes around the world, observed 
some clear trends in world economy as well.® According to his research, the end of 
the 20th century painted a very different picture from what preceded it. With the 
exception of a small ruling class, in the early 19th century there was, so to speak, 
“equality of misery” around the world. The Industrial Revolution, however, saw 
Western standards of living rise enormously and the rest of the world lag far behind. 
No wonder, then, that by the middle of the 20th century differences in wealth between 
countries were tremendous. This all began to change with the rise of Japan and the 
subsequent rise of the Asian Tigers. The Japanese economy grew at an annual rate of
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9.8% in the 1960's and 6% in the 1970's. The Asian Tigers grew by 9.3% during the 
same period. The economy of the entire Southeast Asian region grew by 8% per 
amuun.71 The economic rise of China, again due to that country's embracing of 
capitalism and the increased standard of living of her people, contributed much 
towards the diminishing global economic ine<^u^lil^^y2 Today Chinese real incomes 
are double of what they were three decades ago. Incomes in South Korea and Taiwan 
are similar to average European incomes. Of course, the critics point out, the Chinese 
embracing of capitalism also meant an increase in that country's domestic inequality. 
This is true, but as the South Korean case suggests, in the long term, the degree of 
inequality stabilises below the levels experienced during the period of transition to 
capitalism, hi the 1950's, when South Korea was a poor country, there was also a 
greater degree of equality - equality of misery, so to speak. During the period of 
tremendous economic growth that South Korea experienced by opening itself to the 
world, Gini measurement rose to about 40. But, by the mid-1990's, Gini had fallen to
the low 30's.
Despite the above improvements, it is remarkable how the issue of “equality” 
stole the global economic agenda. It seems as though certain scholars see the existing 
relative inequalities as only issues worth discussing. This they do apart from the self­
evident improvements in the absolute standards of living that participation in the 
global economy brings. The long-term benefit that integration in the market brings 
seems irrelevant. It is with this steady long-tenn growth in mind that Omierod writes,
By far the most important characteristic of capitalist economies, which 
distinguishes them from all other previously and currently existing 
societies, is their slow but steady underlying rate of real economic
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growth. Before the 19Ul century, increases in living standards of just 
one percentage point took decades or even centuries to achieve. Since 
then, per capita growth of around 2 per cent a year has become the 
noim in the successful market economies. The impact of moving to 
the path of sustained growth can be clearly illustrated by comparison 
of per capita incomes in South Korea and an African economy. The
Ivory Coast is by no means unsuccessful in African terms, but the 
transfonnation of South Korea has been stupendous. Even as late as 
1970, the two countries had very similar levels of output per head, 
with Korea being about one-third higher. But it is now nearly nine 
times higher - around 1000 per cent/7
Similar results can be observed in many other countries. Both Taiwan and China 
started their separate existences in 1949 with roughly equal standards of living. 
Under the market system, the Taiwanese economy grew by 8.7% per year leading to 
a GNP per capita of $7500 by 1989. The comparable figure for China was 
approximately $350. Similarly, in 1960 both North and South Korea had roughly 
equal levels of GNP per capita. By 1989, the South Korean GNP per capita was 
$4550, more than four times that of the North. Moreover, both Taiwan and South 
Korea have steadily decreased their income inequalities. While Taiwan’s top 20% 
made 15 times the income of the lowest 20% in 1952, this ratio fell to 4,5 times by 
1980.6“ Thus, the issue of inequality is indeed much more complex. It is most 
important to realise that “dispersion” of wealth and “equality” of distribution of 
wealth are different. Capitalism disperses wealth better than any other economic 
system, albeit unequally. The fact that the analysts and decision-makers choose to
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focus on the latter and ignore the former encourages a feeling of an imminent 
catastrophe or crisis that needs to be tackled. This image is wrong, but it is not 
without its own internal reasoning. Only by deliberately encouraging this imaginary 
sense of oppression and by continuing to stratify the society by exaggerating the 
numbers of the victimised, can any possible credence be given to the long-discredited 
socialist policies. Some practical outcomes of socialism will be encountered in the 
next chapter.
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Chapter Five
"When the great world literature of the past - Shakespeare, Schiller, Dickens - 
inflates and inflates images of evildoers in the blackest shades, it seems somewhat 
farcical and clumsy to our contemporary perspective. The trouble lies in the way 
these classic evildoers are pictured. They recognise themselves as evildoers.... And 
they reason: "I cannot live unless I do evil". ...But no; that’s not the way it is! To do 
evil a human being must first of all believe that he’s doing good... ”
- Alexander Solzhenitsyn
Held's proposal is based on a set of assumptions. This chapter will look at some of 
them. Primarily, it will focus on the “causal relationship” between the lack of 
participation of a certain group in the political process and its substandard 
performance. This assumption rests on an expectation that, were access to the 
decision-making equal, all groups would perfoim equally well. It then follows that a 
superior performance of a group B can only be achieved at a cost incurred by a group 
A. Since the superior performance of a group B can only be attributed to its 
“exclusionary access” to the political decision-making, the discrepancy in 
performance is “unjust”. Thus, rectification of the discrepancies thus produced is 
itself “just”. In other words, increasing the access of group A and restricting the 
access of group B to the political process must accompany the actualisation of a 
“truly” democratic society. This equalisation has to continue until equality of access 
is achieved; in other words, until all definable groups achieve proportional 
representation in the political sphere, the seven sites of power and so on. Moreover, 
in order to prevent the exacerbation of current inequalities as well as the future return
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of inequality, capitalism, the system most prone to producing such inequalities must 
be severely constrained. Besides its thorough regulation, capitalist modes of property 
relations must also be transfonned. After all, Held writes, it is both the oppressive 
groups and the economic system of exploitation that collude to destroy true
democracy.
This chapter will start by looking at two examples of superior group- 
performance that camiot be attributed to “social closure”. Both the Chinese minority 
in Malaysia and the Jewish minority in the USA are minorities transplanted from 
very poor enviromnents into totally alien ones. Both have been discriminated against 
in the political as well as economic spheres and yet succeeded in thoroughly 
outperforming the dominant group to become affluent and influential. From these 
facts it will then become possible to conclude that Cosmopolitans in general, and 
Held in particular, fail to make the causal comiection between political and economic 
exclusion and under-perfonnance. Also, as Held points out, those who participate in 
quintessentially capitalist activities, such as finance and stock market trading, may 
appropriate disproportionate financial rewards. This, Held maintains, is unjustifiable. 
In fact, this distinction between creative, manual labour and speculative, non-manual 
labour contributed to Nazi’s discrimination against the Jews as well as their ultimate 
amiihilation. Equally, Communist extermination of the Kulaks shows the inherent 
incompatibility of equality and capitalism. Both examples will be considered at 
length below. As will be shown, it is impossible to wed together the Cosmopolitan 
ideas of equality with the capitalist practice of profit-making.
Before moving on, a number of preliminary points must be addressed. Firstly, 
the Cosmopolitan concept of a group needs to be clarified. The definition Held 
provides, is a very flexible one. It concerns all sorts of social criteria; class, race.
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ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation among them. At least as far as the theory 
goes, focusing on group differences is unfortunate, because the focus of the 
Cosmopolitan agenda is essentially individualistic. On the other hand, group-focused 
discussion is unavoidable, because quite evidently not all groups do presently achieve 
the same results. The definition of a group, to begin with, is not simple. Persons can 
belong to a number of groups at the same time. It is, for example, possible to be a 
British citizen, while at the same time being black, a lawyer, a woman and a mother. 
Also, in expectation of unearned privileges, an ever-increasing number of people 
claim special or “protected” status on the basis of their belonging to specific and 
presumably oppressed minority group. As a consequence of this automatic equation 
of a minority status with an oppressed status and the concomitant gaining of special 
privileges that flow from it, the system of group identification has been open to 
abuse. However, for the purposes of this paper, Held’s own broad definition of a 
group will be accepted. Due to the time and space constraints, the thesis will focus on 
refutation of the Cosmopolitan assumptions with regard to the most potent of all 
group characteristics; ethnicity and socio-economic status.
Secondly, there is the Cosmopolitan understanding of discrimination. 
Cosmopolitans believe that groups acquire disproportionate wealth and power 
through coercive control of resources, such as land, capital, armed force and esoteric 
knowledge. Of course, in a just society all coercive appropriation of resources is 
unjust. A question arises out of the automatic link the Cosmopolitans make between 
superior performance and lack of fairness. Equally troubling is the concept of 
“esoteric knowledge”, which Held leaves undefined. If it means coercive acquisition 
of mfoimation, Held is right. If, on the other hand, “esoteric knowledge” implies 
voluntary inter-generational or intra-cultural exchange of information, the issue is
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more complex. As will be shown, groups may share characteristics that enable them 
disproportionately to succeed in one or more areas of socio-economic life. If these 
characteristics are disseminated through such voluntary exchange, should they be 
considered unjust? Clearly, this point is a non-starter or else all information not 
readily available to everyone else would have to be considered unjust.
Thirdly, the question of proportionality needs to be considered. Held 
maintains that he is primarily concerned with the equality of access to decision­
making. However, the only way to determine whether there in fact is such equality of 
access is through equality of outcome. In other words, in the absence of the equality 
of outcome, meant as an equal or proportional participation of all groups in the 
process of decision-making, there is a compelling reason to believe that some fomi of 
discrimination had to have occuned. Similarly, unless it is possible to prove that all 
possible participants enjoy equal access to the seven sites of power, the nautonomic 
distortions can be said to persist. In fact, proportionality is the very measurement 
Held himself chose. Of course, others too have started by advocating simple equality 
of opportunity or equal participation in the political decision-making, and ended up 
advocating equality of outcome or discrimination against one group on behalf of 
another, hi fact, once the point of departure is the premise that all groups can perform 
the same, equality of outcome is nothing but a logical extrapolation of the equality of 
opportunity.
In a logical sequence, 1) All groups have a potential to perform the same. 2) 
Given equal opportunity, all groups will perform the same and, 3) consequently, all 
groups will end up being proportionately represented in all aspect of socio-economic 
life. 4) If group A is not proportionately represented in certain aspect of socio­
economic life and group B is over-represented in the same, group A is being
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discriminated against by group B. 5) This is unjust. 6) Group A must, therefore, be 
promoted until it achieves proportionate success and 7) group B must be prevented 
from enjoying disproportionately high success. Should this sequence seem 
improbable, the thesis will show how similar propositions provided justification for 
the atrocities committed in both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Moreover, as 
the rest of this thesis will show, the above egalitarian assumptions provide 
justification for instances of discrimination against over-perfonning groups in the 
world today. In reality, groups perform differently not just when they have an equal 
starting line. In fact, there are minority groups, which outperformed the majority in
the face of vehement discrimination.
I. DisjnT^i)(^i ti(^nal Success-rates among Groups
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement even for the most admirable and benign 
purposes is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that 
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred?
- Antonin Scalia
One of the most striking examples of a successful ethnic group is that of the Chinese 
minority in Malaysia. Contrary to Held's expectations, the Chinese success cannot be 
attributed to the Chinese oppression of anyone else. In fact, the Chinese have succeeded 
in the face of outright discrimination. In order to appreciate the outstanding nature of 
the Chinese experience, it is necessary briefly to look at the history of the Chinese 
immigrants. The British imported Chinese workers to Malaysia at the turn of the 19th 
century, because they were willing to work for less than the indigenous population.3
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The sanitary conditions aboard the ships that brought them to Malaysia were so 
appalling that they were called “floating hells”. In fact, large numbers of the Chinese 
died in transit. Most of the labourers who made it to Malaysia were poor, unskilled, 
and illiterate. Consequently, they were employed in the most strenuous, dangerous 
and dirty jobs - most of which ethnic Malays would not do.4 Moreover, the British 
colonial administration subjected the Chinese to severe discrimination, by 
systematically excluding them from participation in political and economic life? 
Government primary schools, for example, were free for Malay children. The 
Chinese, however, were required to pay, which most of them could not do. 
Consequently, the Chinese established their own schools. Most of these were “dirty, 
ill-ventilated, and ill-lighted basements, out-houses, or attics... [where] sanitation 
was non-existent... [and] skin diseases... common.6 After Malaysia became 
independent, anti-Chinese discrimination increased. The Malay constitution 
mandated preferential treatment of the Malays in “civil service hiring, granting 
licenses to private businesses, admission to universities, and land ownership”? The 
Malay government discriminated against the Chinese in the private sector as well, 
awarding the government contracts and credit to Malays only. Moreover, the Malay 
government limited Chinese competition in certain economic activities and forced 
the Chinese businesses to adopt racial quotas in hiring?
Yet, despite all this blatant discrimination, the Chinese succeeded spectacularly. 
In 1911, over 40% of the Chinese immigrants were employed in the mining sector and 
an additional 11% in the agricultural sector. By 1931, only 11% of the Chinese 
remained in the above two sectors. The rest moved on to dominate the Malay retail 
industry, with ownership of 85% of all retail outlets. Conversely, by 1970 the Malays’ 
role in manufacturing declined to 4%, The rest was owned by Chinese and Indian
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Malaysians as well as, to a much lesser extent, foreigners. Equally revealing was the 
way the Chinese overcame pro-Malay affirmative action at the University of Malaysia. 
Dming the 1960’s, for example, they have earned 22 times as many Bachelor of 
Science and 102 times as many Bachelor of Engineering degrees as the Malays? Today 
the situation is different. Following the 1969 anti-Chinese riots, which the 
government saw as “justified” precisely because of the massive Chinese over­
representation in the economy and professions, the Malays introduced a new and 
much more discriminatoiy set of policies. This new approach, the government freely 
admitted, aimed at the achievement of a better “racial balance” in the country’s 
social and economic life. The practical implication of this policy was a government- 
mandated set of rigid racial quotas. By 1980 the pro-Malay affimiative action 
resulted in the proportion of the Chinese students at universities being reduced to less 
than their proportion in the country’s popularirn.l0
Though this example should be enough to shake the Cosmopolitan 
assumptions, it is important to notice that the Chinese-Malay discrepancy cannot be 
explained by seeking refuge in “local peculiarities”. In fact, the Chinese perform 
disproportionately well wherever they live. In the Philippines, where Chinese account 
for less than 1% of the population, they own 75% of the retailing businesses, hi 
Indonesia, where the Chinese account for less than 3% of the population, they control 
70% of the coimtry’s private domestic capital. They also run 75% of hidonesia’s 200 
largest businesses, hi Thailand, the Chinese minority owns over 70% of all retailing 
outlets. Truly astonishing is the fact that in all thiee cases the Chinese were, and still 
are, subjected to varying degrees of discrimination, hi Indonesia, the Chinese suffer 
from legislated discrimination and mob violence, while in the Philippines they are, in
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addition, subjected to periodic mob violence. Similarly, in Thailand the Chinese have 
been faced with pro-Thai affirmative action since the 1930s.' '
In fact, the entire Chinese experience flies straight in the face of the 
Cosmopolitan argument. The Cliinese minorities, wherever they live, were, at the time 
of their arrival, poorer and less educated than the majority population. They were 
subjected to discrimination and, often, violence. They could, and did, overcome all of 
these problems. Just about the only “problem” the Chinese could not overcome, was 
their ability to provide better, quicker and cheaper service than the groups among which 
they lived and live. That is the secret behind their disproportionate success rate. The 
Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad, admitted as much when he 
stated, “Whatever the Malays could do, the Chinese could do better and cheaper”.^ 
Remarkably, however, his response to Chinese ability and skill was not to try to utilise 
it. His, in fact, is an administration renowned for its anti-Chinese discriminatory 
practices. Why? Because like the Cosmopolitans, Dr. Mohamad also believes that all 
groups perform the same and if they do not, then this must be due to some sort of unfair 
practices.
Astonishingly, it is this deeply racist and discriminatory approach that has 
been adopted by the South African government to “solve” South Africa's inequities. 
On the llth of June 2001 on an E-TV progranune entitled “3rd Degree” Cyril 
Ramaphosa, the current head of the Black Empowerment Commission, spoke about 
the lessons that are to be learned fir^j^m the Malaysian example. Implying the justice 
of their cause, Ramaphosa mentioned the outrage of the Malays against the Chinese 
businesses in the 1960's and the riots that ensued. Then, Ramaphosa spoke 
glowingly of the New Economic policy adopted by the Malay government and 
specified that it is a version of this Malaysian experiment that the South African
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government should adopt. The Malaysia-styled riots, Ramaphosa said, can only be 
avoided through govermuental intervention aimed at “empowering” the 
underrepresented peoples in the South African economy. As a result, the South 
African govermnent introduced a particularly baiting policy of affinnative action, 
which many young non-black professionals to leave the country. It remains to be 
seen what else could the government do to ensure that South Africa remains in the 
economic slump into which she had fallen.
Similar observations can, of course, be made with regard to other minority 
groups, not least the Jewish immigrants in the USA. Though the Jewish immigration to 
the USA accelerated in the concluding decades of the 19111 century, by the start of the 
WWI, when the immigration began to be restricted, Jews still accounted for only 3% 
of the American population. The Jewish immigrants arrived in the USA poorer and 
less literate than their European counterparts. While only 1% of English, 3% of Irish 
and 5% of German immigrants could not read, 26% of Jewish immigrants were 
illiterate. Likewise, the Jews were bringing with them, on average, less money than 
any of the other European immigrants. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Jews ended up 
living in some extraordinarily appalling conditions. Lower East Side Manhattan, 
where most of them lived, had a population density of 523 inhabitants per acre. At 
the time, this was thought “to have been the most densely populated area in the world 
...a district of squalor whose stifling air was fouled ...with odour of rotting fish, 
meat, and vegetables sold on uncovered pushcarts, the immense amount of animal 
waste from horse-drawn wagons and trucks, dirty streets and the stench of a crowded 
humanity.”'4
Yet, by 1919 the Jews were massively over-represented at most of the pre­
eminent American colleges, accounting for 20% of students at Brown University, 25%
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at the University of Pennsylvania and 40% at Columbia University. Soon, 21.5% of 
Haiward undergraduates were Jewish.® Moreover, the Jews were greatly over­
represented amongst the best achieving students there. This prompted Harvard 
University President Lowell to observe that the Jew “is, on average, a better scholar 
than the Gentile”. Similarly, Dean Jones of the University of Yale observed that the 
Jews attained a high success rate “despite the handicap of poverty and the necessity of 
working their way”.® Yet, despite recognising the Jewish intellectual aptitude, the 
universities introduced discriminatory policies to reduce the numbers of the Jewish 
students. The logic behind anti-Jewish discrimination was articulated by the Chaiiman 
of the Haiward Board of Overseers Committee for investigation of the “principles 
and methods for the more effective sifting of candidates for admission to the 
university”. As he stated, “The proportion of Jewish students at the university is 
greater than any other race. Consequently, the problem of restricting Jews... is the 
greatest”. “It seems plain”, he continued, “that a college entrance examination would 
not solve the problem. The Jew is a remarkable student. He is intelligent. The Jewish 
race as a whole is intelligent. It is astonishing the number of Jews from poor districts 
who enter Harvard and become remarkable students.”®
The Jews, in other words, were appropriating a disproportionate share of the 
intellectual pie. However, to the egalitarian elite in the USA this was unacceptable. As a 
result of the anti-Jewish discrimination in admission, New York University and the 
Columbia University managed to reduce their undergraduate Jewish emolment from 
47,5% and 40% to 25% and 22% respectively, hi fact, Columbia’s medical school 
had done even “better”, reducing the Jewish enrolment from 50% in 1919 to 19% in 
1924 and 6% in 1939.® [Today Jews are once again being short-changed at
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American universities; “this time for being white”.®] But, even this overt 
discrimination failed to prevent the Jews from succeeding.
According to Forbes's annual lists of the richest Americans, over 30% 
of billionaires are Jewish. That is nearly certainly an underestimate,
since Jewish business activity is especially concentrated in real estate, 
the most difficult area in which to gauge assets and the easiest in
which to hide wealth. Half of the USA’s richest Wall Street executives
are Jewish. The three most prominent Canadian business families are 
Jewish. In 1984, four times as high a proportion of Jewish American 
households as non-Hispanic white Gentile American households had 
an income over $50,000 a year. Approximately 40% of American 
Nobel laureates in [the] past several decades have been Jews. A study 
by the American Jewish Committee found that American Jews with 
Master of Business Administration (MBA) degrees advance faster in 
corporate hierarchies and make more money than American Gentiles 
with MBAs.20
Though accounting for no more than about 2% of the US population, 10% of the 
members of the US Congress are Jewish. Similarly, a few years ago, seven out of 
eight presidents of the American Ivy League colleges were Jews.21 Once more, the 
Jewish success is not a local phenomenon. The Jewish immigrants to Argentina, for 
example, arrived exceptionally poor. Yet, while constituting only 1% of the 
population of Argentina today, the Jews account for 20% of the Argentinean 
university students,22 Simllarly, in mid-19tl1 century Melbourne, Jews owned over
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50% of all clothing stores. Yet the Jews constituted less than 1% of the Australian 
population. The Jewish success is not a recent phenomenon either. The Jews in 
medieval Spain faced intolerance and periodic pogroms. This did not prevent them 
from occupying high offices in the financial administration of every Castilian king 
from the late eleventh to the late fourteenth centimes. Similarly, the personal doctor 
of every Castilian king fiom Juan I through to Henry IV was a Jew/.23 Today, despite 
varying degrees of “social closures”, prevailing anti-Semitism among them, Jews 
continue to outperform all ethnic and racial groups amongst which they live. This 
astonishing success-rate is the essential meaning behind “The Jewish Problem” and it 
will be looked at in greater detail below. There are more examples of inequality of 
achievement, which carmot be explained through social closure. Sowell writes,
In the days of the Ottoman Empire, when non-Moslems were 
explicitly second-class under the law, there were whole industries and 
sectors of the economy predominantly owned and operated by 
Christian minorities, notably Greeks and Armenians... As late as 1965, 
half the [Nigerian] officers were members of the Ibo tribe - a southern 
group historically disadvantaged... A 1985 study in the United States 
showed that the proportion of [historically disadvantaged] Asian 
American students who scored over 700 on the mathematics portion of 
the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) was more than double the proportion 
among whites... As early as 1887, more than twice as many Italian 
immigrants as Argentines had bank accounts in the Banco de Buenos 
Aires, even though most Italians amved destitute in Argentina and 
began work in the lowest, hardest, and most menial jobs.24
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Judging by the above evidence it is clear that the Cosmopolitans fail to make a case for 
the intensification of regulation of society and the market by their inability to defend a 
causal link between group performance and “social closure”. In fact, some groups 
manage to succeed not only by not discriminating against others, but in the face of 
discrimination they themselves experience. However, to say this is not enough, for to 
stop here would be to absolve the Cosmopolitans from sharing much more 
incriminating assumptions. Clearly, to state empirical evidence of one group 
outperforming another is not enough to induce the kind of reform, which 
Cosmopolitans envisage, hi fact, such a statement would do the opposite. It would 
imply the harsh reality of human existence; that predisposition to succeed in specific 
areas is not equally distributed among different groups, let alone individuals. It would 
also imply that opposing this reality is nothing but envy, masquerading as a desire for 
equality. Therefore, acknowledgement of differing performance, if it is to be at the core 
of the Cosmopolitan proposal for reform, must be buttressed by the implication that 
superior performance of one group is caused by injustice done to those who do not 
succeed. Nowhere is this attitude more apparent than in the case of the Nazi Holocaust.
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II. Disproportional 5^n<^^e^ss-i'ate^^ among Groups and their Consequences
The Jews ... are a living and most striking evidence of the falsity of that pernicious 
doctrine of modern times, the natural equality of man. The political equality of a 
particular race is a matter of municipal arrangement ... But the natural equality of 
man now in vogue ... is a principle which, if it were possible to act on it, would 
deteriorate the great races and destroy all the genius of the world.
- Benjamin Disraeli
What lessons are there to be learned from the Nazi Holocaust? It is the contention of
this paper that the true lessons of Nazism are yet to be learned. As Farron shows, 
people responsible for the atrocities of the 20th century were normal people, motivated 
by assumptions that are readily accepted and followed throughout the world today?6 
These assumptions are that potential to succeed among different groups is distributed 
equally and that disproportionate success of a particular group must be a result of 
injustice. Over time it became commonly accepted that the Nazi Holocaust was 
caused by Hitler’s racism. Hitler himself, however, never defined the concept of race 
and even denied that it existed. As he said, “I know perfectly well, just as well as those 
know-it-all intellectuals, that in the scientific sense there is no such tiring as race”?”7 As 
Haffner writes, it is not clear which nations Hitler thought of as Aryan. “The real 
racial differences between white, black and yellow-skinned people did not interest 
Hitler at all... [By] the racial struggle... [Hitler meant] a struggle within the white
race, namely between the ‘Aryans’ and the Jews. In other words, between the Jews
28and all the resit...
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In fact, on many occasions Hitler expressed his admiration for the Indians, Chinese, 
Japanese and Arabs, all of whom he preferred to the British.® Thus, Hitler exhibited 
contradictory behaviour. He formed wartime alliances with Asian Japanese and 
Slavic Slovaks, but called Nordic Swedes and Danes “vermin”.® He prohibited 
bombing of Athens, but approved of bombing London, even though the British were 
by conventionally understood standards much more “Germanic” than the Greeks. He 
spoke of “warm friendship” with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, both Slavic, and of 
“friendly terms” with the Asian Chinese. He believed that Western nations gained a 
great deal from oriental civilisations, but that Germans were backward and 
primitive?'
The conventional racists in the Nazi party, on the other hand, were Rosenberg 
and Himmler. Rosenberg wrote a book, in which he claimed to have “expounded” 
Nordic racial superiority. Hitler, however, described it as “stuff nobody can 
understand” and “a relapse into medieval notions”.3® Himmler’s own contribution to 
the exposition of Nordic racial superiority was his excavation of ancient German
sites. Hitler was not amused. He ranted,
Why do we call the whole world's attention to the fact that we have no
past? It isn't enough that the Romans were erecting great buildings 
when our forefathers were still living in mud huts; now Himmler is 
starting to dig up these villages and enthusing over every potsherd and 
stone axe he finds. All we prove is that we were still throwing stone 
hatchets and crouching around open fires when Greece and Rome had 
already reached the highest stage of culture. We really should do our
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best to keep quiet about this past. The present-day Romans must be
• ■ • 7Thaving a laugh at these discoveries.
It is in the above passage and many similar ones that Hitler did what most 
conventional racists would never contemplate - to assert the inferiority of the 
Gennan race itself. Astonishingly, on a number of occasions Hitler came close to 
asserting the intellectual superiority of his greatest nemesis; the Jews. He stated, 
“What they [Jews] possess today, they have mostly gained at the cost of the less 
astute German nation”.3® And, “If five thousand Jews were transported to Sweden, 
within a short time, they would occupy all the leading positions there”.3® It is in the 
above passages that Hitler exhibited typically anti-Semitic behaviour. Indeed, it is 
only in tliis context that Sartre’s analysis of an anti-Semite makes sense. Sartre 
wrote, “An anti-Semite readily admits that ...the Jew is intelligent and hardworking 
.. .He will even avow himself to be inferior in these respects. .. .There is no example 
of an anti-Semite claiming individual superiority over Jews. ...For the anti-Semite 
intelligence is Jewish.... [He says,] “Don't Jews win all the scholarships?”3®
Recognising the superior abilities of the Jews in Germany is not a difficult task. 
Records clearly show massive Jewish overrepresentation in high-paying and decidedly 
intellect-based economic activities, which, in turn, made the Jews disproportionately 
wealthy. Conversely, there is an utter lack of Jewish presence detected among 
German manual labour force. Three years prior to Hitler’s assumption of power, for 
example, Jews constituted only 0.74% of the Gennan population. Yet, Jews 
accounted for 16.5% of doctors, 22% of lawyers and 50% of theatre directors in 
Germany. That year Jews wrote 75% of the plays produced in Gennany. Similarly, 
44% of members of the board running the German Attorney Association were Jews.
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Jews also owned 41% of German iron and scrap firms and 57% of other metal 
businesses, and accounted for 26% of retail sales and 79% of all department-store
sales. At different times in the 1920’s Jews accounted for 85% of brokers on the
Berlin Stock Exchange, owned 93% of the private banks in Berlin and held eight 
times more executive positions on the boards of non-Jewish banks than was their 
proportion in the population.37 A little earlier, in 1907, nine of the thirteen German 
corporations with share capital over a hundred million marks had a Jewish majority 
on its board of directors. Four years later, 44% of the richest men in Prussia were
Jews. Between 1905-06, 34% of the graduate students in Gennan Philosophy 
faculties, which included arts and social sciences, were Jews.77 Despite 
discrimination that marked the inter-war period, the proportion of Jewish professors
at German universities increased several times from what it had been. The most
widely accepted estimates suggest that Jews constituted 26% of Genian professors 
in physics, 20% in mathematics, 18% in natural sciences besides physics and 18% in
medicine. Between 1918 and 1933 nine Germans won Nobel Prizes. Five of them 
were Jews, Albert Einstein among them.77 Similarly, during the concluding decades 
of the 19th century, 13 of the 21 newspapers in Berlin were completely, and another 
four partially, owned by Jews.®
The problem at the centre of Geiman and Hitler's anti-Semitism, therefore, 
was the disproportionate prosperity of the Jewish community. Like many other anti- 
Semites before him, Hitler himself admitted as much on a number of different
occasions. “This legislation is not anti-Jewish, but pro-German... The Jews, who 
formed less than one percent of the population, tried to monopolise the cultural 
leadership of the people and flooded the intellectual professions, such as law and 
medicine”, he said/' However, a purely factual recognition of Jewish success was of
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no use to the Nazis. Complaining about the empirical fact of Jewish riches would 
merely imply envy. What Hitler had to demonstrate to make their extennination 
defensible, was that the Jews have committed an act of “injustice”. It is this topic of 
injustice that shall now be looked at. In order to understand it, however, it is 
important to comprehend Hitler’s overall vision of society.
Hitler was no more a psychopathic maniac than Stalin. What the two shared 
was a revolutionary zeal; a deep devotion to the creation of a new man living in a 
new society. Theirs’ was a search for what Sowell called “a universal solution” to 
what they perceived to be deeply rooted social probtems.s2 As Hitler acknowledged, 
“We are involved in a conflict in which more than the victory of one country or the 
other is at stake; it is rather a war between two opposing worlds”.43 As will become 
clear below, the two opposing worlds that Hitler spoke about were not Nazism and 
Communism, but Nazism and capitalism. Likewise, Goebbels wrote, “He 
[Mussolini] is not a revolutionary like the Fuhrer and Stalin. He is so bound to his 
own Italian people that he lacks the qualities of a worldwide revolutionary and 
insurrectionist”.44 What, then, was this deep-seeded social problem that Nazism 
believed it had to eradicate?
Clearly it was the Jews, but not the “sub-human” Jews of the racist babble. 
What Hitler sought to destroy were Jews as capitalists, as traders, as “shopkeepers”, 
as intellectuals and as bourgeois; in short, Jews as “parasites”, who did not work for 
living. How did this come about? Firstly, Hitler never understood the need for an 
entrepreneurial class. He believed that these were unnecessary and even dangerous to 
a functioning economy. He wrote, “Our so-called statesmen ... think they can build 
up the state through economics... [But what is needed] is always the heroic virtues 
and never the egoism of shopkeepers, since the preservation... of a species
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presupposes a spirit of sacrifice”.45 Secondly, like Marx, Hitler distinguished
between “creative” manual work of the workers, which was beneficial and desirable,
and “parasitic” activity of the businessmen, which was ha^nnftil and to be eradicated.
He wrote,
Previously I had been unable to recognise with desired clarity the 
difference between pure capital as the result of productive labour and 
capital whose existence and essence rests exclusively on speculation....
But now [1919] this was provided by one of the gentlemen lecturing... 
Gottfried Feder. For the first time in my life I heard a principled 
discussion of international stock exchange capital and loan capital. Right 
after... Feder’s first lecture, the thought ran through my head that I had 
now found the way to one of the most essential premises for the 
foundation of a new party. In my eyes Feder’s merit consisted in having 
established... the speculative... character of stock exchange and loan 
capital, and in having exposed its eternal... presupposition, which is
interest;... As I listened to Gottfried Feder’s first lecture about the
‘Breaking of hiterest Slavery’, I knew at once that this was a theoretical 
tmth which would inevitably be of immense importance for the future of 
the German people... The hardest battle would have to be fought, not 
against hostile nations, but against international capital [emphasis
added] 4°
Later, during the war, he pontificated, “If in this war everything points to the fact that
gold is fighting against work, capitalism against peoples and reaction against the
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progress of humanity, then work, the peoples, and progress will be victorious”.47 
Pulzer agrees that this deep-felt hatred of capitalism was at the heart of Hitler’s 
revolutionary socio-economic thinking. To Hitler, anti-Semitism was anti-capitalism. 
It distinguished between two kinds of economic activity. One was creative, schaffendes, 
and the other grasping, raffendes. The former was one that a farmer engaged in, while 
the latter was the domain of bankers, brokers and middlemen. As Pulzer continues, “it 
would be difficult to find the anti-Semitic program which did not contain items for the 
protection of “honest” property and. the control and taxation, if not the abolition of the
stock exchange” .77
There seems little point debating whether Hitler hated bourgeois capitalism 
because it was in the Jewish hands, or whether he hated Jews because they were 
capitalists, hi Hitler’s mind, the Jews and the capital were inseparable. Should the 
link between anti-capitalism and anti-Semitism seem tenuous, it must be remembered 
that Hitler, being the leader of a National Socialist German Worker' Party, saw the 
link himself and repeatedly pointed it out. He said,
I am not only the conqueror, but also the executor of Marximi... I had 
only to develop logically what Social Democracy repeatedly failed in 
because of its attempt to realise its evolution within the framework of 
democracy. National Socialism is what Marxism might have been if it
could have broken its absurd and artificial ties with democratic 
order.77
Hitler equated socialism and anti-Semitism repeatedly. For instance, he said, “If we 
are socialists, then we must definitely be anti-Semites - and the opposite, in that case,
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is Materialism and Mammonism, which we seek to oppose”. He then added, “How, 
as a socialist, can you not be an anti-Semite?”?? Later he said, “Socialism ...is 
entirely alien to the Jew. The Jew will always be the bom champion of private 
capital’’?1 Ironically, Karl Marx, a Jew, might have influenced Hitler’s thinking on 
this subject. After all, it was Marx, who wrote,
What is the Jew’s foundation in our world? Material necessity, private
advantage. What is the object of the Jew’s worship in this world?
Usury. What is his worldly god? Money. ... The Jew ...decides the 
fate of Europe. .. .Money is the zealous one God of Israel, beside 
which no other god may stand. ...The Bill of Exchange is the Jew’s
real God??
Hitler acknowledged his intellectual debt to Marx by saying that the whole of 
National Socialism was based on Marx?? Thirdly, Hitler admired heroism and self­
sacrifice. Thus Hitler said, “If you preach private gain, all the egoists will join you... 
but if you demand sacrifice and courage... then that part of the people that calls these 
virtues its own will join your ranks’’.?* Fourthly, Hitler believed that “virtues” of 
heroism and self-sacrifice were most developed in an Aryan and least developed 
among the Jews. He wrote.
The greater the readiness to subordinate purely personal interests, the 
higher the ability to establish comprehensive communities. This self- 
sacrificing will to give one’s personal labour and if necessary one’s 
life for others is most strongly developed in the Aryan. The Aryan is
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not greatest in his mental power as such, but in the extent of his 
willingness to put all his abilities in the service of the community...
He willingly subordinates his own ego to the... community and, if 
necessary, even sacrifices it. Not in his intellectual gifts lies the source 
of the Aiyan’s capacity for creating and building civilisation. If he had 
this alone he could only act destructively, in no case could he 
organise; for the innermost essence of all organisation requires that the 
individual renounce his... interests... in favour of the larger group...
Every worker, every peasant, every official, etc. who works without 
ever being able to achieve happiness or prosperity for himself 
represents this lofty idea, 55
Fifthly, Hitler believed that the people guilty of the bourgeois individualism and 
intellectualism, not only useless but dangerous to a healthy society, were, by virtue of 
their overrepresentation in almost all non-manual economic activities, the business­
like Jews. “The Aryan regards work as the foundation for the maintenance of the 
community”, he said, but the “Jew regards work as the means to the exploitation of 
other peoples. The Jew never works as a productive creator... He works 
unproductively, using and enjoying other people’s work,, Similarly, “the Jew will 
always be the bom champion of private capital in its worst form, that of unchecked 
exploitation”,, Then he warned, “The Jewish race will have to adapt itself to 
productive work as other nations do, or sooner or later it will succumb to a crisis of 
an inconceivable magnitude”.58
As the above selection of his statements shows, it was Hitler’s deep 
conviction that the greatest crime the Jews have committed was their association
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with socio-economic activities devoid of manual labour and their “parasitic” 
profiteering from it. This, then, was the source of “injustice” committed by the Jews 
and, consequently. Hitler’s “justification” for their extermination. Thus, after the 
Nazi take-over of Austria, it became a national pastime to make the Jews work 
“creatively”. Some were forced to use small brushes and water mixed with acid to 
wash streets and sidewalks of Vienna.5? Another story tells of SA men, who “dragged 
an elderly Jewish worker and his wife through the applauding crowd... “Work for the
Jews. At last, work for the Jews,” howled the crowd. “We thank our Fulner, he has 
made work for the Jews!”?0 After a short while, however, this humiliation was no 
longer enough and the time had come to implement “The Final Solution to the 
Jewish Problem”. As they streamed to Auschwitz, the last thing the Jewish victims 
saw of the outside world was the sign in the middle of the iron gates of the lager, 
stating, “Arbeit Macht Frei” [Work Makes You Free]. It is important to recognise 
that this grisly motto only makes sense with this particular explanation of the
Holocaust.
Hitler’s hate for the Jews, therefore, had little to do with the conventionally 
understood concept of race and racism. He acknowledged both business acumen and 
intellectual superiority of the Jews. On the other hand, he criticised Germans for their 
lack of historical achievement and had little regard for German intellect. He did all 
this without in any way compromising the theoretical coherence of his beliefs, 
precisely because intellect-based entrepreneurship had no place in his vision of an 
ideal society. Thus, Hitler’s conception of a society was one where there was no 
place for Jews as a largely intellectual, non-manual and consequently parasitic or 
profiteering class. The destruction of the Jews must, therefore, be attributed to their 
superior socio-economic performance and their thorough utilisation of the capitalist
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economic system. In the final analysis, it was precisely the Jewish success in wealth- 
creation that brought about their ruin.
III. Incompatibility of Egalitarianism and Economic Freedom
We are engaged in exterminating the bourgeoisie as a class. You need not prove that 
this or that man acted against the interests of Soviet power. The first thing you have 
to ask an arrested person is: To what class does he belong;, where does he come 
from, what kind of education did he have, what is his occupation? These questions 
are to decide the fate of the accused. That is the quintessence of the Red Terror61
- M. Latsis
The massacre of the Soviet Kulaks is yet another example of a group that was 
eliminated because of a belief that what they had was unjustly acquired. This example 
will be looked at only briefly, because, unlike the case of the Jews in Germany, there 
are no competing explanations to disprove. The causes of the destruction of the Kulaks 
should be uncontested and the reasons for the lack of knowledge regarding these causes 
can only be attributed to the secrecy of the Soviet state and the bias of a sympathetic 
academia, hi some ways, the Kulaks are a more illuminating example than the Jews. 
Unlike the Jews, the Kulaks were defined by economic criteria and not etlmicity. Like 
the people who extenninated them, they were Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs and so on. 
But, like the Jews, the Kulaks were destroyed by a web of egalitarian assumptions and 
revolutionary justifications. The revolutionary justice in the case of Marxism was to put 
into practice Lenin’s motto “He who does not work, neither shall he eat”.77 Like Hitler, 
Lenin distinguished between “creative” and “parasitic” labour*. The basic premise of
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Marx’s teachings was that labour and material are the source of all value. Consequently, '
surplus value or profit that the capitalists derived fi'om the part of the value of the ;
labour of their employees that they did not return to them in wages was unjustified.6, f
As in Nazi Germany, profit-making was seen as parasitic and its eradication thus ;
ipso facto justified. As has been said, German anti-Semitism was made easier, 4
because the Jews were a distinct ethnic and cultural group. Ethnic distinctiveness, |
however, is neither sufficient nor necessary for elimination of a particular group. i
What is crucial is to show that a particular group has achieved its current superior -i
socio-economic status via unjust means. ;
Following the collapse of the Soviet economy in 1921, the Communists 
found it necessary to revive it through a partial privatisation called the “New 1
Economic Policy (NEP)”. As is often argued by the proponents of the free markets, 4
the Soviet economy was indeed saved and became, despite huge legislative obstacles, 1
relatively prosperous. None other than Khrushchev himself wrote in his memoirs that I
this was the only period in the history of the Soviet Union when there was no shortage
of consumer goods.64 However, in 1929 Stalin ended this market experiment and 1
nationalised the Soviet economy completely. In accordance with Marxist logic, goods 
were now sold at government-prescribed prices by people whose salaries depended not 
on the profit, but on the decision of the government. Needless to say, the Soviet system 
of distribution collapsed and remained famously inefficient until Communism ended 
some sixty years later.65 Stalin’s most significant contribution to the nationalisation of 
the Soviet economy was his collectivisation of agriculture. As required by Marxist 
dogma, private ownership of the means of production was ended and the peasants were 
forced to relinquish their land, tools, and stock.. Of course, the process of 
collectivisation did not “require” large-scale extermination of people, yet millions were
177
murdered. These were the “wealthy” peasants called the “Kulaks”. Unlike the Jews in 
Germany, the Kulaks were by no means as disproportionately wealthy. Few Kulaks had 
more than three cows and/or horses and ten hectares of arable land, Ironically, many 
were poorer than the public officials who came to exterminate them.??
What, then, were the reasons for their extermination? The Soviet Council of
People’s Commissars defined both their crime and the justification for their 
extermination. “A Kulak household”, the Council opined, “was one that regularly 
employed hired labour, or owned means of production [e.g.: a mill or butter-maker] or 
hired out agricultural machinery or buildings, or engaged in commercial activities or 
usury or other income not from work”.?? A Kulak hiring out labour, in other words, was 
guilty of what the communists called “exploitation”. Due to the seasonal nature of 
agriculture, however, it used to be a practice among farmers everywhere and at all times 
to hire help and borrow money at interest in order to harvest the crops and get through 
the idle months of the year.?? Nonetheless, Communist dogma defined these activities 
as unquestionably criminal. As Farron wiites,
[It] ...was irrelevant that the Kulaks grew five times more grain per 
capita than the average peasant and paid an even higher proportion of 
taxes, since during the NEP taxes were progressive. All that mattered 
was that part of their income did not come from their own work, which 
by definition made them exploiters. As a resolution passed by the Party 
Congress of 1919 stated. Kulaks constitute “the rural bourgeoisie” and 
so have to be resolutely cmshed, as opposed to the “middle” peasantry, 
which “does not belong to the exploiters, since it does not dra.w profits 
from the labour of others”. Ten years later, on December 27, 1929, when
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Stalin finally implemented that resolution, he aimounced that his 
purpose was “to limit the exploitative tendencies of the Kulaks and
70liquidate the Kulaks as a class” .
As with the Jews in Germany, the evidence of Kulaks’ greater ability to succeed was 
easy to find. During the Russian Revolution poor peasants seized the land of large 
landowners and rich peasants and divided it up amongst themselves. In other words, at 
the beginning of Communism in Russia., all peasants started off from roughly the same 
starting line. Between 1922 and 1925, however, the number of Kulaks more than 
doubled. It continued to grow despite high taxes, which were designed to discourage 
peasants from entering that category. As Farron writes, “since all peasants started the 
decade roughly equal, no one, including the Communists, disputed that what 
distinguished the Kulaks of 1929 from other peasants was that they were more 
intelligent, diligent and/or thrifty. That is a set of attributes that is frequently fatal to
71their possessors”.’
It is unclear how many Kulaks were exterminated. Stalin, for instance, told
Churchill that there were ten million Kulaks. He added that most of them have been
“wiped out”. hr his memoirs Khrushchev wrote, “I can’t give an exact figure [of 
people killed and starved] because no one was keeping count. All we knew was that 
people were dying in enormous numbers”. Scholars seem to agree that the number 
is closer to eight and certainly more than three and half million des^ths.74 This 
number, however, included not only the fatally successful fanners, but also their 
families. Holding families responsible for crimes and imagined crimes committed by 
a family member was, of course, an integral part of the Soviet system of collective 
“justice”. Article 58 of the 1935 Criminal Code, for example, criminalised the
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members of the families of the “traitors”, even if they did not know anything about 
the supposed treadieey.7. Another innocent people that suffered were the middle- 
income peasants, who were either killed or deported, because they “resembled” 
Kulaks. This happened, because in the USSR, “...anyone who might be guilty of a 
crime or resembles a guilty person in any way... [was] himself guilty”. Thus, 
“suspicion of espionage” was a criminal offence, as was having Finnish or German 
names. Ironically, many Soviet soldiers, who have been decorated for fighting the 
Films and the Germans, but earned such names, were also deported to Siberia™
The murder of the Kulaks seiwes as yet another example of the falsity of the 
doctrine of equal distribution of the potential to succeed. The Kulaks are one of the rare 
examples in human history, when, following massive upheavals, the so-much-written- 
about common starting point among particular peoples has actually been achieved. 
Within a short period of time there emerged a natural aristocracy of men, who through 
their talent and diligence accumulated more than the rest had. Marxist doctrine, 
however, stipulated that the means by which they succeeded were, as in the case of the 
Jews, “unjust”. As a result, many millions of Kulaks, many of them women and 
children were, in Stalin’s words, “wiped out”.
IV. Summary:The lessonsof Totalitarianism
"... basically National Socialism and Marxism are the same. ”77
- Adolph Hitler
As this chapter contended, the Nazi and Communist regimes were based on the same
assumptions as the proposals for Cosmopolitan reform. Namely, the above
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viewpoints assume that all groups, given roughly the same starting point, will 
perform similarly and that disproportionate success of one group could only have 
been achieved through some fonn of injustice. Of course, the intention here is not to 
insinuate that the proponents of the Cosmopolitan reform are either Nazis or 
Communists, hi fact, the good intentions contained in such a proposal can readily be 
acknowledged. But, historical evidence of the practical applications of these 
assumptions clearly shows how enormously damaging they can be. Hitler and Stalin 
were both convinced of the justice of their cause, but both stand out as the greatest 
murderers the world had ever seen. Hitler’s name, for example, will always be 
associated with the murder of the Jews. Their crime was to out-perform others and 
become disproportionately wealthy by what was considered to be “unjust” means. 
Some apologists for Jewish success have argued that their historical pre-eminence in 
commerce and professions must be attributed to them being prevented from
participating in other areas of socio-economic life? hi fact, the Jews have 
consistently outperformed all other ethnic groups among whom they have lived. 
They have done so iirespective of a variety of social closures. Therefore, the cause of 
the ruin of the European Jewry can only be attributed to their group-characteristic of 
superior ability to utilise the opportunities at hand and the Nazi perception of such 
activities as “unjust”.
Similarly, the Communists justified their extermination of the Kulaks by the 
latter’s accumulation of wealth by “unjust’ means. The Kulak example is 
illuminating for three reasons. Firstly, it forcefully disproves the racial explanations 
for genocide that have been used in the past. Clearly, in the case of the Kulaks, ethnic 
distinctiveness did not contribute to their extermination. Secondly, the rise of the 
post-1917 Kulaks is a historically unique example of an equivalent starting line
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amongst people and the subsequent emergence of a natural aristocracy of ability 
among them. Thirdly, this example clearly shows that differing aptitude to succeed 
can manifest itself in a number of different ways. Thus, while the Jews are an 
example of a gifted endogamous group, the Kulaks are an example of a gifted group 
with no distinctive ethnicity. What the Jews and the Kulaks shared, was a greater 
innate propensity to succeed than the groups among whom they lived.
The Jews and the Kulaks, having achieved greater prosperity than the rest, 
perished. But, the ideas that propelled 20th century from one disaster to another are not 
dead. Today a growing number of disproportionately able groups, be they the Cliinese 
in Malaysia, hidonesia or Thailand, the Indians in East Africa or the whites in the 
United States of America are being discriminated against because of a familiar set of 
assumptions; that ability to succeed is distributed equally and that disproportionate 
success must have been achieved through injustice. But, the universal acceptance of 
the premises in accordance with which Hitler and Stalin exterminated millions is not 
the only worry. Equal dangerous is the fact that enough members of academia and 
intelligentsia espouse these mistaken views and thus give intellectual credibility to 
those with power to implement them.
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Chapter Six
Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary power, which takes upon 
itself alone to secure their gratifications and to watch over their fate... It would be 
like the authority of a parent if like that authority,, its object was to prepare men for 
manhood; but it seeks, on the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood... For 
their happiness such a government willingly labours, but it chooses to be the sole 
agent and the only arbiter of that happiness. It provides for their security, foresees 
and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal 
concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides 
their inheritances; what remains, but to spare them all care of thinking and all the 
trouble of living?1
- Alexis de Tocqueville
The arguments of the social engineers concerning social exclusion, the concomitant 
inequality in material well-being and the subsequent inequality in representation are 
based on the assumption that all groups have a potential to achieve the same level of 
success. When this does not occur, it is often assumed that malice, or neglect, or both 
have caused the discrepancies amongst groups. But, this is not the case. Held fails to 
defend this automatic comiection between inequality and discrimination. The fact 
that inequality exists does not in itself mean that discrimination has occurred. 
Clearly, therefore, where there is no injustice, there should be no compensation. This 
does not mean, of course, that compensation is not, in certain circumstances, 
necessary. Indeed, a just society requires that wronged parties must be compensated. 
But, compensation must not be mechanical. Discrimination must first be clearly
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defined and then proven. The fact of inequality existing is, as a proof, simply not
good enough.
Out of these egalitarian assumptions arise two important practical implications. 
Firstly, Cosmopolitans are bound to oppose socio-economic systems that are prone to 
emphasise rather than diminish the potential differences between peoples. Therefore, 
the system of the free market, which rewards the participants in it unequally, tends to be 
ferociously opposed. Secondly, because of these egalitarian assumptions, the 
Cosmopolitans tend to be drawn to socio-economic systems where it is possible to 
eliminate whatever existing inequality tluough social engineering. Of course, this 
preference is based on the assumption that elimination of inequality is possible tluough 
fashioning of humanity in certain, egalitarian image.
The first part of this chapter will show how contemporary social engineering 
in the USA is based on the assumption that most, if not all, socio-economic 
differences between groups are based on discrimination. As will be seen, the 
evidence showing that certain group pathologies, such as child illegitimacy, have 
really started only with the growth of the welfare state, is conveniently ignored. The 
second part will then point to some of the most glaring examples of social 
engineering in practice, while the third part will show how racial gerrymandering is 
misused by the unscrupulous to emich themselves. The fourth part will look at the 
outcomes of social engineering in Britain and the fifth part will look at social 
engineering in. education. The sixth part will then look at the financial cost of social 
engineering.
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I. Social Engnieeriiig: Logical Incoherencies
Virtually no one seriously questions the principle of equal regard for human beings 
as human beings. We may all agree on equality before the law and religious people- 
can agree on equality that we are all equal in the sight of God,. It is the fatal step 
from- equal regard to equal performance - or presumptively equal performance in 
the absence of social barriers — that opens the door to disaster.2
- Thomas Sowell
The social engineering argument rests on a premise of equal potential of all groups in 
all areas of socio-economic life. Though there can be no doubt that black Americans 
have been subjected to discrimination, can the importance of this discrimination be 
measured by assuming that black Americans would have achieved the same degree 
of prosperity as other Americans if there had been no discrimination? Is this a 
sensible approach, bearing in mind the large differences among distinct groups of 
white Americans and the rise to incomes above the US national average by some 
non-white groups such as Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans? Sowell 
concludes that discrimination cannot seiwe as an “all-purpose” explanation of 
economic differences. As he writes, were discrimination to account for the failure of 
a particular group, black Brazilians, who were after the end of slavery not 
discriminated against, should have come closer to economic parity with the white 
Brazilians. The opposite is tme, for in Brazil the economic differences between 
blacks and whites are greater that those in the USA.
Similarly, with a brief interruption of six years during the Italian occupation, 
Ethiopia has been a self-governing territory for a very long time. But, far from being
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prosperous, Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Then there is Haiti. 
Haiti was the first predominantly black country in Western Hemisphere to become 
independent. This was two hundred years ago. According to the logic that 
discrimination causes economic differences, Haitian blacks should be the most 
prosperous blacks in the Hemisphere. Conversely, black Americans, who gained 
political rights only forty years ago, should be the poorest. In fact, the exact opposite 
is true. Haitians are the poorest blacks in the Western Hemisphere. The Black 
Americans, despite centuries of discrimination, are the most prosperous, the 
healthiest and longest living blacks in the world. As Williams writes, “if we totalled 
the income black Americans earned each year, and thought of ourselves [Williams is 
black] as a separate nation, we'd be the 14lh or 15th richest nation [in the world]. Even 
the 34 percent of blacks considered poor are fairly well off by world standards”?
There is another reason why this emphasis on discrimination is illogical. As 
Sowell writes, racial discrimination is seen as a source of statistical inequalities 
between black and white Americans only. It does not apply to the differences 
between white and Asian Americans. Thus, when US banks “approve a higher 
percentage of loans to white applicants than to black applicants, that is automatically 
called discrimination, but when Asian Americans are approved at a higher rate than 
whites, it is not. Nor is it called discrimination when Asians do better than whites on 
SAT scores, unemployment rates or income”.4 Discrimination in education, Sowell 
continues, is equally unsatisfactory as an explanation for differing academic 
perfonnance amongst groups. Though it is true that in the Jim Crow South black 
Americans have received a worse education than their white counterparts, they have 
received better education then some whites elsewhere in the world. In 1900, for 
example, 56% of Black Americans over the age of 14 were literate. At the same time,
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only 25% of Sicilians, Sardinians, Serbo-Croats, and Romanians were literate. 
Literacy in the Russian Empire was only 21% and in 1925 only 20% of Albanians 
knew how to read. As late as 1950, only 15% of the global population was literate.5 
Yet, many of the groups coming from these more “disadvantaged” backgrounds have 
since achieved higher rates of success than the blacks. Today schools in the 
Washington D.C. area, which is predominantly populated by black Americans, have 
some of the highest expenditures per pupil in the USA. But, the students’ scores are 
among the lowest. Equality of resources spent on education, in other words, is not an 
immediate guarantee of equality in performance? As Williams writes, black 
Americans have been all too keen to see discrimination behind socio-economic
discrepancies in the USA. Yet, they failed to appreciate that
“[The] greatest educational havoc [is] in the very cities where the 
mayor is black, the superintendent of schools is black, and most of the 
teachers and principals are black. When it's noticed that black 
illegitimacy is 70 percent, and less than 40 percent of black children 
live in two-parent families, and social pathology reigns supreme, it's 
not because of personal hnesponsibility. Instead, it's racism and the 
legacy of slavery. Nobody bothers to notice that a century ago, when 
blacks were much closer to slavery, had fewer civil rights and far 
fewer opportunities, black illegitimacy and family breakdown was a 
tiny fraction of today's?
Many commentators on black affairs in the USA, Williams and Sowell among them, 
agree that one of the biggest problems facing the black community is illegitimacy
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and children living in broken families. According to some studies, illegitimacy 
among the American blacks today may be as high as 70%. Today, only 41% of black 
males over the age of 15 are married and only 36% of black children live in families 
with two parents. Of course, some see these statistics as vestiges of slavery.8 But, the 
truth is different. In 1940, black illegitimacy was only 19 percent, hi the fifty years 
between 1890 and 1940, blacks enjoyed a mamage rate liigher than whites. As late 
as 1950, 64% of black males over the age of 15 were manied. Between 1905 and 
1925 in Harlem 85% of black children lived in two-parent families. Clearly, the 
question is why have the social problems besetting black families not been more 
prevalent at the time when blacks were closer to slavery. According to Williams, it is 
probable that the “legacy of slavery arguments are simply covers for another hustle 
[affirmative action] similar to the $6 trillion dollar War on Poverty hustle”?
So what was the impact of discrimination on the socio-economic disparities 
in the USA? According to Sowell, “The fact that discrimination deserves moral 
condemnation does not automatically make it causally crucial. Whether it is or is not 
in a given time and place is an empirical question, not a foregone conclusion. A 
confusion of morality with causation may be politically convenient but that does not 
make the two things one [original emphasis]”.® But, it is this causality between 
discrimination and performance that has been so totally accepted by the promoters of 
reverse discrimination that challenging it is almost impossible. Today, “racism”, 
“sexism”, “ageism” and a seemingly inexhaustible plethora of external reasons are 
constantly being provided to explain discrepancies in performance between 
supposedly equal groups.
Of course, a simple pointing out of discrepancies between groups is not 
enough. In order to succeed, a social engineer must assert that the cuinent socio­
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economic status of a particular group is directly dependent on one conspiracy or 
another. It is amazing how many people accept this type of explanation without a 
single piece of evidence. At the Million-Woman March on Philadelphia, for 
example, “the first item on the march’s twelve-point agenda was... a CIA plot to 
introduce crack cocaine into the [black] inner cities”." Similarly, in 1988, Steve 
Cokely, a former aide to the Mayor of Chicago, delivered “a series of lecture;?... in 
which he said [that the] Jews were a part of an international conspiracy to rule the 
world”. “Jewish doctors”, he continued, “inject Black schoolchildren with infectious 
diseases”. As ever, the members of the intelligentsia give intellectual credence to 
such views. J. R. Feagin, the fonmer President of the American Sociological 
Association, for example, writes,
A majority of white respondents say... that African Americans... now 
have equality in life chances with whites. However government 
statistical data indicate that such views are very much in error. When a 
Vietnamese family is driven out of its home... by African- American 
youth, that is white supremacy. When a Korean store owner shoots an 
African-American teenager in the back of the head, that is white
supremacy. When 33% of Latinos agree with the statement, ‘Even if 
given an equal chance [African-Americans] aren’t capable of getting 
ahead’ that is white supremacy.0
It must be said that the Feagin’s statement is not a joke or an exhortation to the 
public to beware of inflammatory and unsubstantiated statements like that. In fact, 
Feagin is as serious as anyone who accepts that all groups are equal in potential and
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that any discrepancies in equal status must be caused tlu'ough some form of 
discrimination. As Sowell writes, “One of the ways in which the dogma of equal 
performance is a threat to freedom is in its need to find villains and sinister 
machinations to explain why the real world is so different from the world of its 
vision... The very thought of condemning the theory... seems unthinkable”.'4
II. Social Engineering: NonsenseUpon Sttilt
A whole universe of the mind has already been created to explain inequality... Thus 
all standards of behaviour and performance are suspect as mere shams designed to 
ensure the continued advantages of the haves over the have-nots. Even efforts to help 
the less fortunate to acquire the behavioural prerequisites of productivity are often 
condemned as cultural imperialism, while the failure of the less fortunate to reap the 
rewards ofproductivity is also condemned as the fault of 'society ’. 5
- Thomas Sowell
The logic of the goal of proportional representation in the workplace has been 
recently documented by the decision of the US Department of Justice to sue the 
police departments in Philadelphia for failing to hire enough women. Apparently, the 
Justice department deemed it discriminatory that female candidates should be 
required to run 1,5 miles in less than 12 minutes - a physical task required of male 
officers. The Department defended its accusations of discrimination by claiming that 
physical fitness “was unrelated to job performance” and demanded “different 
standards for men and women”.® Cognitive skills have been watered down in order 
to accommodate less-able candidates as well. As Lott writes,
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Since testing for cognitive skills like reading comprehension, writing 
and memory has a ‘disparate impact’ on certain minority groups, the
[US] Justice Department know-it-alls have decided to pressure police
departments across the country to emphasise non-cognitive ‘skills’ 
like personality traits and personal interests when devising their own 
entrance exams. The Justice Department has threatened legal action if 
the police departments don’t go along with their ‘suggestions’. The 
obvious purpose of the department’s bullying tactics is not only to 
force police departments to hire by quota but to ensure that the police 
entrance exams are racially gerrymandered.^
Of course, cities with the greatest racial “gerrymandering’’ saw their crime rates 
increase 1.9% per year of the policies’ enforcement. As ever, it is in the poorest and 
predominantly black areas that the crime increase was greatest. This should come as 
no surprise, since it is in these areas that racial quotas have been most vigorously 
applied.'8
In 1995, the US Food and Drug Administration advised that “the common 
requirement for knowledge of rules of grammar” and “ability to spell accurately” 
should no longer be used, because they may hamper the hiring of minorities and 
people with disabilities. Interviewers have been told not to judge traits such as 
“motivation, ambition, maturity, personality and neatness”.^ Also in 1995, the 
Pentagon determined that “special permission will be required for the promotion of 
all white men without disabilities” and the US Navy resolved that future navy 
officers will be hired “in a percentage approximately equal to their racial makeup of
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the populace”.211 hi its 1995 job announcement, the US Forest Department specified 
that “only unqualified applicants may apply”. It then elaborated that “Only applicants 
who do not meet [required] standards will be considered”. As Larson reported, “in 
some cases, critical firefighting positions were left vacant or filled with unqualified 
temporary workers because no women applied for the posts”.21
Though every federal department has an agency responsible for the 
enforcement of racial quotas in its own domain, none is more powerful than the US 
Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). 
Its most influential tasks are to vet private companies in the application process for 
federal contracts and to enforce affirmative action among federal contractors. As 
such, it is a powerful tool of the social engineers for enforcement among 200,000 
companies and approximately 25 million employees of what its former director, 
Shirley Wilcher, called “equality in the workplace”. “We see”, Wilcher continued, 
“whether or not minorities or women are underutilized in an organization, based on a 
very elaborate formula. We look at the availability of our protected groups in the 
labour force... [and] argue that the... employer really needs to have a goal to achieve 
parity with the available work force”. According to Wilcher, in other words, the 
government ought to prefer some “protected” groups over others. If the proportional 
representation of these “protected” groups in the population of the county or the state 
is out of sine with their representation in the workforce of a particular company, 
quotas must be imposed to achieve proportionality.
It is mistaken to assume that proportionality applies only to hiring. Financial 
rewards must too be proportional. Thus, in 1996, the OFCCP reprimanded the 
University of for paying “too little” to minority and female members of
staff. How did the OFCCP arrive at such conclusion? Instead of looking at every case
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individually and juxtaposing experience, quality of teaching and other such criteria, 
the OFCCP created a hypothetical faculty member with an average salary of X. The 
OFCCP then compared the female and minority faculty members with this 
hypothetical member and the ones that fell below were immediately assumed to be 
discriminated against. Because of this ridiculous method of analysis, the University 
was forced to pay millions of dollars in back payments to the “protected” groups?? 
The irrelevance of merit is something the agency does not even pretend to hide. As 
the OFCCP itself announced, “No distinction is made between minimum and other 
qualifications in an evaluation of the total selection process”. And, as its former head 
Ellen Shong Bergman acknowledged, the OFCCP disciplines businesses, which fail 
“to select a woman. Black, or Hispanic who is as qualified as the least qualified 
incumbent, irrespective of superior qualifications of other non-minority 
applicants’’?? But, as the case of the City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri, shows, 
achieving proportionality may not be enough. In that particular case, the OFCCP 
agent failed to find “racial discrimination” in the hiring practices of the above 
company. The company has, in fact, fulfilled the local racial quota and its workforce 
reflected the proportional representation of non-whites in the community. The 
OFCCP, however, demanded that the company start hiring from the Kansas City 
area, 170 miles away?4
As D’Souza writes, the above cases result from an arbitrary expectation that 
“in the absence of discrimination, all groups should be represented in the workforce 
at roughly their proportion in the population”?? The legal framework for this 
expectation has been set by a number of successive rulings of the US Supreme Court. 
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, it ruled that “It is 
ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in
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a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the 
population in the community from which employees are hired”?6 Its 1971 ruling in 
Griggs v. Duke Power, the Court specified that “companies are liable for illegal 
discrimination, regardless of their intentions, if the effect of their hiring and 
promotion standards that produced such a ‘disparate impact’ could only be justified 
if the company could prove that those standards bore a ‘demonstrable relationship’ to 
performance and were required by ‘business neecssstyi,”27 But, to demonstrate such a 
relationship is very difficult. A supennarket, for instance, may require that the 
applicants for jobs there do not have a criminal record. According to the above 
ruling, however, the supemiarket must prove such a requirement is absolutely 
necessary. This, the supermarket cannot do, because it is clearly possible for a 
convict to refoim his ways. In the absence of clearly applicable criteria for 
employment, however, the door is open for abuse. Thus the US government found it 
possible to sue a number of companies that required, for example, that no applicants 
have a criminal record on the basis that the blacks were more likely to have one?8
In order to avoid this kind of unwanted attention the American companies 
have systematically caved in to the pressure exercised by the misguided public and 
the federal government. Northwest Airlines, for example, may have paid as much as 
$40 million in order “to end a discrimination suit that was based not on proof of
intentional bias but on statistical imbalances in the airline’s work force. Northwest
consented to accelerated hiring and promotion of black workers, special scholarships 
for black mechanics and pilot trainees...” Similarly, over 70% of Fortune 500 
companies promised to take-up race-based hiring, whilst only 14% stated that they 
would stick solely to the merit of the applicants^
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That merit does not and will not stand in the way of the social engineers has recently 
been shown in South Africa, where the government pursues affirmative action 
policies. According to one government official, “It is imperative to get rid of merit as 
the overriding principle in the employment...”30 Such attitudes can only succeed in 
driving better-educated and more skilled whites overseas. This South Africa can only
ill afford.
III. Social Engineering: Legalised Extortion
“[Man can live by his own labour, but] it is also true that man may live and satisfy 
his wants by seizing and consuming the products of the labour of others. ...It follows 
that men will resort to plunder whenever plunder is easier than work. ”3J
- Frederic Bastiat
The most effective way in which the OFCCP can force businesses to comply with 
racial quotas is a financial penalty.32 The case of Carolina Steel in Greensboro, a 
model company as far as social engineering was concerned, for the number of its 
black employees was higher than the local quota required, is a telling one. Despite its 
fulfilment of the quota, the company was found guilty of discrimination. The reason 
was that the company’s location was about a block away from the local 
unemployment office. As such it was inundated with applications it could not 
possibly entertain. The OFCCP, therefore, proceeded to judge the company on the 
basis of minority applicants who were not employed. The OFCCP’s demand for 
financial compensation of workers who never worked for the company was so high 
that, had it been paid, it would have destroyed the company. Under pressure, the
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company caved in, offering a settlement. As the CEO of Carolina Steel said, “We 
don’t think that we were fairly treated under the law, but we settled in order to get 
them [OFCCP] off our back”.33
Another extortion body in the USA is the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission [EEOC]. In 1995 the EEOC descended on Koch Poultry Co. in Chicago 
for employing “too many” Hispanics and “not enough” Blacks. The company was 
asked to place an advert in the newspaper asking “for people who might have applied 
for a job, or if they were thinking about applying, so they might be entitled to a
financial settlement”. The EEOC then asked for over $5 million in order to finance
this settlement. This was more than the company was worth. As a consequence, the 
company went to court and spent $250,000 defending itself'?'1 Similarly, in 1994 the 
EEOC threatened West Point Market in Akron, Ohio, for refusing to hire Blacks on 
the basis of their race. No complaints against the company have ever been filed, but 
this did not prevent the EEOC from demanding 33% quota on Black employees and 
$100,000 in compensation money for 24 Black applicants who have not been hired in 
the past. Rather than facing the court battle, the company agreed to a higher racial 
quota and offered 24 scholarships of $1000 each to the turned-down applicants. None 
of the 24 applicants reapplied?? No wonder that the EEOC Accomplishments Report 
for Fiscal Year 1999 boasted an intake of over $307 million in compensation 
payments from private businesses across the USA.??
Some people have turn race into profitable business. The exploits of the 
former Democratic presidential candidate Jesse L. Jackson, for example, have 
reached such proportions that even the “progressive” Washington Post had enough. 
Following revelations that Jackson had paid $40,000 out of the black-empowerment 
Citizenship Education Fund (CEF) to his mistress and mother of his child, questions
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began to be asked about the methods that Jackson used to extort money from his 
corporate victims. “An examination of the public record and his financial statements 
shows”, the newspaper wrote, “that Jackson has repeatedly inserted himself into 
corporate controversies and transactions just when the companies are most exposed - 
and therefore most inclined to be generous to Jackson's organization - such as when 
they are seeking federal approval for a merger or battling charges of discriminatory 
hiring practices”.
Moreover, Jackson also seems to have pressured companies to award 
profitable business deals to his close friends. Jackson, who claims to be a “victim of 
a right-wing conspiracy to discredit him”, denied any link between his threats to 
boycott businesses for apparent discrimination against Blacks and financial rewards 
to his friends. After these disclosures, however, fewer people are willing to believe 
him. Gerald Reynolds, a board member of the Center for New Black Leadership,
called him a “hustler” and “charlatan” who blackmails white CEOs into submission.
There is certainly evidence to support Reynolds’s claims. At the time of Viacom’s 
merger with CBS, for example, Jackson protested against the deal. He would change 
his mind, he claimed, if Viacom sold a part of the company to a minority 
businessman, Percy Sutton. It so happens that Sutton is Jackson's close friend and 
acted as finance chairman of the latter’s 1988 presidential campaign. Sutton is also
the director of the CEF and Jackson owns $1 million worth of shares in one of
Sutton’s companies. The Viacom deal came to nothing, but the company did become 
a supporter of the CEF, contributing $377,500 in 1999. Jackson also opposed the 
merger of telecommunications giants SBC and Ameritech, calling it “antithetical to 
basic democratic values”. “However, after SBC and Ameritech contributed $500,000 
to the CEF and agreed to sell 7 percent of the $3.3 billion cellular telephone business
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to a black businessman, Jackson withdrew his opposition and declared the merger to 
be in the public’s interest”. The black businessman in question was Chester 
Davenport, Jackson’s close friend and a regular contributor to Rainbow/PUSH, civil 
rights group that Jackson heads.37
IV. Social Engineering: Great Britain
History will see... [Blair's] efforts as a final, futile attempt to save a decaying system. 
Blair is a modern-day Necker, the minister of Louis XVI, whose reforms predictably 
failed to rejuvenate the enfeebled carcass of the ancien regime.38
- Stephen Berry
In Britain, as in the USA, social engineering is beginning to be applied in earnest. 
The recent, largely successful, attempt by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) 
to force the pre-2001 election Members of the British Parliament (MP’s) into signing 
a compact promising not to make race an election issue illustrates this clearly. The 
MP’s were asked to undertake to “represent the interests of all... constituents, 
regardless of race, sex, colour, religion or any other discriminating factor... [to] 
reject all forms of racial violence, racial harassment and unlawful racial 
discrimination... [and not to] stir up racial or religious hatred or lead to prejudice on 
grounds of race, nationality or religion”.39
Of course, by insisting on this compact and threatening to publish the names 
of those MP’s who refused to sign it, the CRE achieved the exact opposite to what it 
intended; it put race at the very centre of the British electoral process. It did so by 
implying that the British politicians could not be trusted not to play the race card and
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by assuming for itself the role of a sole defender of a multi-racial and pseudo-liberal 
society. , Alarmingly, it tried to silence a totally legitimate debate about the direction 
the British racial and religious relations should take in the future. That this debate is 
vital is clear, not least because of the actions taken by the CRE.
As Gove wrote, there is much in CRE's approach to race issues in Britain that 
is profoundly anti-liberal. The CRE influenced the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 
2000 to include the concept of “indirect discrimination which holds public bodies 
culpable for racism if the ethnic composition of their staff does not match a particular 
template”. To put it differently, non-compliance with certain racial quota is now 
considered “prima facie evidence of racism”.40 Further, the CRE's hostility towards 
presumption of innocence was evident in its delight at Article 13 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty, which reversed the burden of proof in anti-discrimination cases from the 
plaintiffs to the defendants. This means that “a decision not to employ an individual 
from an etlmic minority automatically makes... [one] a racist unless... [one] can 
prove otherwise”.41
So, in Britain, as in the USA, the existence of ethnic minorities is being used 
to erode the very same principles that allowed these ethnic minorities to arrive and to 
flourish here. Regulations are being put in place, which constrain human freedom in 
order to make group relations better. Mostly, they achieve the opposite. As Faisal 
Bodi wrote, “Much of the blame [for ethnic tensions] lie with race relations policies 
that have promoted ethnic insularity at the expense of integration. Money for 
ethnically exclusive centres and language support projects has poured into [racially 
tense areas]... It has helped bigots... And it has helped the race sector employees 
stay at work.42
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Social engineers are active in other areas as well. The fomner chief of staff, General 
Sir Charles Guthrie, for example, has recently attacked “a culture of risk aversion” in 
Britain. He warned of the possibility of officers being sued “for leading men into 
action which could lead to death or injury”. In addition, Gutlnie attacked “the idea 
that the military should be compelled to accept disabled recruits”. “We need to guard 
against such ill-conceived ideas in future”, he said.43 Guthrie’s statements came not 
long after the British Ministry of Defence “has amiounced that the noise of military 
brass bands, as well as that from gunfire during infantry training exercises, is in 
violation of occupational-safety regulations safeguarding workers from excessive 
noise”.44 Similarly, it has been reported that “Scottish companies were warned... that 
they could face prosecution if their websites are not accessible to the disabled”."* As 
James Clark sarcastically reported, because of the British Disability Discrimination 
Act, “police officers with part of a leg missing are likely to be pounding the beat and 
one-eyed drivers could be at the wheel of pursuit cars”."6
Language is yet another area where the social engineers have been active. 
Stockport College in Manchester, for example, has prohibited its staff and students 
from using more than forty “offensive” words and phrases. These include “postman”, 
“chainnan” and “history”, which are deemed sexist; “mad”, “manic” and “crazy”, 
deemed as “demeaning to the mentally impaired”; “slaving over a hot stove”, 
because it apparently “minimises the horror and oppression of the slave trade” and 
“normal family” and “ladies and gentlemen”, because of its apparent class 
implications. According to the college, adherence to this ban will be a precondition 
of seiwice and admrisiinn^
Similarly, a public employment bureau in Staffordshire had recently 
prohibited an employer from placing a recruitment advertisement that included
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words such as “hardworking” and “enthusiastic”. Apparently, such words were 
“deemed discriminatory”. David Blunkett, the then Education and Employment 
minister, ordered the policy revessed.42
V. Social Engineering: Education
The liberal conceives of men as imperfect beings. He regards the problem of social 
organisation to be as much a negative problem or preventing “bad1’ people from 
doing harm as of enabling "good” people to do good; and., of course,, "bad” and 
"good” people may be the same people, depending on who is judging them.49
- Milton Friedman
At universities tlmoughout the USA and in the UK, governmental policies of social 
engineering are becoming clearly visible. For decades, many American universities 
admitted candidates on the basis of their Standardised Aptitude Test (SAT) scores. 
The SAT is taken by high-school graduates hoping to enter a university. Universities, 
on the other hand, issue their own SAT requirements. Thus, a university with good 
reputation will have SAT requirements lower than a university with an excellent 
reputation etc. It happens that in the SAT's black and Hispanic Americans score, on 
average, lower than whites do. It is for this reason that admissions to US universities 
have not been “proportional”. The American social engineers, rather than accepting 
this diversity in the potential to succeed, have attacked the SAT instead. The 1999 
federal proposal entitled “Nondiscrimination in High-Stakes Testing” stated that “the 
use of any educational test which has significant disparate impact on members of any 
particular race, national origin, or sex is discriminatory”,5®
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It is important to note here that the US Department of Education, which came up 
with this proposal, did not question the objectivity of the SAT, for there is no 
evidence that the test is structured in a way that benefits the politically dominant 
group. So it happens that both, American Jews and Asians score higher than whites 
do. Moreover, as the authors of the proposal themselves state, the SAT simply 
reflects the unequal distribution of particular abilities throughout the US population. 
It is worth noting that the Jewish and Asian over-performance in these tests is 
accepted as completely uncontioversial. The black-white discrepancy, however, 
causes a great deal of debate. It is perhaps tacitly accepted, even by the opponents of 
the SAT, that it would be factually incorrect as well as politically damaging to accuse 
the Jews and the Asians of discriminatory behaviour.
The federal attempt to destroy the SAT is only the latest attempt of the social 
engineers to further their agenda in the educational sphere. Again, the problem rests 
in the assumption of the social engineers that talent and ability to succeed in 
whatever activity is equality distributed throughout the social strata. As one Deputy 
Assistant Education Secretary under the Clinton Administration stated, “Excellence 
and equity must, as a matter of education policy and legal standards, go hand in 
hand”.51
Of course, in real life excellence and equality do not come hand in hand. This 
is clear from a recent report published by the Center for Equal Opportunity in 
Washington, D.C. The report has examined the admissions policies at 47 tertiary 
institutions and was based on a review of applicants' SAT scores and high-school 
class ranks. The report concluded that “the use of racial and ethnic preferences by 
college admissions officers was peiwasive and national in scope”. It further obseiwed 
that only a handful of the institutions under scmtiny did not use any such
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preferences. As the report said, “at least three-fourths of the institutions studied have 
had a substantial degree of preference in favour of blacks over whites and that about
two-fifths of the institutions favoured Hispanic applicants over white ones to a
similar extent”. It continued,
[A] black applicant was four times likelier than a white applicant with 
the same standardized test scores and high-school grades to be 
admitted to the University of Minnesota at Duluth; eight times likelier 
to be admitted at the University of North Carolina at Chaidotte; 18 
times likelier at Longwood College in Virginia; and 57 times likelier 
at the University of North Carolina at Wilmington. The report also 
noted that all the above institutions were ranked as competitive by 
Barron's Profiles of American Colleges, placing them in the middle of 
the institutions studied in terms of their academic quality. The few 
institutions that did not use racial or etlmic preferences at all were 
ones that either accept more than 85 percent of applicants or open 
their doors to anyone who appiies.63
As with so many other kinds of obviously discriminatory practices, the system of 
racial preferences also needs intellectual justification. Thus, Roy Brooks states, 
“There is nothing intrinsically wrong with using race in lawmaking or policy 
formulation... [Critics of affirmative action are unable] to distinguish between 
policies that engender racial exclusion and those that promote racial inclusion”.®® 
Similarly, Randall Kemiedy asserts, “The color blindness theory... is an incomplete 
and misleading approach... to the constitutional end of assuring substantive, not
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merely procedural, equality”. Likewise, Patricia Williams writes, “The rules may be 
colorblind, but people are not. ...[There may be a necessity for] some measure of 
enforced equality... [instead of the] blindly formalised constructions of equal 
opportunity”.5"
Morality aside, the question of practicality must also be addressed. But, it is 
precisely in the practical sphere that affirmative action harms blacks most. The 
dogma of social engineering demands that universities, especially the best 
universities, should accept a certain quota of applicants from each definable group. 
Thus, because of the affirmative action policies, the numbers of black undergraduates 
has in toto increased. But, this increase was not translated into an increase in the 
number of black graduates. This is so, because a large number of black students were 
incapable of meeting the high standards of the universities into which they were 
admitted. A much more sensible approach would be to let the intellectual “market” 
decide the proper and sustainable place for these students elsewhere in American 
academia. Black students, in other words, who are presently unable to meet high 
academic criteria at the best US colleges, could well be able to meet the standards 
required at less demanding colleges, gaining a degree and gaining a career. A degree 
from the University of Texas, after all, is infinitely better than no degree from 
Harvard University.55
According to social engineers, everything must be subjected to the goal of 
reaching equality no matter what the impact on the individuals within society. For 
example, it is plain that logical extrapolation of the liberal dogma must result in 
denying the proper place on the educational ladder to individuals with intellectual 
superiority. Persson Benbow and Stanley give a worrying example. Apparently, a 
student scoring higher than his classmates on the mathematical portion of the SAT
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was denied higher-level tuition in mathematics because it would be “a violation of 
social justice [of his less-able classmates]”.56
Of course, there are two distinct ways of achieving egalitarian goals. The 
state can clamp down on the overachiever in order to bring him down to the level of 
others. Or, the state can bring the underachiever up to the standard level. In the 
educational setting, this means tenific expenditures on “special education” projects 
and other ways of assuring the progress of mentally retarded and otherwise 
handicapped students. Such projects pay little or no attention to financial costs, no 
matter how inconsequential the achievements. No example illustrates this better than 
the infamous Milwaukee Project.
The project involved forty children born to mentally retarded mothers in 
impoverished areas of Milwaukee. Twenty of these children were at the age of three 
months placed under the tutelage of professional educators. The other twenty 
children were left without tutelage and were to serve as a control group. The first 
twenty were “didactically stimulated”, initially for seven hours and later for eight 
hours a day, five days a week. Each child had an individual teacher for at least some
of the time and the child-teacher ratio never rose above three to one. As the director
of the project stated, the “childhood enviromnents of John Stuart Mill and Sir Francis 
Galton would seem very deprived by comparison”. According to the media, the 
project was supposed to have achieved a staggering average IQ gain of 33 points per 
child. Not reported was the fact that whatever “gain” there was, it quickly dissipated. 
Thus, at the begimiing of their first year at school, the artificially stimulated children 
got grades indistinguishable from those of the children in the control group. Also, the 
assessment of their reading ability was the same. At the end of the year, “the average 
score of the children in the experimental group on standardized tests was in the lower
208
half of the general population in reading comprehension, and in the lowest third in 
mathematics”. By the time they were ten, “their average reading comprehension was in 
the lowest 19% of the population and their ability at arithmetic problem solving in the 
lowest 10%, identical with the control group”.®3
The unambiguousness of the failure of the project to raise the IQ’s of the 
children of retarded mothers permanently was truly astonishing. Even more so was 
the cost. The initially reported IQ gains of 33 points cost the American taxpayer 
$23,000 per IQ point per child. Adjusted for inflation, the cost of the project equalled 
to 97,000 1999-dollars per reported IQ point per child.®3 Thus, even if the IQ gains 
were real, which they were not, the environmental avenue would never have been 
feasible from a financial point of view. In conclusion, it is probably fair to say that 
there is no known example of this kind of environmental manipulation ever having 
permanently raised the IQ levels of an individual or a group. Considering the media 
bias in this matter, it is safe to assume that had such a study existed, the world would 
have known about it.®®
The above example lead to another point. This is the relationship between 
state education and spending. State education has been an indivisible part of the 
welfare state since its conception. Yet, the assumption that the state is necessary to 
educate the public is a hoax, hi 1930, at the height of the Great Depression and 
before the birth of the welfare state in the USA, only 3 million Americans could not 
read. Today, after 40 years of the welfare state and approximately $6 trillion spent on 
welfare, 40 million Americans camiot do so®® Even accounting for the growth of the 
American population, this still represents an absolute decline in the proportion of 
Americans who can read. As ever, it is the least prosperous members of the society 
who suffer the most, hi 1930, 80% of black Americans could read. Today, only 56%
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can do so.61 This slump in people’s ability to read is not a fault of uncaring 
capitalism. It is high taxes that make it impossible for the poor people to opt for 
private education. The rich, on the other hand, can both subsidise public education 
and send their own children to private schools. As Beito shows, the welfare state also 
destroyed, through unfair competition, the communal provision of medical care.62
It is a part of the “progressive” dogma that problems in education can only be 
tackled through increased expenditure. Every time a new statistic emerges showing 
educational standards falling in public schools, more money is thrown onto the 
problem. Again, this is exactly the wrong approach. In 1980, the State of New York 
spent about $4000 per pupil per annum. At that time, the Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT) scores of New York pupils was approximately 7 points above national 
average. In 1995, the spending reached $9300 per pupil, whilst the scores plummeted 
to 19 points below national average; a difference of 26 points!63 This trend is 
observable throughout the USA. In 1995, Iowa, Arizona and Utah spent $4344, 
$3276 and £2629 per pupil per annum respectively. Their combined SAT scores 
were, again respectively, 1093, 1005, and 1031. In the same year, New York, New 
Jersey and Washington, D.C., spent, respectively, $7647, $7795, and $7550 per pupil 
per annum. But their combined SAT scores were, respectively, 881, 885 and 840.64 hi 
1997, public schools in Newark, New Jersey had the highest per pupil expenditure in 
the USA. Despite this fact, the SAT scores of the Newark pupils were so low that the 
schools had to be taken over by the state government.65 Today the USA spends more 
per student than any other developed nation. Between 1981 and 1991 the average 
spending per pupil per annum increased by about $3000. Thus, by 1991, the 
American taxpayer spent about $6000 per pupil per annum. But, despite this huge 
increase, the average national SAT verbal scores fell to 422. This represented a
210
decline of 44 points from the 1967 peak of 466. Similarly, the average national SAT 
math scores fell to 474 points, 18 points below the 1967 peak of 492.55
However, the two most popular explanations for the above decline in SAT 
scores are clearly incorrect. Firstly, it is claimed that educational performance 
depends on class size. The average size of the American classrooms is 17, while 
South Korea has an average of 40 pupils per class. Yet, in the respected Third 
International Math and Science Studv. South Korean 4th graders scored 21® in 
mathematics and 1st in science, whilst American 4® graders came 12th in math and 3rh 
in science. Korean 8th graders came 2*6 in math and 4® in science, whilst the 
American 8® graders came 28® in math and 17® in science.®7 The second explanation 
usually offered is the amorphous concept of self-esteem, or lack of it, on the part of 
the American pupils. Thus, tremendous resources have been put into promoting self­
esteem among young Americans, As Sykes wrote, enhancement of the self-esteem 
has become the central obsession of the American educator®.68 But, when in 1989 
thirteen-year-old children in six countries were tested in math and then asked 
whether they thought they were good at it, a very different picture emerged. The 
American pupils thought highest of their abilities, but performed the worst. The 
South Koreans, on the other hand, regarded their abilities with greatest suspicion, but 
performed the best.® In fact, Scherer and Kraut reported that there is no empirical 
coimection between self-esteem and academic perfomiance as early as 1979. They 
wrote, “The overwhelmingly negative evidence reported here for a causal connection 
between self-esteem and academic achievement should create caution among 
educators ...who have heretofore assumed that enhancing a person’s feelings about 
himself would lead to academic achievement”.®* As can be seen, the popular excuses
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offered in order to defend the record of public sector in delivering quality education
can be dismissed.
VI. Social Engineering: The Cost
How can there be a definite limit to the supreme power if an indefinite general 
happiness, left to its judgement, is to be its aim? Are the princes to be the fathers of 
the people, however great be the danger that they will also become its despots?71
- G. H. von Berg
Since the 1960’s the American social engineers faced the task of increasing the 
minority representation in the areas of social and economic life where these have 
been previously underrepresented. Based on the assumption that all groups are equal 
in their potential to succeed, proportionality became the new American dogma. To 
comply with it, “The National Science Foundation and the National Institute of 
Health have spent an average of $135 million dollars a year of the taxpayers’ money 
to increase the number of... [minority] scientists”.
But that is a drop in the ocean compared with the financial and human 
resources that every American science association, nearly every 
university and most large corporations have devoted since the 1960s 
to increasing the number of... [minorities] who study science. These 
programs and projects begin in elementary school and extend through 
graduate school. They cover summer vacations as well as the 
academic year. Some bribe prospective students with large cash gifts
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just for showing up... ‘Big firms like Exxon, G. E. and IBM offer huge 
signing bonuses both for new minority recruits and for existing minority 
employees who help bring them in. Then, when the newcomers arrive at 
the company, the human resources department typically spends a small 
fortune trying to raise the odds that they’ll stay’. The rivalry among 
companies to hire black engineers is so intense that they must make 
contributions to Howard University, whose students are black, before it 
allows them to conduct inteiwiews with its engineering graduates. 
Companies pay scouts $125,000 for each black engineer they recruit.
These efforts have been especially desperate among computer 
companies. Nevertheless, in the past decade in California alone, ‘more 
than a dozen [computer companies] have been cited for affirmative 
action violations, and several ... have paid hefty fines’,o
Similarly, each year the American “government awards hundreds of millions of 
dollars in set-arrds programs that are awarded on a quota basis to minority 
organisations and businessss”.75 Thus, the US Defence Department is required to 
give at least 5% of its contracts to minority businesses. Many of its agencies “do not 
allow” white-owned companies to even bid for these contracts. The US Department 
of Transportation is compelled by law not to spend less than 10% of its federal funds 
with minority businesses. The Public Works Employment Act specifies that 10% of 
construction projects must go to minority contractors. The Small Business 
Administration annually awards contracts to the value of tlu'ee to five billion dollars 
to minority businesses, even though most of them end up being a failure by market 
criteria. The Federal Communications Commission gives preferential treatment to
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minorities “in the purchase and sale of radio and television stations”. Some of the 
minority representatives who benefited financially from these government subsidies 
are millionaires Vernon Jordan, Bill Cosby and O. J. Simp^®."* Racial preferences 
are, of course, burgeoning at the state and local govermnent level. “By 1989, at least 
thirty-six states and 190 local governments had adopted minority set-asides, 
earmarking a fraction, sometimes as high as 25 to 50 percent, of their expenditures 
for so-called minority... business enterprises”.7®
These set-asides are common and their cost, as estimated by the US 
Congressional Research Sernice in 1995, comes to about $10 billion per annum.7® In 
fact, this Congressional report came out only months before the US Supreme Court’s 
decision in the case of Adarand v. Pena. In that case, a white-owned company sued 
the US Department of Transport for awarding contracts to minority businesses, even 
though these businesses were charging more. It turned out that the Department of 
Transport followed quotas, which the Supreme Court now deemed uncontittutiona®®7 
The Clinton administration reacted with fury. Assistant Attorney General for Civil 
Rights, Deval Patrick, stated, “It is important that we are not intimidated by Adarand. 
We have to take Adarand on”.7® Indeed, the Clinton Administration proceeded to do 
exactly that. When, in 1996, a federal judge in Texas prohibited the Huston 
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) from using race as a factor in awarding 
contracts, its federal overseeing body warned the MTA that it would loose hundreds 
of millions of dollars of federal money unless racial quotas were l•emstaCed.77 
Similarly, later that year, a federal appeals court prohibited the use of racial 
preference in the admission of students to the University of Texas Law School. The 
US Department of Education responded by threatening the Texas educational 
authorities with withdrawal of $500 million of federal moneys, unless they disobeyed
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the court order ** Of course, the USSC’s banning the states from continuing such 
practices unless discrimination is actually proven produced a multitude of studies 
aimed at finding it. The City of Miami hired an accounting firm to "locate 
discrimination in the city’s own practices”. When the study produced what should 
have been good news, in other words that there was no patterned discrimination, it 
was condemned. As the Deputy Mayor of Miami lamented, “The whole purpose of 
this study was for you to prove that there was a disparity in minority hiring”.®*
Before leaving the Oval Office, President Bill Clinton signed a large number 
of Executive Orders designed primarily to embarrass his Republican successor 
should the latter try to repeal them. Some were merely malicious, while others were 
outright damaging to the American economy - a good steward of which President 
Clinton has claimed to be. Executive Order 13166, for example, decreed that all 
federal agencies must give non-English speakers “equal access” to federal services. 
Predictably, the order has been “interpreted as an absolute entitlement”. As a result, 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued compliance guidelines to 
its local branches to guarantee “free” seiwices, for example interpreters and written 
materials in languages such as Farsi and Tagalog, to all welfare recipients. As 
Michelle Malkin writes, if doctors fail to provide these amenities, they can be cut off 
from Medicaid reimbursement and even sued for discrimination. One of the early 
victims of the order was the Maine Medical Center in Portland, which was forced to 
sign a settlement “requiring it to offer interpretation in eight languages including 
Somali, Spanish and Serbo-Croatian, both Cyrillic and Roman alphabet, at a cost of a 
quarter-million dollars a year”. Of course, what needs to be borne in mind is that as a 
result of this one Executive Order stories like this are likely to be repeated in medical 
centres thwghout the US, raising the costs to hundreds of millions of dollars per
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annum. What also needs to be remembered is that Clinton, following the example of 
most of his predecessors, is responsible for issuing thousands of Executive Orders 
with a similar intent, the cost of which is likely never to be fully known. Yet these 
are merely seen costs. There are also unseen costs, for as the American Medical 
Association points out, “if forced to absorb the rule's costs for all Medicaid non­
English speaking patients, physicians will simply decide not to treat any Medicaid 
patients”. Of course, this is the exact opposite of what Clinton wanted to achieve.
Another example of the astonishing financial costs associated with social 
engineering is the plethora of American antr-dircrrmrnatron acts. Though intended to 
encourage a level playing field, the natural human propensity to live at other people’s 
expense had given rise to some remarkable peiwersions. Here are some recent 
examples from the USA,
• The 9th Circuit reinstated the disability discrimination claims of a 
county employee who was disciplined for sleeping on the job. The 
court reasoned that the plaintiff-employee, who suffers from 
anxiety, panic and somatoform disorders, which became 
“paralyzing”, and who took medications that made him drowsy 
and sexually impotent, produced sufficient evidence of substantial 
limitations on major life activities to proceed with his disability
discrimination claim.
• A Florida phone sex operator won a workers' compensation case 
(US$ 30 000) in which she claimed that she was injured after 
regularly masturbating at work. The woman claimed that she had 
developed carpal tumel syndrome - a repetitive motion injury - in
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both hands from masturbating as many as seven times a day while 
speaking with phone sex clients.
• The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission decided in July 
that an employee who was fired for his “obsessive” belief in the 
possibility of cold fusion - which most physicists believe is 
impossible - can sue his employer, the U.S. Patent Office, for 
religious discrimination.
• The United States' largest aerospace company has been sued for 
religious discrimination by a fonner employee who was fired for 
working in the nude at the office on Thanksgiving Day 1998 when 
he thought he was alone. A security guard turned him in for 
“violating the company's dress code”. The plaintiff charged that 
his tennination was illegal because the company should have 
provided “reasonable accommodation” for his religion,
shamanism.
• Ohio's 8th District Court of Appeals ruled that a clerical worker 
for a mental health agency who claimed he was fired after his 
employer detemiined that he had no history of mental health 
problems can proceed with a wrongful discharge claim. 
Characterizing the claim as one of reverse discrimination, the 
court ruled that the plaintiff, who was the only employee at the 
agency without a mental health disability (or a history of one), was 
entitled to a trial on his claim of reverse discrimination. [Thus, for 
the first time in legal history, sanity has been identified as a
O1
protected class®
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In Canada, a man who became addicted to crack cocaine has recently decided to sue 
his drug dealers, “claiming they ‘owed a duty of care’ to their customers and should 
have known [that] their activities could cause harm”.®4 Even sports are not safe from 
anti-discrimination legislation. According to the USSC ruling, the Professional Golf 
Association (PGA) can now be forced to let the disabled golfer Casey Martin ride in 
a cart during competitions. Other contestants, however, will still have to walk.®5 
Similarly, the New York Road Rumiers Club, which organises the annual New York 
City Marathon, was forced to “establish a separate division of the race for entrants in 
wheelchairs, and award trophies to the winners”. The club was then sued again by 
disabled entrants who complained that the club had violated the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), “by moving the marathon start time for 60 disabled people... 
from 8 a.m. to 8:40 a.m., a less convenient time for some entrants since it might 
require them to finish after dark”.®® Staying with the ADA, parents of a nine-year-old 
sufferer from cerebral palsy, filed a suit to force the local soccer team to admit the 
child “despite administrators' fears of injuries from his metal walker”.®® The ADA 
legislation was used again by a seventeen-year-old student, who was kicked off his 
university’s basketball team for dimnken driving. The boy demanded a compensation 
of US$ 100 000 and his reinstatement to the team, claiming that he is an alcoholic. 
According to his attorney, ADA defines alcoholism as disability.88
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Chapter Seven
See if the law takes from some persons what belongs to them, and gives it to other
persons to whom it does not belong. See if the law benefits one citizen at the expense
of another by doing what the citizen himself cannot do without committing a crime. '
- Frederick Bastiat
Despite the role that scholars play in public policy arena, by providing the social 
engineers with philosophical grounding and intellectual credibility, it would be 
wrong to say that social engineering is all imposed from above. On the other side of 
social engineering are the masses of people willing to derive advantages and benefits 
from labours of others. This chapter will begin by considering contemporary 
egalitarianism from the Public Choice Theory perspective. As will be shown, in a 
world where the government assumes control over an ever-growing proportion of 
resources, human proclivity to live at someone else’s expense expands as well. To 
put it differently, the size of government is directly correlated with the degree of 
coiTuption; the more the govermnent does, the more comption there must be. 
Moreover, as the second and third parts of this chapter will show, the view that the 
parasitic behaviour of individual welfare recipients is most damaging to the economy 
is mistaken. In terms of economic growth, “corporate welfare” is a bigger problem. 
This is an especially important point, for Held’s preferred solution to the 
disproportionate influence business exercises over governmental decision-making is 
to increase the governmental interference in the running of the economy even 
further. Somehow, the above author believes that more regulation and more
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bureaucratie oversight will actualise without the accompanying increase in 
corruption and bribery.
In fact, the only effective way to stop corporate welfare and other forms of 
parasitic behaviour is to minimise the role of the government in the economy. The 
first and crucial step on this road must be the reinstatement of a strong conception of 
private property. This is so, because private property is an insuperable obstacle to 
egalitarian designs. Without destruction of the concept of private property, it is 
impossible to engage in “redistribution” or any other form of social planning. When 
people are safely in charge of their property - when they can withdraw behind the 
protective wall of their possessions - the social engineers are weak and vice versa. In 
this sense, therefore, private property not only thwarts the designs of the social 
engineers, but also maximises liberty. The fourth part of this chapter will, therefore, 
look at the historical link between property and freedom. As will be shown, private 
property is at the very heart of freedom conventionally understood. Though there 
have been autocratic societies with a free economy, there has never been a free 
society without a free economy. The last two parts of this chapter will then look at 
the long history of dislike for the conception of private property and show how 
contrary to actual human predispositions this is. Again, the issue of private property 
is of fundamental importance to this discussion, for Held’s own intuition is not to 
strengthen it, but to further weaken it.
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I. Public Choice Theory
Every election is a sort of advance auction sale of stolen goods.2
■ H. L. Mencken
The basic assumption of the Public Choice Theory is that agents in the public sector 
are no more altruistic in what they do than, for example, managers of the General 
Motors. However, this assumption is the exact opposite of the popular view. Every 
time new regulation of business by government is proposed, it is automatically 
assumed that bureaucrats, who will enforce it, will behave with public interest at 
heart. But, as Buchanan argues, the public choice theory replaces this romantic 
perception of politics with common sense.3 The example of the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) may illustrate this point. The mission of the FDA is to screen 
out unsafe drugs from reaching the market. Because of the FDA regulations, 
pharmaceutical companies spend on average $231 million and about 12 years to get 
any single drug approved. In some cases, the FDA regulations have been responsible 
for doubling the cost of drug development; cost that is then passed onto the 
consumer. Moreover, there is the issue of the so-called “orphan” drugs. Orphan drugs 
are aimed at diseases that are rare, affect few patients, and are, therefore, aimed at a 
relatively small market. However, because of the added cost associated with the FDA 
approval procedures, such dmgs simply are never developed. These hidden costs of 
regulation cost the lives of thousands of people, but even the drugs that are 
developed go through a very long process of approval and, consequently, reach the 
market too late for many patients. The angina-treating Propranolol, for example, took 
10 years to approve. According to a study by Arthur D. Little Associates, about 100
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000 American patients died because of the delay. Similarly, the Nobel Prize laureate 
Dr. G. Hitchings calculated that because of the delay in the approval of the 
antibacterial drug Septra, about 80 000 Americans have needlessly died. But, as 
Williams comments, there is a reason for the long delay that has absolutely nothing 
to do with the quality of the drug! The FDA officials who approve a drug that ends 
up being hamiful will have to assume responsibility for their decision. In order to 
keep their jobs and salaries, therefore, the FDA officials are over-cautious. They 
endeavour to be absolutely certain. The thousands of patients who die because of this 
over-caution thus become the invisible victims of the officials’ self-inier4st.4
As can be seen, far from focusing on the quality of the product, an FDA 
official has a more important task on his hands; namely, protecting his job. Though 
other motivating factors, such as pride, loyalty, and even altruism must not be 
dismissed, the public choice theory is based on the assumption that public officials 
do, at least in part, behave out of self-interest.5 Therein rests the problem. As has 
been seen when looking at Adam Smith’s contribution to liberal philosophy, self­
interest in the market place contributes not only to the well-being of the individual, 
but also to the prosperity of the society as a whole. Individuals like Smith’s 
celebrated butcher, labour to benefit society without intending to do so. Moreover, 
they do so more efficiently than those whose explicit desire it is to do good.5 Self­
interest in the public sphere, on the other hand, is unambiguously damaging. As Starr 
writes,
[Public Choice Theory shows] that whereas self-interest leads to 
benign results in the marketplace, it produces nothing but pathology in 
political decisions. These pathological patterns represent different
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kinds of ‘free-riding’ and ‘rent-seeking’ by voters, bureaucrats, 
politicians, and recipients of public funds. Coalitions of voters seeking 
special advantage from the state join together to get favourable 
legislation enacted... In general, individuals with ‘concentrated’ 
interests in increased expenditure take a ‘free ride’ on those with 
‘diffuse’ interests in lower taxes. Similarly, the managers of the 
‘bureaucratic firms’ seek to maximize budgets, and thereby to obtain 
greater power, larger salaries, and other perquisites. Budget 
maximization results in higher government spending overall, 
inefficient allocation among government agencies, and inefficient 
production within them, hi addition, when government agencies give 
out grants, the potential grantees expend resources in lobbying up to 
the value of the grants...
Societies, he continues, exhibit a need for certain collective or public goods. Of 
course, unanimous consent on the level of public provision of goods and services is 
impossible to achieve. So, Western societies work on a majoritarian basis, achieved 
in an environment of elected legislatures. It is by these means that special interest 
groups then try to influence the political process in their favour. The problem of rent- 
seeking arises when a special interest group is enabled by the majoritarian rule to 
push through laws that will help it obtain special favours at the expense of all others 
in the community.8 There are two kinds of rent-seeking. Firstly, there are laws that 
award special privileges to some pressure groups, whilst taking them from others.9
The European fanners, for example, stand to suffer out from overseas 
competition. The New World and even Third World agricultural produce is cheaper
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and were it to be allowed to reach the European consumer, many European farmers 
would find themselves priced out of the market. The European farmer is, therefore, 
faced with two options. He can either introduce cost-saving and efficiency-enhancing 
measures to cut his expenditures so that he can compete for the patronage of the 
customer, or he can invest his money, his time, and his electoral prowess to force the 
European politicians to raise trade barriers against overseas producers. His choice 
between the two depends on his assessment of which one is easier or cheaper to 
achieve. Again, the effect of these two ways of dealing with competition is startlingly 
different. A farmer choosing the former approach benefits the consumer. A farmer 
succeeding in the latter approach harms society. European farmers have opted for the 
latter approach and are, consequently, hainning the European economy in a number 
of ways.
Firstly, protectionism raises the price of the agricultural commodities Europe 
produces to artificial levels, thus depriving the economy of a more efficient use of 
that capital. Of course, less efficient use of the capital does often mean loss of jobs in 
an economic sector, whose goods are in particular demand at the time. Strange 
though it may sound, agricultural protectionism may thus have a negative impact on, 
for example, computer makers. If the consumer has to pay more for food than would 
have been necessary under the free trade regime, he has less money left to spend on 
supplying his business with faster computers or upgrading his cuntent computers with 
the latest software. In the case of one or two consumers, such wastage is of little 
importance, but the accumulated effect of such a distortion on the economy is 
tremendous. The country loses tax revenue from unsold computers and from the 
employees who will loose their jobs because of this decreased demand. Moreover, 
efficiency that could have been increased through upgrades with the latest computers
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and software will not occur. Secondly, some of the resources that the European 
fanners have expended to assure the passage of the protectionist law are, from an 
economic point of view, wasted. Thirdly, the European farmers’ actions cause his 
competitors to engage in defensive lobbying, thus causing an even greater wastage of 
effort. In other words, in order to prevent the European farmer from eliminating his 
competitors, these competitors will expend their own time and other resources to 
protect themselves. They may even lobby the very same politicians not to agree to 
the protectionist pleas of the European fanner. Fourthly, the European farmer harms 
the non-European producer, who is by his actions deprived of the ability to export to 
Europe. The Europeans, in other words, deprive the non-European producers of their
income.
This point is of special importance today. Many of the contemporary 
opponents of free trade are the same people who claim, correctly, that the EU should 
do more to help the Third World. These two aims, however, are incompatible. The 
obvious way to help the poor countries would be to enable them to export to Europe 
and thus to earn money through exports. This is impossible as long as the European 
agricultural market is protected from non-European competition. But, the problem is 
even greater. One way the EU manages to keep the prices of agricultural produce 
artificially high is tlmnugh its guarantee to buy European agricultural produce at a 
certain set and normally artificially high price. This, of course, means that the 
European farmers have every incentive to produce as much as possible. As a result, 
the EU produces more food than the European consumers can or will buy. The 
unsold food that thus accumulates is then dumped on the foreign markets at a 
discounted and below-the-market price. This produces further wastage of resources, 
for the difference between the price that the farm produce has been bought at and the
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price that it has been sold at overseas, is met by the European taxpayers. 
Furthermore, the fact that the EU dumps its agricultural produce at a discounted or, 
to be more precise, a subsidised price undermines the overseas producers, including 
the farmers in the Third World. Instead of helping the people in less developed 
regions to develop, EU protectionism effectively destroys their livelihoods. As can 
be seen, therefore, the European Common Agricultural policy embodies all sorts of 
distortions of the market. It negatively affects the European economy, European 
consumers, as well as the non-European producers. Western societies, however, 
describe such measures in terms of “public” and “social” good.
But, the problem of rent-seeking is more complex. Under normal 
circumstances, the farmer who has obtained protection from oversees competition, is 
still subject to domestic competition. The state can grant monopoly status or 
protection from domestic competition to domestic economic agents as well. 
Buchanan illustrates this point with the following example?0 In order to achieve the 
laudable objective of promoting safety standards, the City Council usurps for itself 
the right to issue, for a small fee, a taxi-driving licence to any qualified applicant. 
Because of laws of supply and demand, more licences will result in a decreasing fare 
price and, consequently, decreased incomes of the licensed taxi-drivers. Acting in 
self-interest, these licensed taxi-drivers will form a pressure group and convince the 
Council to limit the number of taxi-drivers to a particular, perhaps current, number. 
As the demand for taxis grows, however, the fare price will rise above what it would 
have been under the conditions of the free market. The licensed taxi-drivers will, in 
other words, begin to receive what is called a ‘monopoly rent’, or benefits from the 
lack of competition.
229
By its decision to limit the number of licences, the Council has not only distorted the 
market. It has also created an asset that can be traded at a price. If a retiring taxi- 
driver is permitted to sell his licence, he will do so, charging the highest possible 
price he can get away with. The Council, seeking to increase its revenue, will spot 
the potential for additional income and decide that it will now detennine not only the 
recipients of the licences, but also the total number of licensed taxi-drivers. The 
Council will, therefore, establish an appropriate licensing Commission to deal with 
the matter and detennine that this newly created Commission will keep the proceeds 
from the issuing of the licences. As soon as this happens, the Commission members 
and not the taxi-drivers will become rent-seekers and issue licences to the highest
bidders.
Of course, the successful applicants for a licence will then recoup their 
investments in the licences by increasing the prices of their fares and passing the cost 
onto the consumers. This is not all, however. The Commission has now become a 
source of power and, possibly, a source of financial bribes with which the potential 
taxi-drivers will try to purchase the licences. Consequently, the members of the 
Council will start bribing and blackmailing each other for a place on the Commission 
to partake in the loot. Eventually, the corruption will be such that laws against 
bribery will be passed. These, however, will need to be enforced and the Council will 
thus have to expend additional resources on policing of the anti-corruption measures.
Alternatively, seeing the corruption among the members of the Commission, 
the members of the Council decide to remove the cause of comiption and rule that 
the proceeds from the licensing process will now go directly to the Council itself. Of 
course, the problem will not go away. But, now it is membership of the Council that 
becomes the target. The members of the public will expend time and money in costly
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campaigns to win a seat on the Council. Of course, matters may get even more 
complicated. If, through vigorous enforcement of law, the money from licensing 
finds its way to the common coffers, another set of rent-seeking arises. Different 
special interest groups may now begin to pressure the Council to use the ‘public’ 
money for their own goals. These may include payment for a new brand-new fleet of 
automobiles for the use of the esteemed councillors, fact-finding missions to Hawaii 
or a new administrative building, the subcontractors of which will just happen to be 
Mayor’s school friends.
As Gumiing explains, the second kind of rent-seeking behaviour is an 
unavoidable part of the process of redistribution of resources, be it from one 
individual to another or from one group to another. When redistribution seiwes to 
address an instance of discrimination or other forms of injustice, redistribution itself 
is just. Being just does not, of course, mean that it is costless. Groups seeking 
reparation must often heavily invest in bringing the reparation about. There is also 
the cost associated with defensive lobbying by those who stand to loose as a result of 
reparation and the costs associated with the enforcement of reparations. But, it is 
with respect to redistribution between groups that the problem of free riding is most 
serious. In order for redistribution between groups to work, the membership of the 
group has to be clearly defined. Otherwise, the people who would normally not be 
deserving of reparations will attempt to jump onto the bandwagon. This is especially 
important with affirmative action. The affirmative action at American universities, 
for example, stipulates special treatment for all non-white and non-Asian minorities. 
However, according to these criteria, millions of non-whites, who have arrived in the 
USA following the 1960’s civil rights reforms, are eligible for special treatment even 
though they never suffered from any form of institutionalised discrimination. This
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problem then raises the so-called eligibility cost; the cost incurred by the rent-seeker, 
who desires to be re-classified to partake in the redistribution of resources. For 
example, in 1975 the Malone brothers failed to get the scores prerequisite for the 
employment with the Boston Fire Department. They reapplied as blacks and were 
accepted even though their marks were significantly lower than necessary. After 
serving for ten years, their fraud was discovered and they were fired. The scandal led
to a witch-hunt in which five other firemen were found to have been white after all. 
They were all dismissed.11
The result of this kind of rent-seeking behaviour is the creation of a society 
where a great number of groups compete by bribery, blackmail and sycophancy to 
obtain benefits at the expense of others. The result is a society based on greed and 
parasitic behaviour; in other words, a welfare state. That said, it is often wrongly 
assumed that the criticism of the welfare state must always focus on the rent-seeking 
behaviour in the public sectors, such as education and healthcare. In fact, some of the 
largest abuses happen with regard to the “corporate” welfare state, which subsidises 
businesses, large corporations among them, in order to make them more competitive 
vis-a-vis their foreign competitors - many of which are also subsidised by their 
respective governments. Examples below will show the immense waste of resources 
that goes on in contemporary democracies. It should also be borne in mind that the 
examples below are an infinitesimal fraction of the real amount, be it in the USA or
elsewhere in the world.
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II. Corporate Welfare State: The Myth
The state is the great fictitious entity by which everyone seeks to live at the expense 
of everyon e else,12
- Frederick Bastiat
As with government-enforced unfair discrimination in favour of private individuals, 
the welfare received by business must also have some form of intellectual or moral 
grounding. As Moore argues, this is done through the perpetuation of “myths about 
the benefits of the government-industry partnership model”.13 The first of these is the 
myth that the government can know and does know which companies deserve the 
taxpayers’ funding. This is based on the essentially socialist premise that the 
government is capable of distributing funds better than the market can. Socialist 
experience aside, the experience with government funding in the USA paints a very 
disturbing picture about the governmental ability to do so. As the U.S. General 
Accounting Office figures show, the federal loan programs have a rate of failed debt 
collection or “default rate” almost three times higher than commercial lenders. 14 The 
same applies to the Federal Housing Administration. Similarly, in the 1980’s the 
already discussed Small Business Administration had its default rates reach over 
20%. The comparable figure for the Farmers Home Administration was almost 
50%. The above myth gives rise to a claim that govermnent investment provides 
the taxpayer with long-term returns on investment and that this stimulates the 
economy. The evidence, however, points to returns that are either lower than the 
market returns, non-existent or even negative. 16 In fact, the evidence amassed over 
the past century of governmental interference in the market process clearly shows
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that the government is simply incapable of doing what the capital markets do best - 
to direct capital to fimis with the highest potential rate of return.
The second myth is that govermnent subsidies improve the competitiveness 
of home industries. This kind of logic, however, damages the domestic market, 
where because of corporate welfare, the capital is diverted not to the most profitable 
firms, but to the firms with greatest political connection. Moreover, this often 
happens at the expense of firms with less political influence. Consequently, the latter 
firms are subjected to higher taxes, which in turn lower their competitiveness vis-a­
vis the former. Another argument that is often made is that the subsidies are 
necessary in order for firms to compete against their overseas rivals, which too are 
subsidised by their respective governments. Of course, in the ideal world of free 
markets, there should be no tariffs at all and those who argue that the lowering of 
protectionism should be reciprocal do at first seem to have a point. Contrary to 
common misperception, however, it is not tme that unilateral free trade is damaging 
to the economy. A country without protectionist policies does benefit in consumption 
as well as production. In an open market, consumers can buy whatever they want at 
the cheapest possible price. This enables them to make the most of their income.
On the side of production the story is slightly more complicated, because 
unilateral opening of the economy would probably result in harming some producers. 
But, as Wood argues, “the economy as a whole would still gain”. This is because the 
producers “are guided by the prices they see confronting them to produce what is 
most profitable for them and to do so as cheaply as they can”. In effect, therefore, the 
unconstrained price mechanism would direct capital to finns that would make the 
best use of it, giving the free economy a competitive advantage relative to the rest of 
the workl/7 It is not just the economic theory that shows the irrationality of corporate
234
welfare. In practice, up to 90% of all American businesses exist in the competitive 
international snvrronnsnt without recourse to subsidies. The answer to corporate
welfare, it seems, must therefore rest in the influence that some US businesses
exercise over the political process.
The above point is connected to the third myth about corporate welfare. This 
is the claim that partnership or cooperation between business and government is 
beneficial. This is not true, unless, of course, one wants the benefits to go to corrupt 
politicians and inefficient companies. Fully in line with the Public Choice Theory, it 
is clear that much of the tax breaks and subsidies distributed by the government go to 
companies that donate cash to political campaigns. To give some examples, the 
Clinton administration had in the past rewarded many of its donors with technology 
research grants. For example, the 1994 winners of the multimillion-dollar awards 
under the Advanced Technology Program and of the Technology Reinvestment 
Project included some of the biggest donors to the Democratic Party and to the 
Clinton-Gore election drive. These included AT&T, Boeing, Chevron, Exxon 
General Electric, IBM, Shell, Texaco, and McDonnell Douglas. 18 On the Republican 
side, the former Presidential Candidate Bob Dole, has been a recipient of 
contributions from Archer Daniels Midland, a company that produces federally 
subsidised ethanol and com sweetener.19
The perversion of the entire scheme is exacerbated by the fact that almost all 
of the big companies “that chase corporate welfare dollars hedge their bets by giving 
to both parties”. In Washington, the way to gain a ‘seat at the table’ is to contribute 
bipartisanly. Industry learns the rules of engagement in Washington quickly: giving 
to both parties is tolerated; giving to neither is not”.20 Of course, the corruption 
involved does not have to come solely in monetary teirns. Also important is the
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perversion of the electoral process. For example, before the 1992 presidential 
campaign, the Bush administration expressed its opposition to the development of 
the M-l tank. With the Cold War over, the M-l seemed like a waste of money. 
During the campaign, however, Dan Quayle travelled to Michigan with a promise of 
an additional $250 million for the M-l project. It will come as no surprise that 
Michigan is also the state where the M-l was built.21 Similarly, the cat-food-maker 
Ralston Purina, which in 2001 received over two hundred thousand dollars in
govermnent largesse, just happens to have its corporate headquarters in the 
constituency of the US House of Representatives Minority Leader Dick Gephardt.22
The fourth myth is that state subsidies benefit consumers and employees. 
Firstly, it is clear that subsidies raise prices and therefore damage the consumers. 
Some estimates place the annual cost of the US subsidies and, consequently, added 
cost to the American consumers, at between $80 and $100 billion.23 Similarly, there 
is little connection between subsidies and creation of jobs. For instance, between 
1990 and 1994, AT&T, Amoco, DuPont, Citicorp, IBM, Motorola, General Motors 
and General Electric were awarded a quarter of a billion dollars in subsidies, but 
reduced their US workforce by over three hundred thousand people.24 One of the 
reasons why the protectionist argument is incoherent is because tariffs protect 
employees in one part of the economy often at the expense of employees in another 
part of the economy. In 1991, for example, the US imposed tariffs on cheap Japanese 
computer parts. That decision inflated the cost of personal computers manufactured 
in the USA by about $1100. This reduced sales by US computer companies and, 
consequently, deprived many Americans of their jobs.25 The $80 to $100 billion per 
annum that the US spends on protectionism should rather be invested elsewhere in 
the economy and create jobs there.
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III. Corporate Welfare State: The Cost
There is, indeed, no genuine disposition among American public officials, or indeed 
among public officials anywhere,, to reduce public expenses. As I have pointed out in 
this place a hundred times, they always try to lay on at least $2 every time they
“save " $126
- H. L. Mencken
Moore estimates that at the end of the 1990’s the US government’s subsidies to US 
business approximated to $100 billion per annum. As he put it, “If all coiporate 
welfare programs were eliminated, Congress would have enough money to entirely 
eliminate the capital gains tax and the death tax. Alternatively, Congress could cut 
the personal and corporate income tax by 10 percent across the board”. 
Astonishingly, most of the businesses in the question are not even struggling to stay 
afloat. In fact, most subsidies went to the Fortune 500 companies, whose combined 
1997 earnings were $325 billion.27 hi 1996 these included General Electric with 
grants of over $20 million, Rockwell hitemational with grants of over $25 million 
and Westinghouse Electric with grants of over $26 million, hi the same year, each of 
these companies posted profits of over $500 million^
Through its Rural Utilities Services and Power Marketing Administration, the 
US government subsidises large electric companies to the tune of $2 billion. One of 
these companies, ALLTEL, could boast more than $2 billion in sales in 1994. hi this 
way, the US government holds down the price of electricity in places like the ski 
resorts in Colorado, five-star hotels in South Carolina and casinos in Las Vegas.29
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Similarly, in 1997, the US Forest Service “spent $140 million building roads in 
national forests, thus subsidizing the removal of timber from federal lands by 
multimillion-dollar timber companies”. As Moore calculated, over the last two 
decades, the Forest Service has built “340000 miles of roads - more than eight times 
the length of the interstate highway system - primarily for the benefit of logging 
companies”. Another part of the corporate welfare state is the US Department of 
Agriculture’s Market Promotion Program (MAP), which spends about $100 million 
per annum advertising US products overseas. Recipients of the MAP largesse include 
Tyson Foods with $500000 in 1995, Pillsbury Dough Boy with $526000, Ocean 
Spray Cranberries with $308000, California Prune Board with $2 million; Kentucky 
Distillers' Association with $1 million and the Campbell Soup Company with 
$281000?°
Similarly, between 1990 and 1994 the US Commerce Department spent $280 
million in research grants to some of the largest companies in the USA. Among these 
were IBM, AT&T, DuPont, Amoco Coiporation, Citicorp as well as General Motors, 
General Electric and Motorola. The combined profits of these companies in 1994 
were $26.8 billion.31 Since 1986 the US government has been promoting the sales of 
its microchip industry in countries such as Japan and Germany. The US microchip 
giant, Intel, was among its main recipients, hi 1998 the US Trade Commission was 
spending the US taxpayers’ dollars again. This time, it was suing Intel under antitrust 
legislation for being too big. Continuing with the absurd, the US Senator J. McCain 
of Arizona, one of the main pork-barrel opponents in the US Senate, compiles an 
annual list of the ten most outrageous federal grants. In 2001 these included, 
$250000 for onion research in Georgia, $300000 for the Pineapple Growers 
Association in Hawaii, $1.5 million for sunflower research in North Dakota,
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$400000 for the Southside Sportsman Club in New York, $400000 for the National 
Center for Peanut Competitiveness in Georgia, $250000 for potato research in 
Washington, $100000 for a programme aimed at providing information on the use of 
trees, $176000 for the Reindeer Herders Association in Alaska, $5 million for an 
insect rearing facility in Mississippi and $1.5 million to refurbish the Vulcan Statue 
in Alabama.32
As Moore writes, protectionism harms society in three distinct ways. Firstly, 
purchasing favours and concessions in the corridors of power and “donating” money 
to the election campaign of a corrupt politician in exchange for his promise to 
support more handouts in the future makes a mockery of democracy. Secondly, 
protectionism often results in directing the resources from the poor to the rich. This is 
because the companies with largest profits also have the money and the political 
influence to purchase favours from corrupt politicians. Thirdly, protectionism 
negatively affects the economy by misdirecting and misusing the capital and thus 
lowering the rate of economic growth and the overall standards of living of the 
population. As Jorgenson calculated,
[Every] additional dollar of taxes collected by the IRS exacts a $1.35 
toll on the economy because of collection costs and economic 
efficiency losses. This means that for a corporate welfare expenditure 
to be economically wealth producing, the benefit of every dollar spent 
must exceed $1.35. A 35 percent return on a dollar of govermnent 
spending is the de facto economic break-even point. If the program 
yields less than a 35 percent return, the nation would be richer if we 
cancelled the spending and cut taxes by that amount.33
239
Even if the government were able to do produce $1.35 return on each, dollar invested, 
it would still be bad for the economy, because the govermnent channels money away 
from those areas of the economy where it could make real, often manifold, profits.
Historically speaking, however, it has been difficult for the government to match a 
dollar spent by a dollar gained. More often than not, the government made a loss that 
is inherent to the way the government functions. Though it is possible that many of 
the protectionist decisions made are well intentioned, the laws of economics camiot 
be evaded. As a result, all decisions that are based on considerations of, for example, 
public good, however defined, and that do not take into account the price mechanism 
that within the free market guides capital into the most profitable areas of the 
economy, run the risk of repeating and perpetuating the above sorts of distortions. To 
re-emphasise, by departing from the price mechanism as a guide to investment, the 
government deprives itself of the ability to know how the money should be spent 
without wastage and negative results for the aggregate rate of economic growth.
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IV. Private Property and Freedom: The Historical Perspective
What our generation has forgotten is that the system of private property is the most 
important guarantee of freedom, not only for those who own property, but scarcely 
less for those who do not. It is only because the control of the means of production is 
divided among many people acting independently that nobody has complete power 
over us, that we as individuals can decide what to do with ourselves.34
- F. A. Hayek
Corporate welfare is only one of the many ways in which the society “distributes” 
wealth from one group to another. The result is a complex web of parasitic 
behaviour, with each group attempting to maximise the benefits it receives and 
minimise the contribution it makes to the common coffer. Of course, it is only in the 
political arena, that income is “redistributed”. In the market, it has to be earned. 
What the governmental expropriation of the money earned by millions of economic 
agents does, is to politicise needlessly a huge part of the lives of the people, who, in 
turn, vie for unearned rewards. Exterminations of large parts of populations of 
Germany and USSR are poignant examples of what happens when economic rewards 
are taken out of the market sphere and distributed by politicians according to some 
social criteria. Vitally, neither Communism nor Nazism would have been possible, 
were it not for the overwhelming power of the state in USSR and in Gennany. This 
power was immeasurably enhanced by the governmental control of the economy, be 
it through its ability to confiscate property of or by its ability to deny employment to 
political dissenters. Private property, therefore, is central both to the functioning of 
the free market and to the existence of a free society. The Cosmopolitan proposals
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aim at further weakening of the concept of private property. This should not be 
surprising. Elimination of private property is necessary if social engineering is to
succeed.
Conversely, private property has shown itself to be the necessary, though not
sufficient, requirement for the birth of freedom. Again, it is the ancient world that
provides contemporary scholars with the first examples of this connection. Ancient 
Greece was an agricultural society, with a population living on the lands surrounding 
the city-states. Land was passed from one generation to another and “rarely” traded. 
The reason for this was that private possession of land was linked to the rights of 
citizenship and the vote. The Greek, who lost his land, lost his citizenship. Pipes 
writes, “In ancient Athens landownership and citizenship were indissolubly linked, in 
that only citizens could own land and only landowners could be citizens... Since 
Solon’s time, there were property qualifications for high office. Thus, in effect, a 
property census was established for political participation.. .”.35
But, it was in England that defence of private property brought about a birth 
of limited government in the modern sense. Two events were of vital importance in 
these struggles. First was the publication of Magna Carta and the second was the 
self-assertion of the Parliament during the reign of Charles I. Magna Carta was a 
series of concessions issued by King John to the disgruntled English nobles in 1215. 
Though it is true that Jolm’s predecessors had made concessions to their nobles, 
these concessions were always granted “by” the king, never exacted “from” him. 
Understanding of the reasons for the wrath of the nobles is thus of importance. It will 
come as no surprise that at the root of the problem was the Crown’s growing 
expenditure and the ever-increasing demands it placed on the private property of the 
nobles. There were the heavy taxes exacted to pay for the Third Crusade and for the
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ransom of Richard I, after his capture by Henry VI. Then there was the cost 
associated with John’s defence of his French possessions. Then, when he lost them, 
John increased the taxes to make up for the lost tax revenue. There followed a 
quarrel with Pope Innocent III and John’s taxing of the church. Ultimately, it was the 
Archbishop of Canterbuiy, who directed baronial unrest and succeeded in exacting
the terms of the Carta.
According to these tenns, the King was forced to clarify property law with 
regard to the lands leased from the crown. Special attention was paid to the 
behaviour of the royal guardians, who were appointed to oversee these lands during 
the time of minority of the heirs. There were guarantees to towns and merchants. As 
the Carta stated, all “cities, boroughs, towns, and ports shall have all their liberties 
and free customs”. To merchants John promised freedom from arbitrary exercise of 
royal will and granted them the sort of freedom of contract necessary for the growth 
of trading activities. According to the Carta, the merchants shall “be able to go out of 
and come into England safely and securely and stay and travel tlu.-ouglfou.t England, 
as well by land as by water, for buying and selling by the ancient and right customs 
free from all evil tolls”. The Carta also provided for the end of scutage. The scutage 
originated as a payment made by a knight to his King to commute the military 
seiwice the knight owed him. Although it was first levied on the Church, which found 
it difficult to fulfil its quota of men for military service, it soon became generalised 
across the board. Thus, the Crown demanded scutage, while denying the taxpayers 
the postponement of the military seiwice. As a result, the Carta prohibited the levy of 
scutage without the agreement of the great council. The King was also compelled to 
promise that no “free man shall be anested or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or 
exiled or in any way victimised, neither will we attack him or send anyone to attack
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him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land”. To make 
the King uphold its terms, the Carta appointed a council of twenty-five barons who 
had the right to wage war against a non-complying King?? As can be seen, the 
concessions contained in the Carta were truly revolutionary. What started as a tax 
revolt, ended in a wholesome limitation of the monarch’s ability to dispense with the 
life and property of his subjects in an absolute way.
The Magna Carta was merely the beginning of a long process that culminated 
in the establishment of British parliamentary democracy. Following the signing of 
the Carta, the monarch remained a very powerful figure. It took another four hundred 
years before England saw the emergence of an independent Parliament with power 
equal to that of the Crown. Today, with its derivations spread across the world, it is 
easy to overlook the events, which led to the self-assertion of the English Parliament. 
But, as Burke writes, it was once more the issue of taxes and the royal infringement 
on the institution of private property that underlined the revolt against King Charles. 
“Liberty”, he wrote, “inheres in some sensible object; and every nation has... some 
favourite point, which by way of eminence becomes the criterion of their happiness. 
It happened, you know, sir, that the great contests for freedom in this country wsrs 
from earliest times chiefly upon the question of taxing”.??
As Pipes narrates, from the time of King Jolnr, royal power in England 
progressively declined because of excessive expenditures, wars, extravagance, poor 
management, and inflation. Though the financial straits of the English monarchs 
were common, it was the reign of James I and Charles I that finally broke ths 
exchequer. When James I assumed the throne, the debt of the crown was £400 000. 
He himself managed to more than double it. By 1615, James could no longer obtain 
credit. To cover his debts, James sold much of the Crown’s lands. Though hs
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obtained a quick financial relief, he lost the long-term revenue from leasing that land, 
putting his son Charles in a desperate situation. Charles’ answer to his financial 
situation was to search for new ways to obtain money. When the parliament refused 
to give him the right to customs duties, he dissolved the parliament and proceeded to 
extract it anyway. Failing to meet his financial needs, Charles “demanded” loans 
from affluent citizens, arresting those who refused. This went against the very 
essence of the English understanding of liberty. As Sommerville wrote, “To say 
that something was a man’s property... was precisely to say that the thing in question 
could not be taken away from him without his consent. To take property without 
consent was to steal, and thus to break the Eight Commandment”.39 To obtain 
additional funds, therefore, Charles was compelled to sign the “Petition of Right”, 
promising not to impose taxes without the consent of the parliament. This act, Hexter 
wrote, was “the decisive first step in the direction of modern freedom, of liberty as 
we know it in our world”.* Thus, as with ancient Greece, property was at the centre 
of struggle for freedom in England as well.
But, as Milton Friedman observed, it is often assumed that politics and 
economics are separate; that the question of civil liberties should be tackled through 
political arrangements, while the question of material well-being should be tackled 
through economic arrangements. Consequently, there are many, who claim that it is 
possible to respect civil liberties and at the same time to adopt the essential features 
of the communist economic model. As Friedman claims, countries with socialist 
economies cannot be free, for economic arrangements are of dual importance in the 
promotion of freedom. “On the one hand”, he writes, “freedom in economic 
arrangements is itself a component of freedom broadly understood, so economic 
freedom is an end in itself. In the second place, economic freedom is also an
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indispensable means towards the achievement of political freedom.”41 When it comes 
to the first role, it is clear that a citizen who is forced to purchase a government 
retirement package or government healthcare and is, consequently, deprived of the 
option to invest his money in a private retirement fund or spend his money on private 
healthcare, is also deprived of his freedom. The close correlation between economic 
freedom and political freedom, Friedman narrates, was clearly dramatised by the case 
of the Amish sect, which opposed the compulsory retirement programme in the USA 
and “refused to pay taxes or accept benefits”. As a result, the US government simply 
took and sold some of the Amish livestock in order to pay for the retirement levies. 
When it comes to the second role, the case for the free market is also clear'.
Economic arrangements, Friedman writes, “are important because of their effect on 
the concentration or dispersion of power. The kind of economic organisation that 
provides economic freedom directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes 
political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in 
this way enables the one to offset the other”. Thus, while there have been autocratic 
societies with a free economy, there has never been a free society without a free 
economy. 2
This observation is, of course, of fundamental importance to this discussion, 
for the Cosmopolitans claim that it is possible to wed socialist economy with civil 
liberties. But, this is unlikely to be practicable. Any departure from a free market 
economic arrangement, of which inviolability of private property is an integral pari, 
must unavoidably result in the decline of freedom, the degree of which depends 
almost entirely on the degree of the said departure. Of course, it is clearly possible to 
start with restrictions on economic freedom involving only government-enforced 
retirement packages and nationalised healthcare. But, where will it end? hi the
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1970’s, to give one example, the Labour Party imposed a myriad of restrictions, 
culminating with the “Control of Engagements” order that meant a centralised 
allocation of to occupations, a system in place in the USSR. Such was its
incompatibility with ths idea of personal freedom that the government was forced to 
repeal it.?? As can be seen, therefore, private property is deeply interconnected with 
individual liberty. Leon Trotsky acknowledged as much when he wrote, “hr a 
country where the sole employer is the state, opposition means death”.44 Simnariy, as 
the American Marxist Max Eastman wrote.
It seems obvious to me... that the institution of private property is ons 
of the main things that have given man that limited amount of free and 
equalness that Marx hoped to render infinite by abolishing this 
institution. Strangely enough Marx was ths first to see this. He is the 
one who infomred us, looking backwards, that ths evolution of private 
capitalism with its free market had been a precondition for the 
evolution of all our democratic freedoms. It never occurred to hin, 
looking forward, that if this was so, these other freedoms night 
disappear with the abolition of the free market.45
As has been seen, the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment believed that the 
institution of private property was the sine qua non for the growth and preservation 
of liberty. Despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, which he himself 
acknowledged, Marx came to see private property as “socially conservative in its 
effect”.4? As some of his latter works show, he was fascinated with pre-history, 
when, hs assumed, humanity was not yst “corrupted by private greed”."? No
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evidence for such a belief has ever been found, but as a result of Marx’s influence, 
the 20l3 century mirrored his view that social progress was wholly dependent on the 
abolishment of private property. But, as will be seen below, Mara’s view of private
property was in no way original.
V. Pandora’s box of Equality
‘7 have no respect for the passion of equality, which seems to me merely idealising 
envy. ”48
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
All major monotheistic religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam - contain a 
variation of a myth of a perfect, original society. Characteristic to all these societies 
is the lack of private property.49 The earliest such myth is to be found in Hesiod’s 
Works and Davs. Hesiod divided human history into four metallic ages: Golden, 
Silver, Bronze, and Iron. Each of these ages was progressively worse, just as the 
metal after which it was named was inferior to the preceding one. The defining 
characteristics of the Golden Age were common possession of property and the 
resulting peace. The characteristics of Hesiod’s contemporary Iron Age were profit­
making and violencc?0 Like Hesiod, Plato too saw property as a cause of social 
strife.51 His ideal society comprised of the wise rulers called “guardians” and of the 
commoners. The guardians lived communally and had no private property, so as not 
to “tear the city in pieces by differing about ‘mine’ and ‘not mine”’?. With their 
needs provided for by the commoners, Plato believed, the guardians would behave in 
ways that benefited all. As Pipes writes, over two thousand years later, Lenin
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fulfilled Plato’s dream. Asserting that the commoners could never rule themselves, 
Lenin placed the destiny of the Russian people in the hands of the socialist 
intellectuals. History shows, he wrote, “that the working class, exclusively by its own 
effort, is able to develop only a trade union consciousness... The theory of 
socialism... grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories that were 
elaborated by the educated members of the propertied classes, the intellectuals.53
Of course, the communist experiment showed the “guardians” to be anything 
but wise and altruistic. The self-serving elite in the Soviet Union provides a definite 
refutation of Plato’s vision. However, Lenin was correct in asserting that 
communism, socialism, and all other forms of egalitarianism originated not in 
evolutionary developments, but in intellectual exercises devoid of considerations of 
actuality. As Hayek observed, socialism “is a construction of theorists, deriving from 
certain tendencies of abstract thought with which for a long time only the 
intellectuals were familiar; and it required long efforts by the intellectuals before the 
working classes could be persuaded to adopt it as their program”.54 Not surprisingly, 
Lenin, a man who never had a proper job in his entire life, led the communist 
intellectuals, who took over Russia in November 1917.55 But, as with Lenin, Marx 
did not have a steady job either. His income came from Engels, who got his money 
making profit out of the same workers Marx was trying to “liberate”.56 In fact, to this 
day, most left-leaning intellectuals lack “direct responsibility for practical affairs”.57 
Not surprisingly, most of them can be found among the dreamy towers of the 
academe.58
Chesher and Machan contend that much of the dislike for private property 
among many intellectuals lies in their insistence on the dualistic view of human 
experience. This dualism concerns the artificial distinction between the temporal and
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the spiritual experience. The intellectuals’ self-serving bias in favour of the latter 
may date, yet again, to antiquity.59 Socrates, tlnough ths writings of Plato, is said to 
have believed in a thrse-way distinction of human persona. The first and the highest 
part of being was reserved for reason and intellectual pursuits, while the lowest part 
was concerned with appetites and material wonres. Though it is clearly possible that 
Socrates intended the two parts to be seen as mutually dependent, Plato’s writings 
turned them into polar opposites. In the Republic Plato thus recreates ons of Socratic 
dialogues,
Socrates: Take the other craftsmen again and consider whether these 
things corrupt them so as to make them bad.
Adelmantus: What are they?
Socrates: Wealth and poverty.
Adeimantur: How-?
Socratss: Like this: in your opinion, will a potter who’s gotten rich 
still bs willing to attend to his art?
Adslmantus: Not at all.
Socrates: And will hs become idler and mors careless than he was?
Adeimantus: By far.
Socratss: Doesn’t hs become a worse potter then?
Adelmantus: That, too, by fan?0
Spiritual development, in other words, was to take precedence over worldly needs. 
Chesher and Machan, however, contend that to separate the spiritual and the worldly 
is dangerous and counterproductive. Acquisition of material resources as well as a
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prominent position within one’s society can, in fact, be seen as an expression and 
fulfilment of one’s own intellectual prowess; an assertion of one’s superiority over 
one’s fellow men, not through the force of arms, but through the provision of a 
valued service. Indeed, in the past, much pride has been taken from the achievements 
of one’s own person or family. During the renaissance, for example, once a year all 
wealthy families in Florence brought their worldly possessions out of their houses 
and placed them in the street. Golden jewellery, silverware, money, and expensive 
carpets would be placed there for all to admire.’ It was honourable to be wealthy 
and successful.
These two attitudes to property acquisition, taken to their proper extremes, 
could thus be no more different. As such, they have given rise to two very different 
philosophical strands. The Stoics have derived their philosophy from the teachings of 
Zeno. Zeno, like Socrates, believed in a general detachment and independence from 
the outer, material world. The body, in other words, became a prison of the mind; the 
dirty polluting the immaculate.. Epicureans, on the other hand, believed in a 
“harmony of body and mind”. To be happy, was to unify what the Stoics have 
separated.. Christian doctrine did much to enforce this duality through its insistence 
on the rewards in the afterfe.. The Bible, for example, sanctions the disdain for 
private property. Gospel of St Mark says, “It is easier for a camel to go through the 
eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God”.. Though Thomas 
Aquinas argued that common ownership promoted inefficiency and discord, the 
relationship between the Church and property remained uneasy.. As Populorum 
Progressio and Octogesima Adveniens of Pope Paul VI show, the utopian and 
essentially socialist undercurrents of the Catholic Church persisted well into the 
twentieth century.7
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The anti-property sentiments were reinvigorated with the discovery of the New 
World and the Western encounter with the “noble savage”. Columbus’ discovery 
created an immense interest in the subject of natural liberty, property and proper 
governance. The one view that all early commentators on the Americas shared was 
the resemblance the New World had to the mythical Garden of Eden.68 As Columbus 
himself wrote, he was pleasantly surprised to find that Indians shared their 
possessions.69 Columbus contrasted such “virtues with Spanish vices”. However, as 
the European understanding of the indigenous societies grew, the words of praise and 
admiration turned to those of abhorrence. Running below the communal enjoyment 
of property was an undercurrent of remarkable savagery and a disregard for human 
life. As D’Souza writes, cannibalism was widespread among Guarani, Iroquois, 
Caribs, and others. Aztecs engaged in cannibalism regularly, eating human flesh with 
peppers and tomatoes. “Children”, he continues, “were regarded as a particular 
delicacy”. Both Aztecs and Incas also partook in religious ceremonies “in which 
thousands of captive Indians were ritually murdered, until their altars were drenched 
in blood, bones were strewn everywhere, and priests collapsed with exhaustion from 
stabbing their victims”.70
Though the shift from the naive and empirically incorrect understanding of 
the original societies did eventually occur, the one place where it continued to 
persevere was in academe. Like Plato, French philosophers such as Morelly, Saint- 
Just and Helvetius saw communal possession of property as essential to the creation 
of an ideal society. Rousseau wrote,
The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his 
head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe him,
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was the tme founder of civil society. What crimes, murders, what 
miseries and horrors would the human race have been spared, had 
someone pulled up the stakes or filled the ditch and cried out to his 
fellow men: ‘Do not listen to this impostor. You are lost if you forget
79that the fruits of this earth belong to all and the earth to no one!’
Rousseau’s argument was based on no evidence at all. The ideal society that 
Rousseau envisaged had no precedent.73 Strangely, Rousseau himself admitted that 
his philosophy was but a fantasy. As he said to Boswell, “Sir, I have no liking for the
world. I live here in the world of fantasies, and I camiot tolerate the world as it is... 
Mankind disgusts me”.74 The utopian writings of Rousseau and many others like him 
did, however, have a huge impact on the 20th century, for they have fuelled the idea 
that private property and the consequent material inequality is somehow unnecessary
and unnatural.
Modern social engineers subscribe to a version of this unflattering view of 
private property. The regime of private property guarantees possessions of goods 
acquired by lawful means and pays little attention to whether these possessions end 
up being equal. If achievement of equality is, as it is today, elevated to the first 
governing principle of society, then the inegalitarian regime of private property must 
be the first obstacle to tackle. Thus, Cosmopolitans have no choice but to abandon 
the principle of inviolability of private property. Instead, they turn to “tough” 
conception of “redistribution” and the need for a distinction between the acceptable 
form of private property, such as the “shirt on one’s back” and the unacceptable form 
of private property, such as the “IBM shares”. However, this has been tried before. 
The 20th century was extreme in both the extent of social engineering and destruction
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of private property. In the 20th century, Bethell writes, “there has been a far-reaching 
attempt to restore the legal distinctions of persons... Increasingly, laws make 
allowances for such characteristics as race, gender and ethnicity. At the same time 
there has been an attempt to... delegitimize property, to deconstruct it, to abolish it, 
or expropriate it, at the least to redistribute it”.75
VI. Nature vs. Nurture
77ze propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another is common to all 
men, and to be found in no other race of an imals.76
- Adam Smith
Every time human society sought to organise its affairs along egalitarian lines, it has
failed. Neither Soviet Communism nor its Cambodian version had worked. The same
applies to the communist experiments among the colonists in Jamestown and 
Plymouth and Robert Owen’s commune in Indiana.77 But, the private property regime 
is not only practically advantageous. It is also naturally necessary. Firstly, evidence 
shows that property acquisition is nearly universal among animals.78 Being dependent 
on its survival without recourse to external benefactors, the animal monopolises its 
territory.79 This enables it to “develop a detailed knowledge of its environment and... to 
construct an inventory of... vantage points, hiding places, etc.- which facilitate quick 
and effective responses to danger and attack”.80 As such, the animal “limits itself to one 
or more small areas, known as its range; this it does not normally leave except under 
dire necessity. Within this range, too, the animal does not move at random, but only 
along particular paths and according to a fairly fixed schedule”.81 Possessive behaviour
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can also be observed among insects.82 Dragonflies attack one another to protect the 
areas where they laid their eggs.83 Fish too defend their breeding territory.84 Some 
primates, Pipes writes, assert exclusivity of their land claims by sitting on it. Humans 
exhibit similar behaviour and words denoting the act of possession are, therefore, 
strikingly similar in many languages.
Thus, the German verb for “to own”, besitzen, and the noun for
possession, Besitz, literally reflect the idea of sitting on or, figuratively 
settling upon. The Polish verb posiadcic, “to own”, as the noun 
posiadlosc, “property”, have an identical origin. The same root 
underpins the Latin possidere, namely sedere, “to sit”, from which 
derive the French posseder and the English “to possess”. The word 
“nest” derives from a root (nisad or nizdo) signifying “to sit”. The 
monarch occupying the throne has been described as engaging in 
“nothing else but the symbolic act of sitting on the realm.85
Standard literature of social engineering assumes that property acquisitiveness is a 
symptom of a capitalist society and, therefore, a social vice. But, in order to substantiate 
this argument, social engineers have to show that children, who have been untouched 
by social norms, do not exhibit “possessive behaviour and learn it only as they grow 
older under the influence of adults”, hi fact, the evidence suggests the exact opposite. 
While children are exceedingly possessive, they grow to share under social influence. 
This is so, because, as with animals, “the leading causes of human acquisitiveness are 
economic and biological: the need of territory and of objects with which to sustain 
oneself and to procreate”.86 Being the most vulnerable members of society, it is not
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surprising that possessive behaviour manifests itself in its extreme among children. As 
research shows, young children build an attachment to familial' objects, such as toys and 
blankets. At two years, children wish “to posses as many things as possible” and display 
“strong feeling of ownership... Tt’s mine’ is a constant refrain”. This pattern of 
possessive behaviour can be observed among all children, no matter where they live and 
what culture they belong to. Children living on the Communist kibbutzim in Israel are
■ oo •no exception. But, private possession does fulfil more than just a biological urge. As 
William James wrote, “hi its widest possible sense... a man’s Self is the smn of total of 
all that he can call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but liis clothes and his 
house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works.., [his] 
yacht and bank-account”.89 Thus, it is clearly undeniable that humans naturally 
gravitate towards some form of private property arrangement and do tend to be 
dissuaded from doing so only by persuasion or, and this is more likely, by force of the 
kind witnessed tlnoughout the course of the 20Ul century.
Of course, this does not mean that all impulses found in human nature must be 
tolerated. Aggressiveness, for example, seems to be as deeply embedded in human 
nature as acquisitiveness of private property. But, the two are different in both moral 
and practical sense. Property acquisitiveness tlnough voluntary exchange and within the 
rule of law does not harm people in any meaningful sense. Aggressiveness, on the other 
hand, is unambiguously harmful. Moreover, no society tolerating an unrestricted 
outpouring of aggressive behaviour could survive for long. On the other hand, no 
society without private property can continue to be free and prosperous.
But, what are the practical policy implications of this “nature versus nurture” 
debate? According to Daryin, “So in regards to mental qualities, their [biological] 
transmission is manifest in our dogs, horses and other domestic animals. Besides
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special tastes and habits, general intelligence, courage, bad and good tempers, etc. 
are certainly transmitted [biologically]. With man we see similar facts in almost 
every family”..0 The last sentence of Darwin’s is crucial, hi accepting nature- 
determined behaviour amongst animals, Dai*win logically assumed that the same 
applied to man. Why, after all, should man be different? Social engineers, on the other 
hand, believe that man “has no instincts... [and that] everything he is and has 
become he has learned, acquired, from his culture, from the man-made part of 
enviromnent, from other human beings”..’ These beliefs make biological 
determination of behaviour politically unacceptable. As Stephen Jay Gould asserts, 
opposing sociobiologists is a political as well as a scientific task. As he writes, “If 
this subject were merely a scholar’s abstract concern, I could approach it in more 
measured tone. But few biological subjects have had a more direct influence upon 
millions of lives. Biological determinism is, in its essence, a theory of limits”... 
Gould is right. Socio-biology is a theory of limits - limits of social engineering 
action. As such, the theory questions not only the assumptions of social engineers,
but also the need for their existence and usefulness. It embraces a vision of the world
that is essentially tragic. A vision of the world, where accidents do happen; a vision 
where people live in inequity; a vision where some people are dealt cards inferior to 
others. This then is a conflict between two competing understandings of the world. 
On the one side, there is the perfect society of Plato and of St Thomas Moore. On the 
other side, there is the tragic society of Burke, Tocqueville, Berlin, and Hayek, 
struggling to come to terms with its imperfections. In the fomier, lawmakers strive to 
turn people into what they are not. In the latter lawmakers strive to limit the damage 
imperfect beings inflict on each, other.93
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Chapter Eight
I should have loved freedom, I believe, at all times, but in the time in which we live I
am ready to worship itJ
- A. De Tocqueville
Throughout this thesis, social engineering has been attacked from tliree different 
perspectives. Firstly, social engineering is based on the assumption that groups are 
equal in their potential to succeed. This is wrong, for groups differ in their abilities. 
Secondly, social engineering compromises economic growth and this results in 
increased unemployment and poverty. Thirdly, social engineering compromises 
private property and thus it compromises liberty itself. These arguments, however, 
do not strike a chord with those, who find a poor but “just” society preferable to a 
rich but, as they see it, “unjust” one. And, there are many people, who see free 
society and free markets as unjust. According to this view, capitalism discourages 
justice or “fairness” in distribution of resources and rewards. As such, a society that 
furthers the above conception of justice, even if it does at the same time perpetuate 
poverty, can be seen as defensible. The USSR is a good example. Even though 
Communism was economically crippling, the Soviet conception of justice, in as far 
as it was the antithesis of the capitalist reward schemes, was seen by many as 
laudable. So, as De Soto had argued, an argument for a free society must be both 
practical and moral and it is the morality of the markets that will be considered
below.
As Kirzner’s argument shows, in a world where there is no totality of 
knowledge and where the entrepreneur has to be alert to the opportunities arising
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from the market and where he then has to assume the risk of being wrong, profits are 
earned in a moral sense as well. Of course, in the cases of both the over-performing 
group and the individual entrepreneur, the rewards they receive are at least in part 
based on what Rawls calls “the morally arbitrary distribution of natural 
endowments”. Rawls is correct. The markets reward people for deeds achieved 
tlirough the medium of arbitrarily distributed endowments. Literally no reward a 
human being receives can be said to be, so to speak, “luck-free”. Just as an intelligent 
woman will in her lifetime reap the benefits of her being born intelligent, a beautiful 
woman will receive a number of “lucky” breaks. Of course, one of the main points of 
Rawls’ thesis is to justify governmental intrusion in order to correct the accidents of 
birth. But, Rawls’ argument depends on a particular conception of desert. As 
Schmidtz writes, it is possible to understand desert not in terms of what one did, but
in terms of what one can do.
I. Which Liberallsm?
As a supreme, if unintended compliment, the enemies of the system of private 
enterprise have thought it wise to appropriate its label [liberalism]2
- Joseph Schumpeter
The word “liberal” was first used in the British context to classify the 1868 
government of William Gladstone. In order to jettison its aristocratic connotations, 
Earl Grey and Lord Melbourne precipitated the popularisation of the term by 
renaming the Whig party in the House of Commons the Liberal Party. As such, 
modern liberal politics had its roots in the radicalism of the Old Whigs, who pestered
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the English conservative establishment in the House of Commons for much of the 
18lh century. Under the leadership of Marquis of Rockingham and Charles Fox, the 
Whigs favoured freedom for the American colonies and, in the domestic sphere, they 
favoured electoral reform that would get rid of the conservative-dominated rotten 
boroughs. Indeed, it was in opposition to the privileges of the landed aristocracy and 
the intransigence of the Tories with respect to most forms of change that liberalism 
emerged. Liberalism then remained as a principal source of opposition to 
conservatism until socialism proved itself an even greater threat to liberty and these 
liberals found themselves, often without much enthusiasm, supporting the Tories. 
The situation in the USA was somewhat different. There, liberalism was enshrined in 
the US Constitution and was, therefore, traditional in the same way that
Conservatism was traditional in Britain.
But, as Hayek wrote, it would be incorrect to see these “classical” liberals as 
occupying the middle position between the socialists on the one side and 
conservatives on the other side. As far as the conservatives and socialists represent 
the diminishment of personal liberty and the growth of the power of the state, 
“classical” liberals find themselves in opposition to both, hr that sense, the imaginary 
political diagram is not linear, but triangular, with “classical” liberals occupying a 
very distinct comer of their own.3 When it comes to the former, the “classical” 
liberals welcome evolutionary change and trust social forces to arrive at best 
outcomes in a spontaneous manner. Conservatism, conversely, could well be defined, 
in the way Lord Hugh Cecil did, as “a disposition averse fi-om change; [springing] 
partly from the distrust of the unknown”.4 Likewise, the “classical” liberals oppose 
the patronising air of the conservatives and their willingness to use the enforcing 
power of the state in order to assert their own moral and ethical preferences. Instead
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of the moral absolutism that conservatives possess, a “classical” liberal relies on 
principles, which enable him to cooperate with people of very different moral 
convictions. Crucial, here, is the principle of individual autonomy and a sense that 
human behaviour, even if unpleasant, must be respected, provided, of course, that it 
does not harm others. But, it is precisely because the conservative has a sense of 
moral superiority and a missionary zeal to convert others that he is opposed to the 
limitation of the state’s interference in private lives. Like the socialists, conservatives 
too are fond of big government. It enables them to further their cause. Moreover, 
because of their opposition to individualism, the conservatives are also opposed to 
the internationalism of the “classical” liberals. The allegiance of a conservative is 
towards his state or his nation, while the allegiance of the “classical” liberal is 
towards his principles and others who share them.
With regard to the latter, there is little that the “classical” and “modern” 
liberals have in common. In Britain, the term “liberal” was expropriated by statists of 
very illiberal tendencies and has ceased to have its “classical” meaning at least since 
the time of Lloyd-George.5 Instead, it came to resemble liberalism of the Continental 
type. In a sense, therefore, British liberalism has abandoned the very particular route 
chosen by Smith and Hume at the height of the Enlightenment. Smith and Hume saw 
the value of liberalism in continuously contributing to the growing store of man’s 
knowledge and subsequent betterment of his condition, hi their minds, reason 
militated against an assumption of the possibility of perfect knowledge and, 
importantly, perfection in human affairs. Reason, in other words, dictated uncertainty 
and evolution. The route taken by the Continental philosophers, on the other hand, 
was characterised by blind belief in human reason as a means to perfection in the 
acquisition of knowledge and human affairs. The proponents of the Continental type
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of “liberalism” reasoned in absolute terms. Whatever the outcome of reasoning, it 
was to be followed or even precipitated, so long as it was reasonable. And, because it 
was reasonable, opposition was useless, discouraged or even prohibited. Both,
Communism and Nazism have their roots in this continental liberalism and the belief
that all must be subjected towards reaching a particular, reasonable, goal. And it is 
with respect to these two philosophies and their modern transmutations that 
liberalism became so thoroughly illiberal in its treatment of individuals and of 
liberty. The fact that the statists and social engineers have appropriated for 
themselves the word “liberal” changes nothing about their disregard for basic tenets
of liberalism.
II. Moral Libertarianinn
The main merit of individualism which Adam Smith and his contemporaries 
advocated is that it is a system under which bad men can do least harm. It is a social 
system which does not depend for its functioning on our finding of good men for 
running it, or on men becoming better than they now are, but which makes use of 
men in all their given variety and complexity, sometimes good and sometimes bad., 
sometimes intelligent and., more often stupid.6
- F. von Hayek
The theory that claims to defend the lost focus on liberty is libertarianism. All 
libertarians agree in the primacy of liberty. They agree that liberty is a “good” thing 
and they agree that it should be maximised. Their reasons “why” this should be so 
are, however, profoundly different. One group of libertarians, the consequentialists.
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believes that it is enough to show that people are “happier” and more prosperous 
living in a free society. Other libertarians, the moralists, agree with the 
consequentialists that people are “happier” and more prosperous in a free society, but 
maintain that this is not enough. They believe that the initiation of force by one 
person against another, to coerce them into doing something they would otherwise 
refuse to do, is morally wrong in and of itself, regardless the consequences. For the 
moralists, in other words, freedom is not simply an arrangement producing the best 
possible result; it is, as Bradford argues, an arrangement based in “objective 
morality”. Of course, consequentialist libertarians are also opposed to the initiation 
of violence, but non-coercion is not “the” principle from which all just social 
arrangement must be derived.
Perhaps the best-known proponents of the moralist libertarianism are Rand, 
Rothbard, and Nozick. In her novels as well as in her non-fictional writings, Rand 
defended a notion that the initiation of force on anyone is immoral in and of itself..7 
In the economic sphere, Rand supported the free market and defended egoism as an 
ethical theory where self-interest served as a foundation of morality itself. In the days 
of Communism and Nazism, her principles were in stark contrast with socially 
predominant morality of selflessness, altruism and, ultimately, self-sacrifice. Rand's 
literary utopia was populated by a super-rational god-like set of characters, behaving 
according to an unshakable set of ethical principles. Rand herself accepted that her 
heroes' and heroines' seclusion from the pressures and necessities of social life was 
divorced from the reality of human existence, but this disregard for differences 
between the ideal and the real permeated her thought. For example, in her effort to 
defend man's independence from society, Rand's heroine in Atlas Shrugged, Dagny 
Taggart, says that she only envies one man; he who said, “The public be damned”?
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But this is precisely what a capitalist cannot do. The sole reason why capitalism is 
the most successful economic system in history is its ability to deliver that which the 
public wants. Indeed, the only system so far that has produced goods iiTespective of 
the public desire for them was Communism - the very system that Rand spent her life 
opposing. Then, without realising the obvious contradiction, Dagny Taggart goes on 
to say that the revolutionary invention of John Galt, another of Rand’s characters, 
will bring great benefits to mankind. Far from being an independent agent, the work 
of a capitalist is the slave of the people who purchase the fruits of his work;.9
Like Rand, Rothbard also based his arguments on the theory of natural rights 
alone. In Rothbard’s view, a person owns his own body and his natural talents, which 
he then puts to use as he sees fit and, of course, so long as he does not infringe upon 
the right of others to the same. If, then, a person does in fact acquire material or 
intellectual property by mixing his labour with it, it is properly his and can only be 
taken away from him with his consent. These rights, Rothbard states, are absolute. 10 
But, what happens to Rothbard’s reasoning in extremis? Being chased by a bear, 
would A be justified to break into a mountain cabin to save his life? Clearly, natural 
rights must eventually turn to consequentionalism. Rothbard himself seemed to have 
accepted this when he defended freedom on a distinctly consequentialist grounds. As 
he wrote, liberty is “vitally necessary for each man's survival and prosperity that he 
be free to learn, choose, develop his faculties, and act upon his knowledge and 
values”.11
Similarly, Nozick followed Kant’s assertion that individuals are ends in
themselves and that the utilitarian treatment of individuals as means to an end is
unacceptable. He argued that there could not be a justified sacrifice of one on behalf 
of others* hi practice, the only legitimate function of the state is its protection of
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individual rights from violation by other individuals. Nozick’s rights are given or 
natural and are, therefore, left undefended. But, like others, Nozick accepted that in 
the case of emergency the absolutism particular to natural right theories might have 
to be compromised. Another problem with rights-based theory is that it substitutes 
intuition for empirical research and reasoning. As Glendon argued, “rights talk” 
debases political discussion. Demands issued as a matter of “right” portrays 
opponents not simply as mistaken, but also as immoral. Rights talk also obstructs the 
democratic process of public deliberation and public justification and destroys the 
possibility of the emergence of mutually acceptable solutions; it is derisive of 
precedent and custom and results in politicisation of life and amplification of 
litigiousness.1'1
Of course, despite these shortcomings, the reason for the emphasis on natural 
rights is obvious. A person concerned merely with consequences may well conclude 
that, on some occasions, state intervention is desirable and beneficial. This is, in fact, 
a position reached by Milton Friedman, who reportedly stated that he could imagine 
supporting socialism if he were convinced that it increased prosperity and 
happinsss. This, Rand and others must have feared, is a slippery slope argument, 
the final destination of which could well be not the free society they hoped for, but 
the Soviet Gulag. As Rand stated about the one pre-eminent consequentialist of her 
time, “As an example of our most pernicious enemy, I would name Hayek. That one 
is real poison... [He is of the] kind who do more good to the communist cause than 
ours”.15 However, the fact that the state has been hugely oppressive during the course 
of the last century and beyond does not mean that the state is incapable of doing 
good. Though it is true that libertarians believe that, generally speaking, state
intervention is hamiful and that the market could take over most of the roles of the
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state and do a better job, moral libertarians fail to make a case for saying that all 
actions of the state must be hamiful in their consequences per se. Similarly, they are 
incapable of proving that all would be well without the state. As Steele writes, the 
coincidence of natural rights automatically leading to best consequences is too good 
to be true. There may arise a problem with which the market will not be able to 
deal.16
To be sure, few things are perfect. Even laws of nature that taken for granted 
every day may, in very special circumstances, fail. No example illustrates this better 
than Newton's laws of physics, which are applicable to 99.9% of all things human 
beings do on earth. Yet, as Einstein's Theory of Relativity illustrates, these laws are 
deficient at immense speeds like, for example, inter-stellar travel. The same goes for 
the theory of moral libertarianism. It might be of great intellectual interest to ask 
hypothetical, in extremis, questions. But, as Rand had argued, it might be wiser not to 
base ethics on “lifeboat situations”, if for no other reason, then because people do not 
live in them. It might well be the case that those who find liberty worth preserving 
will find moral libertarianism a perfectly appropriate way to conduct their affairs in 
day-to-day situations and only question it when, during war or pestilence normal 
rules of conduct are suspended. 17 Moral libertarianism, therefore, is not in worse 
shape than other universal and rights-based moral theories.
Importantly, however, there are practical problems arising out of moral 
libertarianism that are as, if not more, important. Moral libertarianism encourages the 
emergence of dogmas rather than dialogue. People who fear the responsibility that 
arises from freedom, for example, may be more comfortable believing that there is 
someone or something that will take care of them. Libertarians may feel that 
nationalised healthcare is inferior to private healthcare, but clearly there are many.
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who are satisfied with it. Moreover, proposals such as privatisation of the police 
force seem incredible if argued for only from the moral perspective. That is not to 
say that there is no case for the privatisation of policing. As contemporary South 
Africa shows, private policing may sometimes be the only answer to raising levels of 
crime. This, however, is not a moral argument. Thus, as Bradford writes, “If 
invoking the non-aggression imperative fails to convince and, worse, ends dialogue 
altogether, then perhaps we should try another approach”.18
III. Consequentialist Libertarianism
A society that puts equality... ahead offreedom will end up with neither.19
- Milton Friedman
The alternative approach is consequentialist libertarianism. This approach is not 
based on an absolute principle, but on the assertion that practical application of 
libertarianism increases utility. The process, in other words, is reversed. Liberty and 
non-coercion is not an origin, but an outcome of both intellectual process and 
empirical experimentation. Indeed, moral libertarianism has been in decline for some 
time, hi a Liberty magazine poll of 1988, only 10% of libertarians disagreed with 
Rand's view of the non-permissibility of coercion. By 1998, this number rose five­
fold. The same survey showed increasing support for the consequentialist type of
libertarianism.
The difference between the two types of libertarianism, then, maybe 
illustrated with an example of minimal wages. A moralist’s opposition to it is based 
on the principle of non-coercion principle. A moral libertarian will argue that
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minimum wage laws infringe on the freedom of an employer who purchases labour 
below a government-mandated price. By threatening to send him to prison for 
breaking of the law, the state initiates force and this is wrong. Most people will not 
really care for the right of the businessman to pay what the skilful propagandist will 
immediately label an “unsatisfactory” or even “unfair” wage. A consequentialist, on 
the other hand, will argue his point differently. “The purpose of a minimum wage 
law is to raise the wages of people near the bottom of the wage scale”, one 
consequentialist philosopher says.
But the effect of minimum wage law is quite different; while it may 
raise the wages of a few low-paid people, it will raise the cost of 
hiring low-skilled people to a level at which many business owners 
will either no longer be able to operate profitably, and thus go out of 
business, or will replace the low-skilled employee with a piece of 
automated equipment. The net effect is to increase unemployment 
among the marginally skilled. Is that what you really want to do?20
And so, a consequentialist claims that rights are themselves never foundational, but 
rather, as one philosopher claims “intermediaries between claims about human 
interests that are vital to well-being and claims about obligations it is reasonable to 
impose on others in respect of these interests”. Rights, in other words, “gain their 
content from the requirements of human well-being - and they will be variable as the 
demands of human well-being vary?1 Of course, what human well-being is or ought 
to be is debatable. But, even the staunchest defenders of liberty, like Epstein, von 
Mises and Hazlitt find grounds for natural rights in utilitarianism?? Does this mean
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that consequentialist libertarianism is entirely amoral? Consequentialists do, after all, 
claim to uphold certain ethical precepts that have been proven over time and not, as 
is the case with modern liberalism, in short-term expediency. Of course, it is here 
that social evolution enters the equation, for it is this evolutionary vision of social 
development that provides the consequentialists with the ability to account for 
change. But, they argue, change of principle, whatever this may be, must happen 
“naturally”. This means is that there is no “external standpoint of pure reason or pure 
intuition from which... [these principles] can sweepingly be called into question and 
replaced by newly invented ones”.77 This apparent contradiction between 
consequentialist emphases on results on the one hand and their adherence to certain 
ethical principles on the other hand will be discussed below.
What, then, is to be said of libertarianism and both its strands? As Lemieux 
argues, the feasibility of libertarianism should not rest in the ability of libertarians to 
come up with a defensible theory of natural rights. After all, after 2500 years of 
moral and political philosophy, “there is still no agreement on whether natural rights 
exist, let alone on what they are”. There are, of course, many plausible accounts as to 
what natural rights “are” and how they came about. But, none of these accounts 
resolves the Humean conundrum between what “is” and what “ought” to be. 
Moreover, it seems impossible to be certain that any rights exist objectively, without 
“subjective preference”. On the other hand, ethically self-sufficient consequentialism 
seems equally impossible. Even the consequentialist basis of market economics, 
Lemieux points out, “requires some ethical foundation, if only the assignment of 
moral value to individual preferences”. Obviously, the complexity of the problem of 
consequentialist ethics is further magnified, since not all individual preferences are 
seen as acceptable. Murder, for example, is condemned as unambiguously wrong.
mBut, why should the murderer’s pleasure carry no moral weight in evaluating his 
action? Clearly some things are just wrong.24
IV. Moral Defence of Capitalism:
The Austrian View on the Role of the Entrepreneur
It seems... that libertarian political theory cannot be based on a pure, non- 
consequentialist, conception of individual rights; and, yet, that a consequentialist or 
utilitarian theory needs an ethical substratum. Even if no 'natural rights ’ exist, the 
claim would remain that morality is inseparable from human nature; but 
consequences also matter. Thus, consideration of both morals and consequences 
appears necessary for a defence of liberty.
- Pierre Lemieux
In Atlas Shrugged, Rand described a world where entrepreneurs went on strike. In 
that way she turned on its head the common image of employees striking against 
what they often see as unfair working conditions and the like. The novel, on the other 
hand, saw the entrepreneurs escaping the world of high taxation and constant moral 
degradation. The novel shows the result of this “strike”; the end of progress, of 
discovery and economic collapse resulting in joblessness and poverty. In Rand’s 
mind, the entrepreneur was the engine of society. He was the one taking the risk of 
turning ideas into something valuable, thus creating employment and prosperity in 
the process. The entrepreneur was acting, as Adam Smith had described, in his own 
self-interest. By pursuing his interests he has earned for himself great rewards, but he 
also benefited humanity beyond anything that he would ever earn. A good example
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of such an entrepreneur is Bill Gates. Gates’ private fortune is tremendous; at the 
turn of the century, his wealth was estimated at $100 billion. But, is it not true that
the world has benefited from Gates’ work much more than he himself has? Is it not
true that the increased efficiency in speed of communication, the dissemination of 
knowledge and the creation of a new industry employing millions of people around 
the world is worth more than $100 billion? And, this is the point that Rand was 
making. Her heroes, like Hank Rearden and Francisco D’Anconia, were but 
idealisations of thousands of entrepreneurs scattered across the globe, making up the 
motor that moves the world forward. They formed a very elite gioup of men and 
women of unquestionable talent, intelligence and hard work. As such, they stood in 
stark contrast to those in society whose primary concern was not to create wealth, but 
to “distribute” it. Rand’s novel did have an obvious philosophical or moral 
undercurrent. But, Rand had failed to transform it into a convincing and defensible 
theory. That role was left to Israel Kirzner.
Kirzner rejected the notion that price theory should be “seen as primarily 
concerned with the configuration of prices and quantities that satisfies the conditions 
for equilibrium”. Instead, he argued, people ought to “understand how the decisions 
of individual participants in the market interact to generate the market forces which 
compel changes in prices, in outputs, and in methods of production and the allocation 
of resources”.?? Of course, the weaknesses of the general competitive equilibrium has 
been recognised for some time and its assumptions of perfect knowledge, zero 
transaction costs, multiplicity of buyers and sellers and so on questioned. But, they 
did have an important moral outcome. As De Soto obseryed, much of 
consequentialism is rationalistic in a sense that it sees human action determined by 
maximising behaviour of men concerned with the costs and benefits of their actions.
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This rationality can then serve as the basis of a system where consequences replace 
concerns with justice, ethics and so on. But, concern with consequences alone is 
fundamentally flawed. In economic theory, to give an example, it is clearly not 
possible to predict the costs and benefits of every action. The assumption of a perfect 
knowledge of human behaviour and, consequently, human need is, after all, central 
to the failure of the socialist system to provide the people with even the most basic 
commodities. Similarly, a purely consequentialist approach to politics has also been 
discredited by communism. Thus, as de Soto writes,
[If] a person holds that it is possible to make an economic decision 
solely on the basis of cost-benefit analysis because all the necessary 
information is statistically given, then it is not only unnecessary for 
individual actors to follow any moral code but it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that any scheme of equity imposed by force is 
compatible with the criteria of Paretian efficiency [which is] the 
second fundamental theorem of welfare economics.27
Thus, pure consequentialist faces a dilemma arising out of the neoclassical 
understanding of economics. Neo-classical economic assumptions, unrealistic though 
they are, make cost-benefit analysis possible and contribute to the notion that utility 
maximisation can replace concerns of a moral and ethical nature - such as, for 
example, placing people in a Gulag for the greater good of the community. 
Moreover, because of its assumption of perfect knowledge, the neoclassical 
economic model does not allow for the possibility of individual input beyond the 
individual’s utilisation of that readily available knowledge. Of course, once it is
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accepted that the individual has contributed to the productive process nothing but 
utilisation of this readily available knowledge, the separation of production and 
distribution becomes possible. It is, therefore, no wonder that J. S. Mill was both the
father of consequentialism and the first economist to assert the possibility of
separation of production and distribution.
To put it differently, because economic agents, such as businessman, are 
mistakenly assumed to do nothing but act on a price that is already given and known, 
they do not fulfil the requirements of desert and thus abrogate much of their moral 
claim to the awards originating in production. In fact, this view is widespread. Both 
Nazis and Communists claimed that entrepreneurs and businessmen were parasites, 
precisely because they failed to appreciate that entrepreneurs engage in an 
irreplaceable process of discovery. Similarly, the proponents of “distributive justice” 
do not see, as Nozick has pointed out, that produce comes with entitlements already 
attached? Thus, they wish to “redistribute” the social pie in accordance with some 
plan. But, capitalism does not have a central “re-distributing” agency. As Hayek
wrote,
[hi] a system in which each is allowed to use his knowledge for his 
own purposes the concept of 'social [or distributive] justice’ is 
necessarily empty and meaningless, because in it nobody’s will can 
determine the relative incomes of the different people, or prevent that 
they be partly dependent on accident. 'Social Justice’ can be given a
meaning only in a directed or ‘command economy’... in which the
29individuals are ordered what to do...
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Incomes in capitalism are detemiined impersonally, through the interaction of 
millions of market participants. Incomes, in other words, arise simultaneously with 
the market process.30 And yet, this is not enough. Both Misses and Hayek were, for 
lack of a better term, consequentialists. Yes, they were able to show that 
“redistribution” made no sense under capitalism; only a socialist economy could 
have such a goal. But, this is not the same as showing that capitalism itself is moral. 
After all, a critic could easily retort that capitalism, although more efficient, is 
undesirable precisely because of its immorality. This accusation, Kirzner clearly 
believes, springs from misunderstanding the nature and mode of operation of 
capitalism. The social pie is created during a process of discovery, where a fog of 
ignorance surrounds the participants in the market process. They do not, in other 
words, possess the perfect knowledge that neo-classical economics assumes they 
have. The free market, however, provides incentives that dispel this fog. In this 
Austrian or “dynamic” economic model, an entrepreneur decides to take an action 
according to what he does not certainly know, but believes to be profitable. His 
alertness and his resourcefulness to the possibilities that surround him are vital, or 
the opportunities will be missed.32 The aggregate result of these instances of alertness 
or “social pie” thus becomes a product of the entrepreneur. There is nothing 
predetermined about it. A producer creates the product ex nihilo, using no given 
input but his ability.33
Of course, ability is unevenly distributed and it should, therefore, not be 
assumed that its fruits ought to be distributed evenly either. But, Kirzner’s finders- 
keepers ethic does have profound implications vis-a-vis larger-than-individual 
discoveries. European exploitation of South African and Namibian diamond and gold 
mines, just like the European mining of copper in Zambia, are often used as the
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moral basis of an argument for reparation. These views are clearly incorrect. Gold, 
diamonds, copper, and most other natural resources that the Europeans utilised have 
been available to the native populations of the colonies since the beginning of time. 
As is well known, the Orange River erodes its bedrock and carries diamonds onto the 
Atlantic beaches of South Africa and Namibia, where they are currently still 
collected. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that for millennia African fishermen 
literally walked over them, without having the slightest idea about diamonds’ 
potential uses, hi Europe, on the other hand, diamonds were used decoratively as 
well as industrially. In Africa, a diamond was useless, but in Amsterdam it was worth 
a lot of money. Its value was clearly determined by its applications - applications 
that the Europeans were alert enough to recognise. The diamond trade is, therefore, a 
very concrete example of how production in the real world involves discovery. 34 
There is nothing “given” about it. Quite the contrary, wealth arises out of alertness 
and, of course, luck. Discovery leads to profit and great discoveries lead to great 
profits. As Albert von Szent-Gyorgyi reportedly said, “Discovery consists of seeing 
what everybody has seen and thinking what nobody has thought”. The “static” or 
neo-classical economic model, on the other hand, sees a world in which there is very 
little space for the moral defence of profit-making. As Kirzner writes
Analytical models yielded by these [neo-classical] simplifications are 
peopled, in effect, by efficient decision makers each of whom is 
supremely untroubled by any doubts or uncertainties concerning the 
future, knowing, in particular, exactly what decisions other market 
participants are making, and moving in unerring fashion to select the 
respective best positions made available by the relevant environment.
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In these models there is no possibility for pure profit - since 
omniscient market participants camiot be imagined to have irrationally
permitted unexplained and unjustified price differentials to have 
prevailed.3?
But, if profit emerges under dynamic or Austrian conditions, then improvements 
arising out of this process of discovery end injv^^^^l^a^ble profit. Profit, in other words, 
becomes an incentive for discovery.36 But, Kirzner does ignore, as he himself admits, 
the initial redistribution of resourcee.37 Unooi^dtk^dly, Kirzner assumes that in cases 
of theft or coercion, reparation is not only to be welcomed but also necessaiy. But, as
has been shown, a clear distinction between misfortune that has resulted out of
natural and man-made causes must be made. This is a problem central to the 
discussion of two concepts of liberty. As has been explained, a departure from 
compensation based on man-made crimes only, leads to increasing infringements on 
liberty. Rawls’ A Theorv of Justice, at least in its original form, is different. As 
Rawls has argued, the over-achievers’ position in society depends on a number of 
endowments that have been arbitrarily and, therefore, unjustly, distributed. As such, 
Rawls’ theory has often provided the moral base for arguing that “redistribution” is 
justifiable in order to correct the discrepancies arising unjustly from the moral 
arbitrariness of birth. In other words, as Rawls would have it, “redistribution” is 
defensible to correct nature-caused discrepancies as well.
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V. The Question of Desert:
Observations on Rawls' A Theory of Justice
Equality before the law is... incompatible with any activity of the government 
deliberately aiming at material and substantive equality of different people, and that 
any policy aiming at a substantive ideal of distributive justice must lead to a 
destruction of the Rule of Law. To produce the same result for different people it is 
necessary to treat them differently. To give different people the same objective 
opportunities is not to give them the same subjective chance. It cannot be denied that 
the Rule of Law produces economic inequaltty — all that can be claimed for it is that 
this inequality is not designed to affect particular people in a particular way. It is 
very significant and characteristic that socialists (and Nazis) have always protested 
against “merely"formaljustice, that they have always objected to a law which had 
no views on how well offparticular people ought to be...38
- F. von Hayek
Rawls’ theory is one of social contract. The guiding idea behind the contract is 
“justice as fairness”; a position arrived at by logical reasoning by independent and 
self-interested actors.39 Tliis reasoning, he continues, happens behind the veil of 
ignorance, where the participants are unaware of their future status in a society. Not 
knowing what sort of endowments they are going to end up with, the participants 
naturally opt for an egalitarian distribution of resources.40 But, as Flew comments, 
the purpose of the veil of ignorance is to turn self-interested actors into “reliable 
moral judges”.** Thus, it must be assumed that an agreement on a first principle 
would be a moral one, rendering the equality of all social goods absolute. Thus,
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Rawls begins from a position of ultra-egalitarianism, which he then modifies by 
stating “Inequalities are permissible when they maximise, or at least all contribute to, 
the long-term expectations of the least fortunate group in society”.42 So, Rawls 
believes, out of the original position two principles would emerge; the first 
guaranteeing everyone equal liberty tlnough equal distribution of resources and the 
second, he calls it “maximin”, tolerating economic inequalities only when these 
contribute to the well being of the least fortunate.
And yet, it seems that Rawls’ argument is incoherent. If justice is, as he says, 
of moral or “uncompromising” nature, then trade-offs between it and, for example, 
economic efficiency are impermissible.^ Thus, “Ifjustice does entitle everyone to an 
equal share of all (social) goods, then one can and must immediately infer one 
universal right and one universal duty: the human right never to be exceeded, and the 
human duty never to exceed”. In other words, if in the process of becoming better off 
A gets more than B, B’s human right was violated through A’s violation of his 
human duty. The only solution to this dilemma, Flew writes, is the one articulated by 
Gracchus Babeuf. When defending himself against indictment arising out of the 
Conspiracy of the Equals, Babeuf stated, “Society must be made to operate in such a 
way that it eradicates once and for all the desire of a man to become richer, or wiser, 
or more powerful than others”.44
Similarly, there is Rawls’ proposition according to which policies ought to be 
rejected if they do not benefit the worst off. As Sowell points out, tliis philosophical 
stance is ludicrous, for it implies that even policy that may make millions of people 
better off can be vetoed by a group of those, no matter how small, to whom the 
benefits of such a policy do not apply. Thus, essentially, the entire society is forced 
to be worse off as the more able individuals and groups are forced to suffer at the
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expense of the less able individuals and groups. 4? Needless to say, this goes against 
the fundamental liberal principle of individualism, which expects that individuals are 
treated on the basis of the merit of their actions and not, as Rawls envisages it, on the 
basis of their belonging to a particular group.
There are other serious implications of Rawls’ work. Whether he realises it or 
not, his image of the “just” future could only be guaranteed by an enormously 
powerful and intrusive state apparatus - a fact that would be incompatible with the 
conventional understanding of liberty. A world would have to be swept clean.4? After 
all, as Rawls himself says, “Once we decide to look for a conception of justice that 
nullifies the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social 
circumstance as counters in the quest for political and economic advantage, we are 
led to these principles. They express the result of leaving aside those aspects of the 
social world that seem arbitrary from the moral point of view”.4? But, is it really 
possible to have a theory of justice where “deserts” - the distribution of which is 
what justice is, after all, about - cannot be grounded in facts about the people who 
claim them?48
Of course, if it is accepted that some, and perhaps most, differences between 
people ai'e caused by the unequal distribution of natural endowments, then there 
arises Rawls’ assertion that natural endowments, being distributed in a morally 
arbitrary fashion, are no basis for distribution. He writes, it is “one of the fixed points 
of our considered judgements that no one deserves his place in the distribution of 
natural endowments, any more than one desn^es one’s initial starting place in 
society”.4? If Rawls’ argument stands, rectification of differences between people 
tlirough “progressive” taxation and discrimination in admission to universities can be 
seen as acceptable. Importantly, it is perfectly possible that lack of other socially
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desirable attributes, such as beauty, height and intelligence will have to be 
compensated for. Indeed, once Rawls’ idea concerning natural endowments is taken 
up, there seems to be no easily discernible natural boundary, maximin included, for 
the ostensibly equalising social interference.
Of course, much depends on how the notion of desert is understood. Rawls, it 
seems, understands desert in a way that implies that to deserve X, every input A 
appeals to as a basis for his claim to that X has to be deserved. However, since 
everything A does contains arbitrary elements, nothing can really be said to be 
deserved - ever.** In addition, much of what A does happens in interaction with his 
internal features, such as character, talent and so on. Such features camiot all be 
morally arbitrary, for if character and other internal characteristics are morally 
arbitrary, what are they morally arbitrary in comparison to? If internal human 
characteristics do not matter, what does?5’ Walzer writes,
[The] .. .capacity to make an effort or to endure pain is, like all their 
other capacities, only the arbitrary gift of nature or nurture. But this is 
an odd argument, for while its purpose is to leave us with persons of 
equal entitlement, it is hard to see that it leaves us with persons at all.
How are we to conceive of these men and women once we have come
to view their capacities and achievements as accidental accessories, 
like hats and coats they just happen to be wearing? How, indeed, are 
they to conceive of themselves?52
Similarly, Gauthier objects, “We may agree with Rawls that no one deserves her 
natural capacities. Being the person one is, is not a matter of desert.”22 Hayek too
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accepts that arbitrary nature of distribution of natural endowments, but argues, “[It] 
is neither desirable nor practicable to ask basic structure to distribute according to 
desert”.54 This is so, because as he sees it, the concept of justice can only apply to a 
relationship between men.
Schmidtz makes a very different argument. Desert, he argues, is traditionally 
understood in remunerative and retrospective terms. Thus, Rachels argues, “What 
people deserve always depends on what they have done in the past”.55 Similarly, 
Miller writes, “desert judgements are justified on the basis of past and present facts 
about individuals, never on the basis of states of affairs to be created in the future”.56 
Thus, when talking about desert, it is asked, “Has A done enough prior to receiving 
X to deserve X qua reward?” Clearly, the expectation is that unless A has done 
enough, his reception of X was undeserved and his remuneration for services 
unearned. Conversely, if he has done enough, his reception of X was deserved.
Yet, even if this retrospective view of desert is accepted, it still needs to be 
asked, “Retrospective from where?” Some might look back at A year from the time 
when he received X and ask, “Did he deserve the opportunity given to him?” hr 
doing so, the question is still retrospective, but retrospective to A’s actions after A 
has received X. In that sense, of course, A can be said to have deserved the
opportunity given to him. What matters, in other words, is whether A has or has not 
wasted the opportunities given to him.57 hi this sense, of course, desert stops being a 
reward or remuneration for services rendered. Instead, it becomes an opportunity to 
prove his worth. Thus, Schmidtz writes,
[Retrospective] statements overlook an important, perhaps even the 
most important, category of desert-making relation. Even when action
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is needed to forge a connection between outcome and internal 
features, the action need not precede the outcome. In particular, we 
have not yet done anything to deserve our natural endowments at the
moment of our birth, but that need not matter. What matters, if 
anything at all matters, is what we do after the fact..5®
Returning to A, it may be asked, “Has A done enough after receiving X to have 
deserved X qua opportunity?” After all, if X no longer is understood as a reward, but 
as an opportunity, then it may be that at least sometimes Sdmt^dtz’s “prospective” 
view is one that matters. Clearly, therefore, “retrospection” is unnecessary to the 
conception of desert. Thus, an employee who has been promised a lucrative contract 
may promise “to work hard in order to deserve it”. Few would think of such promise 
as paradoxica?**
Of course, to understand desert in these terms does pose serious problems for 
Rawls’ theory. Indeed, Rawls himself seems to have changed his view in his revised 
edition of A Theorv of Justice. There he added, “To be sure, the more advantaged 
have a right to their natural assets, as does everyone else; this right is covered by the 
first principle under the basic liberty protecting the integrity of the person”?0
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VI. Primacy of (Negative) Liberty: Scottish Enlightenment Revisited
Throughout history orators and poets have extolled liberty, but no one has told us 
why liberty is so important. Our attitude towards such matters should depend on 
whether we consider civilisation as fixed or advancing... In an advancing society, 
any restriction on liberty reduces the number of things tried and so reduces the rate 
of progress. In such a society freedom of action is granted to the individual, not 
because it gives him greater satisfaction but because if allowed to go his own way he
will on the average serve the rest of us better than under any orders we /mow how to
61give.
- H. B. Phillips
Kirzner’s theory has implications beyond the moral defence of capitalist profit­
making. Firstly, Kirzner’s theory offers a profound critique of the welfare state. 
Welfare economics, which provide the most widely accepted justification for state 
intervention in the market economy, is based on the neo-classical assumption “that 
all the relevant information concerning preferences and production techniques is 
known and given. The economic problem, under such circumstances, is a simple 
mathematical problem of employing the right means to obtain the appropriate end”.62 
It follows that economic policies in welfare states are often seen as rectifying the 
“shortcomings” of the free market in dealing with these economic problems. If, in 
other words, the free market fails to fulfil the expectations of those economists who 
deal with the problems of provision of healthcare or welfare as though all the 
information has been given, the free market is seen as failing to deliver and the 
government is asked to step in to correct the “injustice”. Kirzner’s “dynamic” or
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Austrian economic model, on the other hand, argues that this approach to the 
provision of welfare and healthcare is flawed, because the assumptions that neo­
classical model entertains, are umeal. The Knowledge necessary for a delivery of 
what may be called “public” services is simply unavailable to anyone individual or 
group in its totalliy.63 rnsrean, Kirzner argues, the free market should be utilised “as a 
social instrument for mobilizing all the bits of knowledge scattered throughout the 
economy”.** hideed, only the market will allow the economic agents to “discover” 
the knowledge needed for the kind of coordination of different healthcare and
welfare providers that the neo-classical model fails to achieve because of its 
presumption of complete knowtedge*? Thus, Kirzner writes.
The world of market equilibrium cannot be judged on its success in 
coordinating scattered driblets of information; ignorance is simply 
assumed not to exist. For such a world it is only natural to expect 
welfare analysis to be confined to an appraisal of how closely it 
approximates the conditions for optimality... [The] success of a 
system is to be measured by its capacity to coordinate the innumerable 
individual decisions, plans and actions that will be made 
independently in society during a given period of time??
The practical advantage of the Austrian conception of economics, therefore, is one of 
Imo'wlrngr discovery. Unlike the usual approach, which “suggests that things about 
which men are completely ignorant are things that, in the sense relevant to economic 
theory, simply do not exist”, Kirzner’s vision brings the “attention precisely to the 
existence of opportunities for the acquisitions of knowledge about which no one
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knows”.67 Of course, the institutions that characterise the free market, such as the 
laws of supply and demand and, concomitantly, fluctuating prices, losses and profits 
“serve as guideposts to individual decision making”. They are, as Mises referred to 
them “indispensable aids to the human mind”.68 As Kirzner again states, “I contend 
that the market performs a crucial function in discovering knowledge nobody knows 
exists; that an understanding of the tme character of the market process depends, 
indeed, on recognizing this crucial function”?* This fundamental point is in need of 
re-emphasising and Boettke’s summary of the Austrian position is of great help.
[Attempts]... to rationally control the economic system are necessarily 
irrational because the knowledge necessary for economic coordination 
is not known to any one mind or group of minds. The competitive 
market process systematically allows for the discovery and utilization 
of the knowledge required for economic coordination. The rivalrous 
competition of market participants generates and reveals the 
appropriate economic knowledge. Interference with that process, on 
the other hand, results in the disappointment of the plans and purposes 
of the interveners themselves. This disappointment of the inteiweners 
plans does not result in an abandonment of interventionist policies, 
but, instead, leads to continued attempts by statists at [more] economic 
control... Nevertheless, the point stands; assuming that the 
govermnent official was seeking to improve economic conditions in 
the name of the public interest, economic analysis demonstrates that 
interfering with the competitive market process produces results that 
are contrary to the betterment of the public. This is not limited to the
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recognition of the problems with wage and price controls that is part 
of every economist's training, but applies to all areas of govenmient 
interference with the market process. From taxation to Keynesian fine- 
tuning, the economic result is the same: interventionism leads to 
destruction of economic well-being and loss of human freeoom.70
It will, therefore, come as no surprise that the reasons for the primacy of negative 
liberty are rooted in the distinction observed in the first chapter of this thesis. The 
struggle for a betterment of human condition has been preoccupying scholars ever 
since antiquity. It should be clear now that there are ways of doing this; one 
successful and the other one damaging. On the one hand there is the evolutionary and 
retrospective view of Hume, Smith and Hayek. This vision draws a comparison 
between the current state of humanity and the state that preceded it. Thomas Sowell 
called this vision a “tragic” one, not because it is unbearable, but because it 
understands that man’s nature prevents him from attaining perfection. The tragic 
vision does not attempt to change this nature. It is understood that to do so would 
involve an intolerable cost to human freedom and ultimately fail. Those who believe 
that differences and inequalities cannot be eliminated through social engineering also 
tend to embrace the free market as a complementary economic arrangement. The free 
market distribution of wealth generally tends toward an outcome whereby the parties 
most endowed with the qualities that enable them to succeed in the market place, such 
as alertness, innovativeness and determination receive the largest rewards. Of course, in 
this system, the inegalitarian distribution of endowments amongst individuals and 
groups acquires an increased prominence and visibility. After all, its functioning and 
efficacy are based upon those very same endowments. Consequently, the free market is
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a thom in the heel of the social engineers. However, bearing the Soviet experience in
mind, it seems undeniable that the free market serves better than any other system to 
discover the knowledge necessary for the smooth functioning of any society. Only in 
a system that is open to change tlirough competition of ideas, can this sort of 
intellectual social Darwinism produce the best possible results.
It will come as no surprise that the scholars most opposed to the concept of 
natural inequalities are also the ones most disparaging of the free market economy. 
Those who favour social engineering as a solution to the problem of inequality, also 
tend to favour an economic system that either prevents innate inequalities from 
arising or reduces them tlirough “redistribution”. This second way towards the 
betterment of the human condition is misguided and the last century provides ample 
evidence to support such claim. The suffering that the egalitarian philosophies of
Nazism and Communism inflicted on mankind bear witness to the cost involved in
attempting to change humanity and to achieve an egalitarian arrangement in a world 
that is spectacularly diverse. At the centre of the egalitarian failure is the search for a 
“perfect” society. Instead of looking back, the thinkers on the left look to the future. 
They ignore the improvements humanity has made in its evolution and instead focus 
on comparing the current state of affairs with an untried utopia. Their views manifest 
lack of humility - a blind belief that society can be constmcted, reconstructed, 
moulded and remoulded according to a preset plan. At the centre of this confusion is 
their inability to understand that acquisition of perfect knowledge is impossible; that 
human action as well as its consequences is very difficult to predict. The notion that 
freedom might be necessary in order to allow the best ideas to evolve is alien to
them.
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Conclusion
Our inquiry is not after that which is perfect, well knowing that no such thing is
found among men; but we seek that human constitution which is attended with the 
least, or the most pardonable inconveniences.1
- Algernon Sidney
Hayek’s main contribution to the world of ideas was his concept of a “constructivist 
fallacy”. According to Hayek, lack of trust in the evolutionary process forces many to 
believe that it is possible to construct “elaborate architectures of institutional co­
operation”, which will manage both society and the economy? The problem is that 
even the most elaborate designs lack the capacity to take into account the imiumerable 
number of possible inputs and outputs. No known model, in other words, can harvest 
the amount of information needed to predict, with certainty, a particular outcome. To 
compensate for this shortcoming, social engineers have to rely on making their models 
more and more complex. As a result of this increasing complexity many such models 
become impracticable, while others become normatively restrictive. In the USSR, for 
example, prices were detemiined centrally. They were based on the projected 
production over a period of many years. Of course, such projections were seldom 
correct. As a result, the Soviet economy became famous for overproduction of one 
commodity and undeiproduction of another. To put it differently, it was stupendously 
inefficient hi the free market system, on the other hand, prices fluctuate constantly. 
They depend on supply and demand, as it happens, minute after minute. In fact, it is 
clear now that the only generally reliable mechanism for the gathering of such huge 
volumes of constantly changing information is the free market price system. But, to be
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reliable, it must be truly fi'ee of governmental interference and the concomitant
distortions.
It is worth noting that early Marxists advocated Socialism as a way of 
improving efficiency.3 Ultimately, this view had its roots in an inflated opinion of 
human reason that distinguished the Continental liberals from their more skeptical 
Scottish contemporaries. In the face of its utter failure to achieve the goal of efficiency, 
however, another defence of Socialism emerged. This was the obseiwation that 
Socialism enhanced material equality. This obseiwation is, in some ways true, but 
material equality among the general population has always come at the price of 
economic stagnation and the emergence of a ruthless and highly un-egalitarian 
governing elite. As Trotsky estimated in 1939, “the upper 11 or 12 percent of the Soviet 
population... [receive] approximately 50 percent of national income”. Tliis inequality 
was greater even than that in the USA, “where the upper 10 percent of the population... 
[controlled in the same year] approximately 35 percent of the national income”.4 
Moreover, as has been mentioned in the introduction, the question of primacy of 
equality is seldom answered. But, if the argument can indeed be simplified to a choice 
between an egalitarian but materially poor society, and an un-egalitarian but materially 
wealthy society, the historical developments in the former Commimist block indicate 
public preference for the latter kind of social arrangement. No doubt, the Gramscians 
would argue that the choices which the people of Eastern Europe and USSR have made 
were - despite decades of communist indoctrination - ill informed. But, what they 
conveniently ignore is that poverty and oppression were very real incentives for the 
people who lived under Socialism to rid themselves of it.
Of course, Gramscians are not alone in trying to salvage the reputation of a big 
state. According to a book by Sunstein and Holmes entitled The Cost of Rights: Why
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Liberty Depends on Taxes, individual rights are funded by taxes and are, therefore, 
public goods. According to these authors, rights depend on the amual budgetary 
process. In other words, it is completely up to the government to decide what rights, if 
any, the citizens will have. Unless they pay their taxes, the people can hope for no 
freedom at all. By implication, the govermnent is entitled to 100% of all national 
income and should it choose to extract only 99%, the remaining 1%o becomes a 
governmental handout.5 But, the right to life, to give just one example, clearly does not 
depend on the decisions that the politicians make when allocating money within the 
annual budget. As a moral concept, the right to life will not cease to exist even if no 
provision for its defence is made in that annual budget. The alternative view is one, 
where the government is seen as a servant hired by the public to perform certain duties. 
One of these duties is the protection of human life. The other may be the protection of 
private property. Taxes, in other words, should rather be seen as fees for service 
rendered. Where Sunstein and Holmes see the government bestowing rights on the 
people, others may well see the people paying the government to do a certain job.
Clearly, the above work is based on a very particular understanding of private 
property, including the wages that people receive. As with the Cosmopolitans, Sunstein 
and Holmes do not see property as coming with any rights attached. They see the fruits 
of human ingenuity flowing into one great reseiwoir of wealth, the budget, from where 
they are then “redistributed”, hi effect, these authors argue that because the politicians 
help to set up the rules of the market and fi'^*e society, they “somehow become 
entitled to what everyone produces”. But, as Bovard writes, this “makes as much sense 
as saying that federal patent clerks deseiwe all the rewards for new inventions, since 
they approve and register new patents, or that a bank security guard is entitled to carry 
home armfuls of money from the vaults he guards”5 Of course, egalitarian designs do
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not have to stop with invasions of private property. According to Goldberger and
Manski,
[A]n individual’s observed IQ test score Y is the sum of her 
“genotype” Z and her “enviromnent” U, so Y=Z+U. Imagine that Z 
and U are uncorrelated, so the variance of Y equals the variance of Z 
plus the variance of U: V(Y)+V(U)... [The usual] thought experiment 
call[s] for equalising environments, making V(U)=0. Suppose instead 
that we preserve V(U) at its current value, but make U perfectly 
negatively correlated with Z by introducing an extreme compensatory 
policy. The IQ variance would fall from V(Y) (h2 +e2) to V(Y) (h2+e2- 
2he)=V(Y) (h-e)2. So with h2=0.6 and e^=0.4, this intervention would 
reduce IQ variance to ( 0.6- 0.4)2=2 percent of its current value 
V(Y).7
In other words, the above proposal not only requires putting all low-IQ people in an 
intellectually stimulating environment, but also mandates putting all high-IQ people 
in an intellectually depressing environment. According to this proposal, it would be 
justifiable to transfer high-IQ people from their affluent neighbourhoods to slums 
and low-IQ people to wealthy suburbs. It could mean withdrawing reading material 
from children with a high IQ. It could also mean transferring low-IQ children to 
parents with high-IQ’s and high-IQ children to parents with low IQ’s® This is not 
very different from Plato’s insistence that the creation of a utopia requires not only 
the abolition of private property, but also of the family as well.’ He was right. 
Family, like private property, is un-egalitarian and selfish. In its effect, it is the
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opposite of a perfect and predictable society as envisaged by generations of some of 
the greatest scholars in the West, Their mistake, like Plato’s, was their “fascination 
with a priori reasoning, or the illusion that the manners and customs of a whole 
people can be transfonned and perfected... that tradition and historical precedent 
count for nothing”. !0 In other words, they were guilty of the constructivist fallacy.
The two ideologies that took a priori reasoning furthest were Communism 
and Nazism, hi both cases, the creation of a perfect society was seen to be dependent 
on the achievement of equality. This was not equality before the law, however. In 
fact, that type of equality was quickly abandoned as an insuperable obstacle to 
Communist and Nazi designs, Instead, the two totalitarian ideologies wanted to 
achieve substantive or material equality. Of course, the goal of substantive equality 
was directly dependent on destruction of individual liberty and a free market 
economy. This was recognised as early as 1755, when the French proto-Communist 
Morelly “advocated the abolition of private property and with it, by necessity, of 
individual liberty”." In fact, soon after they came to power, both the Communists 
and the Nazis undermined private property rights, expanded the role of the state, and 
ignored the needs and desires of individuals. With their newly acquired powers, the 
totalitarian states proceeded to commit crimes of previously unknown proportions.
In both cases, the assumption, from which the two ideologies derived the 
inevitable consequences was that people are by nature equal in ability and that if this 
is not so, some sort of injustice must have occurred. To this day many of the 
discriminatory practices across the globe are based on this assumption. The Chinese 
in Malaysia are being discriminated against, because they have shown themselves to 
be too successful for their own good. In the USA, the social engineers have elevated 
a large number of different groups to a protected status and put in place a plethora of
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discriminatory policies aimed at minimising the inequalities of outcome. Even 
though both logic and empirical evidence strongly contradict the assumption that 
“given equal opportunity all groups will perform the same”, this is exactly the 
premise the American social engineers are employing. But, in reality, this is no more 
than an assertion. Moreover, it is an assertion that flies in the face of empirical 
evidence. In the USSR, for example, the Kulaks, who emerged so successfully after 
the October Revolution, did so despite the roughly equal starting line with their 
fellow peasants. The Jews in the USA, like the Chinese in South-East Asia, 
succeeded despite discrimination.
Another premise held by the Nazis and the Communists alike was that 
capitalism is an immoral system that lends itself to abuse by the most ruthless and 
selfish members of society. The Nazi and Communist drive for substantive equality 
was, therefore, buttressed by the charge that the Jews and Kulaks earned their wealth 
by unjust means. This wealth was, therefore, often “redistributed” and its rightful 
owners cruelly punished. Conveniently forgotten was the fact that both groups 
prospered by providing the people among whom they lived with valued service. For 
example, Jewish lawyers, doctors and financiers were sought after throughout 
Europe. The same people, who would normally avoid association with the Jews 
because of their religious or ethnic prejudices, found their seiwice beneficial, even 
invaluable. In the same way, the Kulaks benefited Soviet society by providing it with 
five times as much agricultural produce per capita as did other peasants. Doing 
business with the Jews, a people who could never rely on the coercive power of the 
state, was always voluntary. Similarly, the Kulaks did not force the other peasants to 
work for them. They merely provided work for those who needed and wanted it.
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The Cosmopolitans, it has been the contention of this thesis, share both of these 
damning assumptions and it is on the basis of these assumptions that they are critical of 
globalisation and the apparent decline of the power of the state. As has been seen, the 
debate about globalisation is essentially about the appropriate role played by the state 
in the lives of the individuals. On the one hand, there are those who argue that 
minimising state interference in the lives of individuals is good, both morally and 
practically. On the other hand, there are those, who argue that it is not. This division 
is not new. As early as the 4th century BC, the ancient Greeks argued about the 
proper role of government. While it is true that in those days individualism was 
barely nascent, Plato was already campaigning for a totalitarian state. In the 20lh 
century, his vision finally came to fruition. At the beginning of the 21® century, 
however, many see globalisation as rolling back the boundaries of the state. In fact, 
this is not, strictly speaking, tme. Certainly, as far as the state expropriation of 
money in taxes and their redistribution is concerned, the revenues are at an all time 
high and still rising in absolute tenns.
For example, before the American War of Independence, the citizens of the 
thirteen colonies were taxed $0.67 per capita per amium. By 1787, the US 
government spent approximately $3 million per amium. Adjusted for the size of the 
US population at the time, this came to $l per citizen. By 1910, the federal 
government spent over $600 million or $6.75 per capita per annum. By 1929, the 
federal spending rose to $3 billion or $29 per capita per annum. In 1995, the US 
government spent over $4 billion a day, or $6000 per capita per annum. Adjusted for 
inflation, between 1929 and 1992 the federal spending increased by 9000 percent.12 
Incredibly, in the eiglit years that followed, the federal income tax revenue doubled." 
This should come as no surprise, for in his notorious 2000 State of the Union
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Address, President Clinton proposed approximately $4 billion of new government 
spending per minute of his one and half hour long speech." Another area, which is 
normally little discussed is the cost home by the private sector in complying with 
governmental regulations. In 1993, for example, Vice President A1 Gore’s Task 
Force on Reinventing Government estimated this cost to be $430 billion per annum; 
9% of the GDP that year.15 Of course, this did not diminish the Clinton 
Administration’s appetite for further regulation. Thus, between 1992 and 2000, his 
administration issued no less than 25 thousand new regulations." Clearly, therefore, 
there are signs that in some respects the state is still growing.
As far as the freedom of the markets is concerned, however, be it in the form
of free flow of capital or growth in the volume of international trade, the world is 
certainly freer than it has been since the beginning of the WWI. This inconsistency 
between the increased freedom to trade and the increased expropriation of resources 
is based on a view that it is possible, at the same time, to maximise economic growth 
and increase tax revenue. Though rising taxation was impracticable in a protectionist 
world where economic growth was either limited or non-existent, the free markets 
are seen to provide a convenient way for the state to increase the tax revenue at no 
apparent cost to the overall standard of living. Economically speaking, this is a 
fallacy. As has been shown by the Socialist experiment, it is impossible for the 
government to divert capital away from its most profitable use in the market without 
damaging long-term growth and the prosperity of the people. However, the lost 
growth caused by high taxation is something that will never be known and the 
politicians cannot, therefore, be brought to account.
Minimising government expenditure, on the other hand, seems to be a sure 
way to achieve maximum economic growth and to assure continued rises in the
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absolute income levels. Importantly, it is also the only way in which corruption can 
be rooted out. As Gary Becker wrote, “corruption is common whenever big 
govermnent infiltrates all facets of economic life”. This is because special interest 
groups are using their political connections to impact economic decisions. According 
to Becker, the “only... permanent way to reduce undesirable business influence over 
the political process...[is to] weaken the link between business and politics”." Of 
course, Becker’s preference for minimal government leads back to Hayek, for the 
latter’s concept of constructivist fallacy does not apply to the determination of 
commodity prices only. Its reach goes well beyond economics. As has been seen, the 
Marxist and Nazi societies were based on the assumption that communal existence 
could be, so to speak, “engineered”. Hayek’s response was his notion of “katallaxia”, 
a name he gave to a spontaneous or naturally evolving social order.18 The attraction 
of katallaxia, like the attraction of the price mechanism, rests in its ability to take into 
account all the available infonnation. In practice, this means that society evolves 
from one stage to another not according to a necessarily faulty design, but according 
to centuries of trial and eiTor. At the end of this process, the argument goes, there 
should emerge a society that is imperfect, but better than the one that preceded it. 
This, in turn, leads back to the defence of liberty that the protagonists of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, such as Hume and Smith, offered hundreds of years ago. As they 
argued, the ultimate defence of liberty must rest in its ability to allow for the 
emergence of a maximum number of choices, out of which the most suitable 
solutions are likely to emerge and take root.
Minimising government is, of course, precisely what the Cosmopolitans do 
not want. According to Held and other Cosmopolitans, the areas of democratic or 
political control should be broadened, bringing an ever-larger section of economic
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and social activities under public and, more importantly, legislative control. How 
exactly this increased democratisation will ensure creation of an efficient and growth 
oriented economic system is, however, left unanswered. This should not be 
surprising, for the main aim of the Cosmopolitans is not the creation of a healthy 
economy. Their aim is to create an egalitarian distribution of resources, which, as has 
been repeatedly pointed out, is not conducive to economic growth. But, neither is it 
conducive to individual freedom. Both the means of achieving of an egalitarian 
society and the functioning of such a society have always been highly coercive, 
restrictive and, ultimately, immoral.
The immorality of big govermnent is a topic often overlooked by those, who 
tend to be satisfied with pointing out the practical shortcomings of government 
intmsion. But, the moral arguments must also be considered. Some proponents of big 
government, for example, suggest that the welfare state is necessary in order to keep 
social peace. But, ready acceptance of this kind of argument is to submit to 
blackmail. Those who fail to succeed should not be allowed to hold society, in 
general, and successful individuals, in particular, hostage. The argument “if you do 
not share with us, we shall revolt” has no place in a civilised society. Similarly, it is 
doubtful that a society where individuals are being habitually exploited and 
effectively sacrificed for the benefit of others is worth preserving. After all, the 
creation of a society, where an individual was considered as a means to an end, 
which was characteristic of the USSR and Nazi Gennany, has already been tried and 
rejected.
Scope should perhaps be created for private initiatives that have historically 
flourished throughout the West before the onset of the welfare state.” What is more, 
only a private provision of aid to the people in need can be said to encompass a true
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moral meaning, which is utterly lacking when such provision derives from taxation. 
Only an individual free to make a choice between contributing to the survival of his 
fellow man and refraining from doing so, can be said to exercise a moral judgement. 
The governmental enforcement of charity, on the other hand, takes that moral 
judgement away. There is no moral choice when looking down the barrel of a gun. 
Clearly, as Bastiat wrote, “you cannot legislate fraternity without legislating 
injustice”.20
Progressive taxation is, of course, one of the most glaring examples of the 
immorality of the welfare state. When progressive taxation was proposed for the first 
time during the French Revolution and then again prior to the 1848 revolutions, it 
was rejected. ‘One ought to execute the author and not the project’, Turgot responded 
to an early version of such proposal. J. R. McCulloch warned, “The moment you 
abandon the cardinal principle of exacting from all individuals the same proportion 
of their income or of their property, you are at sea without rudder or compass, and 
there is no amount of injustice and folly you may not commit”?1 The Cosmopolitans, 
however, claim that progressive taxation is a compensation the disproportionately 
wealthy pay for the greater use they make of the opportunities that society offers. It 
is called “giving back to society”. But, this argument does not work. Firstly, were all 
the people taxed at the same rate of, for example, 10%, the more successful would 
still pay more in taxes. After all, 10% of a million pounds is significantly more than 
10% on a hundred thousand pounds and so on. The arbitrariness of setting taxes at 
“progressive” levels simply points to the government's determination to tax at 
whatever level it can get away with. Thus, between 1978 and 1979 the British 
Labour government set the highest marginal tax rates between 83% and 98%.22
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Moreover, this argument does not take into account the benefits that the society 
receives because of entrepreneurial activity. A pharmaceutical company that 
discovers a new drug and sells it in the market, for example, provides important 
services to the community, by creating employment and contributing to the tax 
revenue. Most importantly, it makes people healthier. There is simply no justification 
for claiming that the company must pay for being allowed to function. Finally, the 
argument assumes that the opportunities to make money need not be, to use 
Kirzner’s phrase, “discovered”; that they exist “separate” from any sort of human 
input. This “static” understanding of the economy fails to provide a satisfactory 
answer why it is that not everyone can utilise these economic opportunities. Clearly, 
not all people are equally able to do so, but to penalise those with superior abilities is 
to jeopardise innovation and economic growth. Progressive taxation is such a 
penalty; it implies that to outperfom others is unjust, unacceptable and to be curbed.
Similarly, on a global scale, the prosperity of the developed nations is 
constantly seen as having been obtained at the expense of others. Conversely, 
poverty of the Third World countries is almost universally blamed on events beyond 
their control. Thus, the argument goes, the Third World countries are poor because 
they were colonies. Yet, a number of the richest countries in the world, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, New Zealand, Australia and Canada, were colonies. Clearly, their 
colonial status did not ham their development. Conversely, with the exception of six 
years of Italian occupation during the WWII, Ethiopia has never come under 
European colonial rule. Yet, it is one of the poorest places on Earth. Then, there is 
the argument that underdevelopment happens because of overpopulation. Again, 
because of its medical inventions, which minimised the Third World mortality rates, 
this is supposed to be the fault of the West. Yet, some of the most densely populated
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countries in the world also happen to be the most economically developed. Japan and 
Hong Kong come to mind. Conversely, some of the least developed countries, such 
as Sudan and Chad, are also the most sparsely populated. As Bauer points out, every 
hungry mouth is accompanied by a pair of hands, which are meant to sustain it.23 
Next, there is the argument that in order to be developed, states need to be 
geographically large and rich in natural resources. Again, this is a false assertion, 
which can be easily refuted. The Soviet Union, for example, was the largest country 
in the world. It was also the country richest in natural resources. Yet, by the time it 
disintegrated in 1991, the Soviet Union was infamous for the poverty of its people 
and for constant shortages of the very commodities it was so plentifully blessed with. 
Conversely, Singapore and Hong Kong, just like Renaissance Florence and 17th 
century Amsterdam, flourish despite their minuteness and lack of many of the sought
after natural resources.
Finally, there is the all-time favourite: economic exploitation. The Third 
World, the neo-Marxists claim today, is poor because of its exploitation by 
Multinational Corporations (MNC’s). But, there are no MNC’s and never have been 
in Chad, Bhutan and Burundi. Yet, these are among the poorest countries in the 
world. Conversely, as evidenced by Hong King and Singapore, many of the countries 
where MNC’s have been encouraged to function, visibly prosper. However, it seems 
clear that the above arguments fail to look at the most obvious factor which 
differentiates between the rich and the poor countries in the World. States that 
participate in free trade grow richer, while states that adopt isolationist and 
collectivist policies do not. As the examples of Taiwan and China, North and South 
Korea, and East and West Germany show, prosperity depends on good governance,
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greater efficiency and, most importantly, a beneficial economic system. Yet, despite 
all this, the zero-sum understanding of capitalism lives on.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the desire across much of the political 
spectrum to regulate the market forces. As has been seen, regulation of the market is 
something on which the egalitarian left, as well as the protectionist right, can agree. 
Before moving onto their regulatory proposals, it is important to notice that on the 
hinges of both right and left there are those who would like not only to stop the process 
of trade liberalisation, but who also wish to reverse it. The religious right, for example, 
may wish to do so in order to move closer to a mythical past, when all was supposed to 
have been shared and where people, as a consequence, lived in harmony. The far left 
also wishes to recapture the supposed egalitarianism of the original societies, but 
without the religious overtones. Tliis makes both fringes close to the original anti­
capitalist movement of the 19lh centuiy. As Marx rightly acknowledged, capitalism 
was the radical force responsible for the emergence of the Western societies from the 
era of feudalism. It was in response to the radical transformation that the Western 
societies were then undergoing that socialism originally emerged. “Communism is 
not radical: capitalism is radical”, Bertolt Brecht, a prominent life-long communist, 
stated. More than anything, Socialism of the 19th century was nostalgic. In the time 
of unprecedented changes, it stood for a return to familiar values and, importantly, 
hierarchy. Thus, the Socialist historian Richard Towney, “called for a return to 
Christian values and traditional morality”, which were abandoned during “the 
demeaning scuffle for wealth”. Similarly, Ruskin, in opposition to Mill and other 
liberals, who supported the legislation that ended slavery, declared himself in favour 
of ‘lordship”. As the reality of Soviet existence was to confirm, Socialism and over­
lordship were fully compatible. One form of over-lordship threatened by capitalism
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was the relationship between the sexes. Thus, in an expression of paternalistic 
conservatism, Friedrich Engels stated that “it was plainly demoralising for women to 
go out to work... especially when the husband was left unemployed at home ‘to look 
after children and to do the cleaning and cooking’”.24
Now, once again, capitalist-driven globalisation is the most radical game in 
town. It is breaking down racial, gender and caste barriers across the world. As the 
world becomes more competitive, fewer and fewer companies can ignore able 
individuals because of factors unrelated to business, such as race and sexual
preference. Black musicians and sportsmen earn millions of dollars by utilising their 
talents and thus, indirectly, bringing more and more blacks into the mainstream of 
socio-economic life. Similarly, business increasingly aims to capture the “pink 
pound” by catering to the needs of the gay community. As with the stock exchange 
in early-modern Amsterdam, business brings people together on the basis of their 
need for each other’s senices. Importantly, it does so without the negative 
consequences, such as the feeling of resentment, that is a result of the affimative 
action policies ciurently favoured in the West. The rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, 
like the calls for a return to Clrnstian values during the course of the 19th century, is 
partly based on a misunderstanding of the process of capitalist wealth creation and is 
partly a reaction to the unsettling changes that capitalism causes in traditional societies.
Aside from the extremists, there are those, who wish “merely” to limit 
capitalist “excesses” through regulation. Thus, the Commission on Global 
Governance proposes to tighten the global financial structmes through the 
establishment of the Economic Security Council. Once again, underlying this 
proposal is the constructivist assumption that the Council would have the information 
necessary to guide the global markets through recessions. But, this is an
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unsubstantiated assertion. Historical evidence suggests that this would be highly 
unlikely to happen. On the contrary, as was the case with the Great Depression, it is 
probable that this kind of interference would result in a worsening of the situation 
and a delaying of economic recovery.25 What is more, the quality of the information 
necessary to guide the markets must increase with the volume of financial 
transactions. In a way, regulating the market is like driving a car. A driver of a car 
moving at 10km per hour can close his eyes for a second and he will still be on the 
same road, moving in the same direction. A driver of a car moving at 100,000km per 
hour cannot do so, for he will find himself off road or cause his car to crush. Fine- 
tuning of the market as large as it currently is, is unlikely to be successful. Fine- 
tuning of the market, as large as it is likely to become if globalisation runs its course, 
is next to impossible.
The Commission also proposes the establishment of a global economic forum 
aimed at making the markets more “equitable”, “democratic”, “socially cohesive” 
and “socially responsible”. But, as has been discussed, the reason why the markets 
work is precisely that they do not take into account amorphous political criteria. 
Social cohesion and social responsibility, after all, characterised the Soviet economic 
system. It was there that the factories kept on producing goods that nobody wanted. 
Ultimately, this dogma of full employment and other socially cohesive factors led to 
stagnation and poverty. The market, on the other hand, causes money to move into 
the most productive areas of the economy. It is true that during this process some 
people loose their jobs. It is equally true that others gain jobs in growing parts of the 
economy. After all, one of the main attractions of less regulated economies, such as 
those of the USA and UK, is precisely the continuously lower rate of unemployment 
than that found among its more regulated Continental competitors. Of course, the
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greatest benefit of a de-regulated economy is the imiovation, increased efficiency and 
economic growth, which make the nations partaking in the global capitalist system 
the richest, healthiest and longest living people the world had ever known. But, even 
some of the supposed friends of the fi'^(3 market camiot conceive of it in terms of
Hayek’s katallaxia.
States exist within an anarchic world. They have no recourse to a global 
govermnent, which can be relied upon to enforce the law. Thus, in order to function, 
international agreements have to rely on the enduring self-interest of the signatories. If 
these signatories perceive the benefits of their continued adherence to an international 
regime to outweigh the costs of breaking away, they will stay in. Alternatively, they 
will leave. All tliis makes international regimes very unstable. This is particularly true 
of trade arrangements, where domestic protectionist pressures often force the 
governments into adopting illiberal economic policies. The recent adoption of steel 
quotas by the USA, for example, flies in the face of the President Bush’s stated goal to 
further the cause of free trade across the globe.2" The alternative, however, would be 
worse, for it would include an intensification of lobbying by protectionist groups. The 
result of this lobbying could well be the defeat of the proposal to grant the President his 
“fast track” negotiating authority. Should Mr Bush fail to obtain it, the cause of free 
trade will be damaged further, for the US Congress will be able to stall new trade 
agreements indefinitely. In other words, compensating for the destructive effects of 
domestic protectionism is not easy. Similarly, making of the international trade 
agreements tighter bears the risk of having no agreements at all.
As Sally argues, the approaches toward trade liberalisation that reflect these 
underlying domestic realities are institutionalism and legalism. Institutional 
liberalisation is an approach which facilitates gradual multi-lateral lifting of trade
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restrictions through the creation of global regimes, such as the WTO. However, its rules 
are an outcome of political compromise and are, therefore, relatively lax. At the heart of 
these political compromises is the desire of the signatories to leave themselves as much 
room for national economic manoeuvring as possible. They aim, so to speak, at 
achieving liberalism abroad and illiberalism at home. Legalistic liberalism, on the other 
hand, is thoroughly uncompromising in its battle against protectionism. Though this is 
good news for the proponents of the free market, the accompanying expansion of the 
legal framework is profoundly anti-katallactic. Thus, wliile in the former case there is a 
danger of dilution of the principles of free hade, in the latter case there is a real potential 
for bureaucratic expansionism. Is there an alternative to this “liberalism from above”?
The authors of the Scottish Enlightenment would find the above approach to 
trade liberalisation strange in the sense that it does not take adequate account of the 
differences in national socio-economic arrangements. For the Scots, “theories of 
international order... [were] predicated very much on the preconditions of national 
order”. In practice, this “liberalisation from below” means that in order for a theory 
of social order to work, both the international and national levels have to agree. In 
the 19llt century, for example, international laissez-faire was mirrored at the domestic 
level. At both levels, in other words, the state interference was minimal. Then, as has
been discussed in the first chapter, came the time of the welfare states. With the 
growth of the state came “inflationary policies and concentrations of political and 
economic power... [which spilled] over into the international economy with balance 
of payments disequilibria and the market-nonconforming interventions of ‘managed 
trade’... [such as] quotas, exchange controls, bilateral clearing anrangements and the 
like”. The two levels fell out of sine and, with time, international laissez-faire 
became illiberal as well. But, because of the effects of globalisation, this joined
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illiberal system came apart. Thus, whilst at the international level there are pressures 
for a greater liberalisation of the market, the illiberal domestic arrangements push the 
world in the opposite direction. It is a “Keynes at home and Smith abroad” situation. 
So, to make international liberalism work properly, a liberal change at the domestic 
level seems necessary. But, how can it be achieved?
Firstly, to use Hayek’s pluase, the rule of men must be replaced with the rule 
of law. As this thesis shows at length, the concept of equality before the law is now 
thoroughly compromised, because of the obsession with material or “substantive” 
equality. National governments promote under-achievement and mediocrity by 
discriminating against over-performing individuals and groups. This unequal 
treatment of persons before the law is immoral, for it makes the social rules subject 
to pressures exercised by the best-connected members of society. But, it is also 
economically distorting, for it makes the fulfilment of the full potential of the most 
able members of the society impossible. Social engineering does not apply only to 
individuals. National governments keep changing market outcomes by their unequal 
treatment of companies. Those companies which are well connected or which can 
convince the political establishment of their “indispensability” receive a variety of 
financial donations and tax breaks. They also get protection from both domestic and 
intemational competitors tlirough the system of licences and import quotas. Labour 
laws and other legislation aimed at the creation of “social cohesion” prevent 
structural adjustments, thus keeping inefficient or obsolete industries operating. 
Therefore, the essential characteristic of a society ruled by law and not by men must 
be the re-establislmnent of a meaningful conception of private property rights, 
including an extensive freedom of contract. The law must “be applied universally 
and impartially to free and equal legal individuals”. Similarly, laws must be “abstract
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and negatively defined, defending the individual's liberties from encroachment by the 
state and other individuals in society, but leaving all other actions not explicitly
mentioned allowable”.27
A minimal government, in other words, is the only way of ensuring the above
“liberalism from below”. Of course, this does not mean that all countries will have to 
jettison “bad” laws and adopt “good” laws at the same time or to the same extent. If
allowed to do so, “liberalism from below” will work in a katallactic fashion.
Countries, which adopt good laws, will be rewarded with increased investment and 
greater prosperity of their people. Countries, which adopt bad laws, will be punished 
by economic stagnation and will thus be forced to change. Globalisation has already 
started doing the above. Tliis should come as no suiprise, for globalisation is a 
spontaneous and unintended development. It is katallaxia at work. Further legislation on 
globalisation, be it for the reason of battling the “excesses” of capitalism or for the 
reason of increasing “equality” will retard this process. Hayek’s dream of a de-regulated 
world, where freedom allows for the emergence of an infinite variety of different 
systems competing for the loyalty of the markets and the people might thus be once 
again postponed.
A final word must be reseiwed for the Cosmopolitans. As Hitler rightly 
recognised, in the sense that it knows no boundaries, capitalism is truly “cosmopolitan”. 
This was one of the reasons, why as a national socialist, he was determined to oppose it. 
Similarly, Marx saw capitalism as cosmopolitan. It was because of the internationalism 
of capital that Marx conceived of the international bourgeoisie and the international 
proletariat. After all, if the oppressive capital was global, so must have been the 
oppressed class of people. But, the capitalist type of cosmopolitanism is profoundly 
different from the one advocated by Held and others. It is, as it has always been, a
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pressure from below; an observable outcome of an infinite number of business 
transactions that individually are almost insignificant, but which together can change 
the world. Held’s Cosmopolitanism is political and as such camiot but impose on the 
society a certain set of predetermined rules. The capitalist type of cosmopolitanism is 
economic. Its result, is an emergence of a society that none intended. It might not be 
a perfect society, but it is a better one.
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